“A Swarm of Ghosts”: Anna Akhmatova’s Russia

 I: The October Epoch 

There is no present — I am proud of the past
And I suffocate from such shame.

Reading Anna Akhmatova’s first two collections of verse it can be difficult to recognise the poet who would later be viewed with such hostility and unease by the Soviet nomenklatura. The sparse, precise love lyrics of Evening (1912) and Rosary (1914) filled with anguish and yearning, frosty mornings and white nights — seem innocuous, apolitical, unworthy of the full arsenal of state suppression. The Bolsheviks, however, took a different view. For the new regime, engaged in a revolutionary struggle for survival, every word that Akhmatova wrote — or didn’t write — had political implications. She would become, for both the Bolsheviks and her readers, the living symbol of a lost prerevolutionary culture and the embodiment of what Svetlana Boym described in The Future of Nostalgia as a “counter-memory” within the Soviet sphere that “laid a foundation of democratic resistance.” Only with the “memory boom” of glasnost and the fall of Soviet Communism would Akhmatova’s work receive full rehabilitation in a reconstituted Russian state with its own use for patriotism, cultural nostalgia, national mythology and the Orthodox Church. 

The October Revolution, for the Bolsheviks, was more than simply a change of regime: it signalled a whole new epoch. The old social system which they had overthrown had its own “official literature” and, as Leon Trotsky put it in Literature and Revolution, the “collapse” of this system “could not but be the collapse of prerevolutionary literature.” There was very little that a poet like Akhmatova could do in this environment other than to leave it or stop writing altogether. The “collapse” that Trotsky described was, in reality, an orchestrated ideological assault on “the literature of individualism” that she embodied, both in her work and in her life, which were largely inseparable. When the Bolsheviks dismissed her as the voice of a “dying class” they neglected to mention that this class was in fact being wiped out by their own agents; in the case of Akhmatova’s husband, the Symbolist poet Nikolai Gumilyov, he was executed by the Petrograd Cheka during the first wave of Bolshevik terror. Although Trotsky did not focus on Akhmatova in his critique of what he called “non-October” literature, she would eventually become the most potent living link to “the culture of Old Russia” partly by the simple fact of having survived most of her contemporaries (her only true rival in this regard being Boris Pasternak). 

Akhmatova’s survival was partly due to her popularity and partly to the fact that she did not directly criticise or openly write about the revolution or the regime, not that this would necessarily be enough to save her reputation or her status within the new communist order. For the Soviet critics, not writing about the revolution, the workers or the collective struggle provided a clear enough reason to condemn her work, if not to actually kill her. But this was not simply a sin of omission: she was also targeted because of the image she presented and the role she created for herself as a public poet. From the Bolshevik point of view, it did not help Akhamtova’s case that her family were land-owning gentry with some very distant and sketchy aristocratic claims, and not only did she fail to disown or hide this, she deliberately wove it into her public identity (Isaiah Berlin described her “distant, somewhat regal manner” and wrote that “she looked and moved like a tragic queen”). This was further aggravated by the elitism of the St. Petersburg intelligentsia, which she partly represented and which was symbolised by the social discrimination enforced by city’s most important cultural institution, the Stray Dog Cafe, as described by the painter and club member Sergei Sudeikin: 

Everyone who entered had to register in an enormous book lying on a lectern in front of a tall red lit candle. The public entered from the courtyard and went through a small door, like going through a needle’s eye. The main door onto the street was opened only for “our crowd.” There were shutters over the windows, and on the shutters fantastic birds were painted. On the wall between the windows I painted Baudelaire’s ‘Flowers of Evil’…Poets, musicians, artists, scholars were admitted free. Everybody else was referred to as “pharmacists,” and what they charged for entrance depended on their appearance and on the mood.

The Bolsheviks had, in general, a deep suspicion of private clubs, societies and cafes: as Svetlana Boym wrote in Common Places: Mythologies of Everyday Life in Russia, the cafe was “a place for conversation, not conversion, a place for minor theatrical revolts, not for revolutions,” “collective in an ideologically incorrect manner, eccentric but in a wrong style, not classless but declasse (if not bourgeois).” By the time she came to compose ‘Poem Without a Hero,’ Akhmatova understood that the Stray Dog crowd, with its tortured love affairs, cult of suicide, literary feuds and decadent masques, had sown the seeds of its own demise in the new social order being constructed by the Bolshevik regime.

In her biography of the poet, Amanda Haight notes that Akhmatova was, by the early 1920s, 

already beginning to be considered as someone connected with the past. In a cultural atmosphere such as that of post-revolutionary Russia, which had its gaze firmly set on the future, this could not but bode ill.

Bolshevik critics would accuse her of being “narrow, petty, boudoir” and writing about nothing except “love from the bedroom to the croquet lawn”; of emerging from a “nest of gentry” and remaining morbidly attached to the old culture of the estates and nobility. As early as 1923, the doctrinaire Soviet literary critic Grigory Lelevich would lay down the party line, linking her poetic themes to her class identity: “Akhmatova’s poetry is a small and beautiful fragment of aristocratic culture,” he wrote in the Soviet literary journal On Guard

The circle of emotions open to the poetess is exceptionally limited. She has responded to the social upheavals, basically the most important phenomenon of our time, in a feeble and, at that, hostile manner. There is no broad sweep of vision or depth of understanding in Akhmatova’s world

This was, in primitive form, the argument that Trotsky would apply to “non-October” literature a year later: the hostile or inadequate response of the Russian intelligentsia to the revolution would condemn them not only on political but aesthetic grounds. Thus, Blok could only be saved by his poem of October, ‘The Twelve’. (Trotsky at least had the taste to recognise that the more “political” Mayakovsky’s poems became, the worse they got.) 

It was also the core of the argument recycled by Stalin’s Central Committee Secretary Andrei Zhdanov in 1946, at the beginning of Akhmatova’s second long period of suppression. “Acmeists, like the Symbolists, Decadents, and other trumpeters of aristocratic-bourgeois ideology, were the propagators of decadence, pessimism, and a belief in the other world,” Zhdanov thundered in a report to the Leningrad branch of the Union of Soviet Writers that would confirm Akhmatova’s expulsion from the official cultural life of the state: 

Akhmatova’s themes are completely individualistic. The range of her poetry is so limited as to seem poverty-stricken…The basis of her poetry is made up of amatory erotic themes, interwoven with themes of sadness, longing, death, mysticism, and doom. The feeling of doom is one we can expect to find in the social consciousness of the dying group. The gloomy tones of hopelessness before death, mystic experiences intermingled with eroticism this is the spiritual world of Akhmatova, a left-over from the old aristocratic culture which has sunk once and for all into the oblivion of the ‘good old days of Catherine’…Akhmatova’s work belongs to the distant past; it is alien to modern Soviet reality and cannot be tolerated on the pages of our magazines…

In some ways, there was little that Akhmatova could do to counter this other than stay silent — much of the Bolshevik critique was, after all, true. These were things she could not deny or renounce without sacrificing her integrity or identity. (Mayakovsky would eventually face the same problem and resolve it by committing suicide.) She could hardly object to being linked to a cultural past that was central to her poetic vision and the themes and images of her work. The poetry of Evening and Rosary was alien to the new Soviet reality and could not exist in any other way. 

There was an important symbolism in the fact that Zhdanov delivered his judgement of Akhmatova in her spiritual home, the old city of St. Petersburg, haunted by the ghosts of Blok and Mandelstam, the Poet’s Guild and the Stray Dog. Even now, Zhdanov felt the need to bury the Russian Silver Age, which remained within living memory and still existed as an abstract threat, an apparition, a dangerous spirit. While Akhmatova lived and while her work was read, this spirit had a tangible medium. In fact, as Zhdanov wrote and delivered his Leningrad report, Akhmatova was beginning to compose her own tribute to the “non-October” Petersburg writers and artists who had been ridiculed, erased, exiled or murdered by the Bolshevik regime: an epic poema, written in defiance of the October Epoch, to commemorate and ultimately condemn her generation.  

 II: The Death of Europe 

Two wars, my generation,
Lit your terrible path.

This “generation” was both the pre-war Petersburg intelligentsia to which Akhmatova belonged and all of the Russians who came of age during the first decade of the twentieth century and lived through two wars and three revolutions. They shared the same experiences that her poems documented: this was, at least, the assumption, or conceit, that was necessary to make them work. 

‘History’ was, for Akhmatova, experienced as a series of shocks: the ‘Bloody Sunday’ of 1905; the July crisis and declaration of war in 1914; the Gorlice-Tarnów offensive; the October Revolution; the Yezhov Terror; the Nazi assault on Leningrad. The destruction of the Russian naval fleet at Tsushima at the end of the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 was, Akhmatova recalled, “a shock that lasted my whole life, and since it was the first one, it was especially terrible.” Amanda Haight comments that “coming as she did from a naval family, this senseless destruction struck her closely,” but the defeat had a wider significance: it fed into the general sense of crisis and despair that led directly to mutiny on the Battleship Potemkin, a portent of the revolutions to come and a founding myth of the Soviet state. 

In ‘The Way of all the Earth,’ Akhmatova’s “great requiem for oneself” and for “old Europe,” Tsushima is considered an epochal stage in the unravelling of a continental civilisation: 

The bird-cherry tree
Stole past like a dream.
And somebody said: “Tsushima!”
On the telephone.
Swiftly, swiftly
The era ends:
The Viking and the Korean 
Sailed to the East…
There, like a swallow, hovers
The old pain…

This is the defining moment in Russian — and therefore European — history: both an end and a beginning. What follows is the disintegration of empire and the “Januarys and Julys” of revolution and world war:

Trenches, trenches
You could lose your way!
Of old Europe
A scrap remains,
Where in clouds of smoke
Towns burn…

The significance of Tsushima as the herald of an apocalyptic conflagration — the annihilation of an era — is partly in Akhmatova’s own mind. The tragedy of the Russian fleet affects her personally, disturbing her own sense of security and becoming the harbinger of even greater tragedies to come. Significantly, it has its place among the “swarm of ghosts” in ‘Poem Without a Hero’ (“The phantom of Tsushima’s hell/Is here as well”), Akhmatova’s final reckoning with those “shades from the year 1913,” the spirits of old St. Petersburg and prerevolutionary Russia. This was not simply a national tragedy or a family trauma, although it was both of these. For Akhmatova, Tsushima and the great wars and revolutions that followed cast a shadow over her own past, her childhood memories of summers spent on the Black Sea, and darkened, threatened, her vocation as a poet, while also giving it new meaning:

Now the ridge of the Crimea
Grows dark.
And I am leading a flock
Of my own mourners. 

If the awareness of “leading a flock” was absent from Evening and Rosary then it had started to emerge by the time of the First World War and the October Revolution. While her estranged husband Nikolai Gumilyov was an enthusiastic and patriotic cavalry officer and a bitter opponent of both 1917 revolutions, Akhmatova was initially more hesitant and apprehensive in the face of war and as a witness to the political and social experiments unfolding all around her. White Flock (1916) contained the first poems that registered the chasm that had opened in time as Akhmatova began to divine the unstable, brutal future of a country about to be cut off from its own past. In ‘July 1914’ she writes:

The sun has become God’s displeasure,
Rain has not sprinkled the fields since Easter.
A one-legged stranger came along
And all alone in the courtyard he said:

“Fearful times are drawing near. Soon 
Fresh graves will be everywhere.
There will be famine, earthquakes, widespread death,
And the eclipse of the sun and the moon.

Months into the war, before Russian imperial forces had faced any significant defeats or reversals, Akhmatova could sense the catastrophes to come; already, she is writing into existence the “Russian earth” that “loves, loves/Droplets of blood,” a scorched landscape that “smells of burning” peat, under a dead, silent sky (“the birds have not even sung today”). But this is not yet a song of total surrender or despair:

But the enemy will not divide
Our land at will, for himself:
The Mother of God will spread her white mantle
Over this enormous grief.”

The Russian patriot, Orthodox poet, Cassandra and “voice of the many” slowly begin to emerge (and merge) out of the ruin and chaos of war. Akhmatova’s war poems reveal a developing sense of her historic role, a self-conscious assumption of responsibility that culminates in the public testimony of ‘Requiem’ and the declaration contained in ‘To the Many’ (1922):

I am your voice, the warmth of your breath,
I am the reflection of your face,
The futile trembling of futile wings,
I am with you to the end, in any case.

In May 1915, the same month that the Russian army was routed in the Gorlice-Tarnów offensive, Akhmatova intones a “prayer” that “the stormcloud over darkened Russia/might become a cloud of glorious rays.” By the summer of 1916 this hope has been extinguished. Instead, she commemorates the final day of a dead era: 

We aged a hundred years, and this
Happened in a single hour…

 …The shadows of passion and songs vanished from my memory.
The Most High ordered it emptied  
To become a grim book of calamity.

‘In Memoriam, July 19, 1914’ is Akhmatova’s elegy for a lost world: it is a retrospective acknowledgment of the passing of a threshold, a point of no return. The war, for Akhmatova, begins and ends as a national tragedy; there is no glory or romance, and if anything can be salvaged it is the survival of the Russian people as a people. Important as this is, the loss is irreparable. What Akhmatova loses is the concept, so precious to the Petersburg intellectuals, of Russia as a European nation: distinct and exceptional, no doubt, but part of a historic civilisational project. It is a threat to the vision, the self-conception, in which she follows in the footsteps of Pushkin and Dante. The ruin of the monarchy and the society of the aristocracy, the assault on the culture of Old Russia and the Bolshevik’s erasure of the past, the critical eclipse of the European imagination of St. Petersburg: all of this strikes at the root of her understanding of the world and herself.

The war poems of White Flock and Plantain (1921) do not simply regret the defeat of her nation, then: they mourn a past that is social, cultural, civilisational and personal. Akhmatova’s own grief represents the grief of a generation: 

Inside me still, like a song of grief,
Is the last winter before the war.

Whiter than the vaults of Smolny Cathedral,
More mysterious than the splendid Summer Garden
It was. We didn’t know that soon
We would be looking back at it in exquisite pain.

This “we” merges Akhmatova’s own experiences with those of her friends, lovers and rivals in the St. Petersburg of her memory and a Russian people who would soon be silenced and exploited by a new imperial autocracy. For this reason, it may well constitute the most serious and subtle challenge to the Bolshevik worldview in all of her work. Describing the shift from ‘I’ to ‘we’ that occurred in Akhmatova’s poetry at this time, Haight notes that “only because this ‘we’ was not the one favoured by the Marxist critics the shift was largely ignored or taken to refer to a very small group of people.” It is clear, however, that Akhmatova meant to apply the pronoun more broadly than the regime would ever acknowledge: to the “many” Russians, patriotic or not, Orthodox or not, who would be classified as “masses” or “classes” or “enemies” by the Bolsheviks. As “decades file by” (“Tortures, exiles and deaths,” Akhmatova laments in ‘Poem Without a Hero, “I can’t sing/in the midst of this horror”) so the shadows of this “we” draw longer and become more crowded. Generational, national, local, unspoken, suppressed, betrayed, valorised, defeated, awarded a final if deferred victory by the record of her poems: Akhmatova’s Russian generation is both a figment of her imagination and a real collective body that responds to her work and sustains her reputation. 

Like Mayakovsky and Blok, Akhmatova was a consummate myth-maker, and the greatest myth that she made was herself. This would be elevated beyond the narcissism of the Stray Dog years by a procession of historical tragedies that gave Akhmatova the opportunity to entwine the narrative of her own life with that of her Russian and Petersburgian generation. Her role as a living symbol of the prerevolutionary culture was the very thing that the Bolsheviks attacked her for. During the lifetime of the Soviet Union she represented what Boym described as an alternative, “unofficial” or oppositional culture in the Communist bloc that became, once again, in the case of Akhmatova, Russian culture following the fall of Communism. Beyond a certain point she could only choose to accept and embody a national cause that was at odds with the Soviet conception of history. To do otherwise would be to abandon her vocation. Her biography does not identify a moment when this choice was made. As we have seen, she had already conceived this role before the events of October: the image had been burnished and her prophetic and collective voice developed and tested. Everything that happened afterwards served to confirm and enlarge the scope of her responsibility to the Russian people and the victims of the Stalin regime.   

Akhmatova’s sense of her own historic role was therefore vast and potentially unlimited. Even her silence had significance for the fate of her people. “I have been silent, silent for thirty years,” she writes in ‘Northern Elegies,’ yet another of her fractured, autobiographical epics:

My silence can be heard everywhere.
It fills the courtroom,
And it could have drowned out 
The roar of rumor, and like a miracle
It puts its stamp on everything.
It is part of everything. 

Her poetry had begun with the neoclassical purity of the Acmeist creed in Rosary and Evening, but the apparent impersonality of this style had barely disguised the theatrically and the dramatic effects that went into the construction of her public image, both in the poems and in her personal life. The overlap was, in many ways, complete. Her role as a “voice” for others was simply an extension of this: a conception of the self as a poetic performance supplemented or enhanced by the responsibilities and demands of her historic destiny. She purposefully stepped onto the national stage in a way that other poets of her generation did not, could not, or were stopped from doing, unless they agreed to do the work of the Union of Soviet Writers. As Isaiah Berlin observed, she had a “dramatic, at times visionary sense of reality” that seemed to separate and even disqualify her from fully participating in Soviet reality. When they met, in St. Petersburg in 1945, “she seemed to see in me a fateful, perhaps doom-laden messenger of the end of the world — a tragic intimation of the future,” an impression partly confirmed by her reference to it in ‘Poem Without a Hero’:

Long enough I have frozen in fear,
          Better to summon a Bach Chaconne
                    And behind it will enter a man,
He will not be a beloved husband to me
          But what we accomplish, he and I,
                    Will disturb the Twentieth Century.

The immediate outcome of this meeting was Akhmatova’s expulsion from the Writer’s Union and the re-arrest of her son. This was serious and traumatic enough in itself, but, for Akhmatova, it held even greater significance. As Berlin recalled, she considered herself to be a key factor in the start of the Cold War, the secret link between Acmeism and ICBMs: 

 …in her view we that is, she and I inadvertently, by the mere fact of our meeting, had started the Cold War and thereby changed the history of mankind. She meant this quite literally; and, as Amanda Haight testifies in her book, was totally convinced of it, and saw herself and me as world historical personages chosen by destiny to begin a cosmic conflict…

 Berlin only slightly exaggerates. Haight writes the following:

There was a direct link, she was convinced, between their meeting and the beginning of the Cold War. Stalin by this time was subject to irrational furies often sparked off by seemingly insignificant occurrences. Akhmatova never claimed that this was the only cause of the Cold War but, whereas the 1925 ban had been a secret affair, for the most part only affecting her personally, now the ban was entirely public with endless repercussions both in the Soviet Union and abroad. If, as she was convinced, this had been caused by her meeting with Berlin, then what had seemed part of their personal lives was in fact part of history…

Even Akhmatova’s friends could only recall this with mild or amusement or pity, but it was the conviction that she was an active agent in a grand national and human drama that gave her poetry its cultural and historic power, a point Berlin tacitly acknowledged, in his own backhanded way, when he remarked:

I could not protest that she had perhaps, even if the reality of Stalin’s violent fit of anger and of its possible consequences were allowed for, somewhat overestimated the effect of our meeting on the destinies of the world, since she would have felt this as an insult to her tragic image of herself as Cassandra indeed, to the historico-metaphysical vision which informed so much of her poetry.

This “historico-metaphysical vision” was the construction of an aesthetic and personal identity that did not just inform her poetry, but also her life; this is what she learnt from the Symbolists, or what made her, in many ways, a Symbolist herself (as Haight notes, she “quoted with pride the critic Viktor Zhirmunsky’s statement that the ‘Poem Without a Hero’ was the fulfillment of the Symbolists’ dream”). She did not simply adopt or accept her role as a “voice of the many”: she created it. It became a credible reality because of the power of her own imagination, ego and talent, and was accepted at face value by so many for the very same reasons. Haight, discussing the composition (or accretion) of ‘Poem without a Hero,’ writes that, “working from the position of the Acmeist through life and experience into a deeper understanding of the language of the living symbol, she could not only set her early life in the larger context of her country’s fate, but also in that of world literature.” It was Nikolai Gumilyov who had first created the image of Akhmatova as “a living symbol,” but it seems clear that this was a persona that she cultivated for herself. She was a “living symbol” for the Bolsheviks too — which showed the danger in playing this game and the courage required to play it — and for them she symbolised an old, decayed, aristocratic, bourgeois, European and Russian Orthodox cultural and social order that their revolution had dedicated itself to destroying and replacing. 

As a response to the collapse of the world that had shaped her, Akhmatova identified and then chose to embody an Orthodox Russian spirit; at the same time, she began to see herself as the custodian and symbol of a Russian culture that had grown out of an imperial power that also saw itself as a European power. If the destruction of Europe had destroyed this power, then it had left untouched, in its essentials, the historical Russian geist that could still be found in its folk tales, legends, myths, land and people. 

III: “Shades from the year 1913”

 As the future ripens in the past
   So the past rots in the future
        A terrible festival of dead leaves.

Akhmatova completed two more volumes of poetry before the Soviet censors silenced her for the first time: Plantain (1921) and Anno Domini MCMXXI (1922). Like her previous books these were collections of poems that were simultaneously dated and arranged in non-chronological order. Akhmatova’s sense of time was always exact, personal, sensitive and non-linear: a poetic time, combining memory, mythology, history, and immediate experience that would find its true form in ‘Poem Without a Hero.’ 

These were the first post-October books and they were (in Trotsky’s schema) both non-October and anti-October works. The 1917 revolutions, whatever their initial potential and promise, were now clearly viewed as part of a continuum of destruction and collapse running from Tsushima to the Bolshevik coup d’etat. For Akhmatova, the revolution was never betrayed; from early on, from, at least, the moment of Gumilyov’s execution, she was in the enemy camp. She didn’t need to write explicit anti-Bolshevik verse or to go into exile for the Bolsheviks to know this or to make her meaning clear to her readers. If there was one reason why she was against the Bolsheviks then it was, like Solzhenitsyn after her, precisely because of their war on culture. In the 1920s, this was a war on the immediate past. If they attacked the Symbolists and the Acmeists and all her friends in Petersburg then they also, in effect, attacked Pushkin, Gogol and Dostoevsky. A key element of the Soviet cultural blitzkrieg was an assault on the idea of St. Petersburg itself. “Zhdanov’s attack on Akhmatova…had a distinct anti-Petersburgian flavour and targeted directly the persistence of the Petersburg myth,” Svetlana Boym writes in The Future of Nostalgia. “The last wave of the great terror of 1949 to 1953 hit the city particularly hard.” 

This was the wave that Akhmatova believed that she had triggered by her meeting with Berlin, “the man from the future” who would wander in and out of ‘Poem Without a Hero.’ There was, in fact, some foundation to her paranoia. Zhadnov had, after all, made a special journey to Leningrad in order to denounce her. That denunciation itself was no casual affair: it was both a revival and summation of the Bolshevik case against her. The “St. Petersburg myth” was at the heart of this case: Akhmatova was not only a “living symbol” of the past, or a “dying class,” or a group of murdered or exiled poets, but of an old artistic tradition that viewed itself and Russia as part of the cultural civilisation of Europe. There is a way in which the Bolshevik revolution could be seen as the culmination of Russian Europeanism: an internationalist ideology founded on German and French texts and incubated in Switzerland and Petrograd that dissolved an autocratic, Orthodox empire. But this was not necessarily how the Bolsheviks themselves saw it: they drew on the resources of this world in order to overturn it. Their revolution was the result of the disintegration of the Old European civilization upon which Peter the Great’s tradition of ‘Europeanism’ had been founded and that the intellectuals and artists of Petersburg admired and emulated. Their own small city “civilisation” would not survive its extinction intact.  

The Bolsheviks did two things to defenestrate St. Petersburg-Petrograd and neuter its myth: first, they gave it a new name, Leningrad, which served to subordinate it to their own ideological identity; second, they moved the seat of government to Moscow thereby denying it any symbolic or political power. As Boym writes, “the move was due not merely to reasons of military strategy but also to a new geopolitical imagination that placed the heartland of Russian absolutism, not the marginal European city, at the centre of postrevolutionary Bolshevik ideology.” But, in the end, this backfired: “it is precisely at the time when Petrograd-Leningrad stopped being the capital of the Russian empire and lost its political importance to Moscow that the Petersburg myth acquired a new life, becoming a spiritual retreat of Soviet outsiders, a place where a nostalgia for world culture was possible.” (It is significant that Boym gets this last phrase from Osip Mandelstam, a key symbolic figure of the Silver Age alongside Blok and Akhmatova.) The old Petersburg was progressively erased by the new Leningrad, partly due to the ravages of war and largely due to deliberate Soviet policies, but it continued to contain and protect and incubate, deep within itself, the “alternative culture” and “countermemory” that Boym credits for fatally undermining the Communist regimes. Akhmatova, remaining in the city, was the living link between the Silver Age and the new generations of Petersburg poets — among them ‘Akhamtova’s Orphans’ Joseph Brodsky, Anatoly Naiman, Dmitry Bobyshev and Yevgeny Rein — who would make a conscious attempt to keep this old literary and cultural tradition alive. Her poetry was the golden thread that linked the prerevolutionary Russian imagination of Petersburg to the “memory boom” of glasnost, “where there was almost as much euphoria about the past as there was about the future.” This “euphoria” was the result of the liberation of memory, but it was an emotion that was alien to Akhmatova’s own work, in which memory was always ambiguous or dangerous and the past a source of regret and pain as much as nostalgia and longing. Akhmatova knew what had been lost and did not live to see it reclaimed. 

In ‘Northern Elegies’ Akhmatova evoked “Dostoevsky’s Russia” and the St. Petersburg of Pushkin, Turgenev, Nekrasov, Anna Karenina and the Stile Moderne. The intention was autobiographical and the city and its culture closely woven into the fabric of her life as she saw it. The myth of Petersburg therefore had a role in her own myth; in some way, the poems suggest, they could not be separated. In her unfinished memoir, she writes 

the first (lower) layer for me is the Petersburg of the 90s, the Petersburg of Dostoevsky. It was dressed from head to foot in tasteless signboards underwear, corsets, hats, without any greenery, without grass, without flowers; drums were beating continuously, thus always recalling capital punishment; French was spoken and there were grandiose funeral processions along the thoroughfares described by Mandelstam.

This is the “prehistory” that makes up the first elegy which documents the texture of a city that would soon become a different place, the Leningrad of the seventh elegy: brutalised by war, revolution and tyranny and condemned to silence (“It is deforming my fate/It almost devoured my soul”). Like ‘Poem Without a Hero,’ ‘Northern Elegies’ (in its final edit) owes a debt to Eliot’s ‘Four Quartets’ in its sense of time (“I am aware of beginnings and endings/And life after the end…”) but where Akhmatova breaks from Eliot is in her understanding of the individual as an agent in a collective experience of history. She assigned herself — and the ‘poet’ — a public role and a moral duty that would strike a discordant note with Eliot’s more abstract and impersonal persona. The elegies once again place her personal history in a wider narrative, from the immersive cultural and physical memories of the first elegy to those cries of anguish, the fifth (‘About the 1910’s’), sixth (“Everything has changed: the people, the objects, the walls”) and seventh (“…I have been silent, silent for thirty years…”). To be born at this moment, in this place, was both a blessing and a curse; but, in a sense, it was the people born at this time who made it so (a theme that recurs, in starker and more pitiless form, in ‘Poem Without a Hero’). There was nothing random or accidental about any of it:

This is when we decided to be born,
And timing it perfectly
So as not to miss any of those pageants
Yet to come…

Unlike Tolstoy, Akhmatova had no fully developed theory of history but her poems do express an instinctive feel for the interplay between the impersonal forces of history and the destiny of the individual; it is not systematic, but mythic and tragic (“Soon I will need a lyre,” she writes in Part Two of ‘Poem Without a Hero,’ “But that of Sophocles, not Shakespeare/At the threshold stands — Destiny”). It was her fate to be both victim and perpetrator, spectator and actor. ‘Northern Elegies,’ in its own fragmented, elliptical way, tells the story of life that has been stolen and then reclaimed in a new form: 

I, like a river, 
Was rechanneled by this stern age.
They gave me a substitute life. It began to flow
In a different course, passing the other one,
And I do not recognise my banks.

Fate, responsibility and history are finally and fully confronted in Akhmatova’s most important work, ‘Poem Without a Hero.’ Unlike ‘The Way of the Earth’ and ‘Northern Elegies,’ there are no real traces of nostalgia in this poem: it is a stark reckoning with the past. The poet is haunted by “a swarm of ghosts,” those “shades from the year 1913”: Blok, the critic Mikhail Kuzmin (“the most elegant Satan”), the dancer Olga Glebova-Sudeikina and her tragic lover Vsevolod Knyazev (whose suicide is one of the pivots of the poem). Akhmatova describes how the first verses of Part One “came to me…on the night of December 27, 1940” (“I did not summon it…”) and the poem never seemed to leave her ever again: she returned to it, editing, adding, rewriting until her death in 1962. The poem itself was a kind of haunting, or even a possession.

‘Poem Without a Hero’ was about Akhmatova and her friends and what their Petersburg lives in 1913 ultimately led to: not what they did so much as what they allowed to happen; what, as a result of their vanity and egotism, they thought they could ignore, or control, or exploit. “The Petersburg delivtry” of the Stray Dog generation would, in the end, prove to be a fatal distraction, a disastrous abnegation of responsibility. As Nancy Anderson wrote in her study The Word That Causes Death’s Defeat: 

In ‘Requiem,’ Akhamtova appears as the representative of a “guiltless Russia” that suffers cruel and incomprehensible torments. But in ‘Poem Without a Hero’ she appears as the representative of a guilty generation, a generation that allowed its artistic brilliance to mask a moral failure. 

Looking back from the ruin and terror of 1940, Akhmatova saw what she did not, or could not, see then:

Death is somewhere near, evidently,
          But thoughtless, shameless, nonchalant,
                    The masqueraders babble on… 

If there is one thing worse than surveying the spectacle of the past in the ruins of the present, it is having to confront your younger self:

But I am afraid: I myself will enter
          And not removing my lace shawl,
                    I will smile at them all and fall silent.
I don’t want to meet again
          The woman I was then…

In ‘Chapter Three’ (Petersburg 1913) the city itself seems to bear responsibility for its own destruction and for its spiritual and moral blindness to the advancing danger:

the whole mournful city floated
Toward some mysterious goal
With the Neva’s current or against it
Only away from its graves 
The Galernaya arch darkened,
In the Summer Garden the weathervane squealed,
And the silver crescent moon brightly chilled
Over the Silver Age.
Because along all the roads
Because towards all the thresholds
A shadow was slowly advancing

Rather than facing the reality of the present and the future, “under Tsaritsa Avdotia’s curse/Dostoevskian and possessed/the city withdrew into the mist.” Like Berlin in 1934, Petersburg could not summon the spiritual strength or the moral clarity to save itself, or forestall its doom, a turn of events for which Akhmatova held everybody who ever claimed to represent or love the city responsible, including herself:

As before an execution, the drum rolled…
And ever-present in the freezing, prewar,
Lecherous, terrible, stifling air,
Lurked an incomprehensible rumble…
But then it was barely audible,
It scarcely reached the ear
And it sank into the snowdrifts by the Neva.
Just as in the mirror of a horrific night
A man is possessed and does not want 
To recognise himself
Along the legendary embankment
The real not the calendar
Twentieth Century draws near.

The charges made by Akhmatova in ‘Poem Without a Hero’ were as unforgiving in their own way as those made by Trotsky and Zhdanov. The Bolsheviks accused the Symbolists and the Acmeists of ignoring reality — the reality that was the revolution — and paying the inevitable and appropriate price. From the other shore, Akhmatova levelled the same accusation: their disconnection from reality, their vanity and their decadence led directly to the destruction of their own society and their city.  

 IV: The Past that Refused to Die 

I will preserve the past in my home,
On the past I will secretly work a charm.

As Svetlana Boym noted in The Future of Nostalgia (published in 2001) Soviet Leningrad was “the city of Vladimir Putin, for whom the Big House, the proverbial KGB building, was as important a landmark as the Winter Palace.” What she meant by this was that Leningrad was the city that created Putin, rather than the St. Petersburg of Akhmatova, Mandelstam and Blok. The Soviet Union had shaped his imagination, but, as in many other cases, what actually came out of this experience was a commitment to Russian imperialism rather than international communism.  

Boym writes that the “grassroots Petersburg nostalgia” and the “large-scale revival of the interest in the city” had grown out of the economic and political stagnation of late-period Leningrad. It was therefore, by implication, a reaction to the failure of the entire Soviet project and the creation of an alternative reality that would eventually become an escape route.

This was by no means limited to intellectuals and writers; it was not simply a matter of wounded pride but a way of cultivating a different kind of civic conscience. The interest in Petersburg history opened up an alternative mapping of the city against the official excursions and Soviet grids.

This was Petersburg as an underground dream metropolis built on traces of the past and existing in silent opposition to the “official” city: what Boym called “Leningradian Petersburg…a city within a city.” “The new generation of Leningrad youth — the first ones born and educated in the Soviet Union — did not remember Petersburg culture,” she writes:

For the poets of Akhmatova’s generation, Petersburg was the “Noah’s Ark” of their past and their cultural belongings. For the postwar generation, Petersburg was the site of memory that wasn’t their own. Petersburg had to be commemorated because it no longer existed.

This “commemoration” was a form of what Boym describes as “reflective nostalgia,” a nostalgia that is “more about the individual and cultural memory” than “restorative nostalgia” which “evokes national past and future.” The “new Petersburgians didn’t naturally inherit the culture; rather, they took it over, by sheer contiguity and coexistence in space that they endowed with great illusionistic potential.” This “illusion” was creative and ironic, “inconclusive and fragmentary” and “aware of the gap between identity and resemblance,” which was fitting for a city that had always been something of a masquerade, a place with a fractured and shifting self-image. 

The newly christened Saint Petersburg to which Putin returned in 1991 was another place altogether: a city defined by its wild sea port (crucible of the 1905 and 1917 revolutions) as much as its fading avenues and boulevards, Art Nouveau facades and cultural heritage; a regional capital that was simultaneously secret and official, governed by an underground alliance between the mayor’s City Hall and the Tambov gang. Like Akhmatova, Putin was made by Petersburg — but this was a new post-Soviet Saint Petersburg that he also helped to shape and which, like Leningrad before it, ultimately threatened to erase Akhmatova’s city forever. “In the late 1990s,” Boym writes, “Petersburg was frequently called the capital of crime, rife with mafia-style groups (now dubbed “violent entrepreneurships”) with Petersburgian names such as Northern Palmyra. Good old Peter and the mythical free Petersburg are now buried under layers of dust.” This was Putin’s city, remodeled by the links formed between state actors and organised crime during the post-Soviet period, a model of power that would have wider applications  — and implications  — when he became Russian president. 

But if Putinism in its local form was a threat to the city and culture of Akhmatova, then the national project that would begin to take shape during his second term could still find a place for her poetry. The key development of the Putin Era has been the return of imperial history: a renewed interest in the work of the White emigres and Russian nationalist writers and the promotion of the concept of the ‘Russian World’ that would come to underpin the geopolitical ambitions of Putin’s administrations. This was an ideological rehabilitation of a past that had long been beyond the pale; even the glasnost and post-Soviet “memory boom” had confined these legacies to the nationalist margins. In the early years of the twenty first century Putin and his advisers and the ex-KGB siloviki who had risen to power with him internalised a neo-imperialist ideology that absorbed aspects of Pan-Slavism and Eurasianism. Like Akhmatova, Putin developed a cultural, linguistic and spiritual conception of Russian identity that did not recognise the separate national aspirations of Ukraine and Belarus. ‘The Russian World’ would be both an organic national entity — “one people” forming “a single whole” across the former Rus territories — and a multi-ethnic empire with a civilisational mission: a “historico-metaphysical vision” (to paraphrase Berlin) applied to statecraft. Restorative nostalgia with global ambition. 

This “vision” was defined by and rooted in a contested and semi-mythical national past. Putin did not just draw on Russian history for inspiration: it was central to the construction of his personal and geopolitical mission. In ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’ — an essay published on the Kremlin website in July 2021 and correctly interpreted as the theoretical foundation for the actual attempt to re-annex Ukraine — Putin sharply criticised the Bolsheviks for their “efforts to detach Russia from its historical territories” which he viewed as part of their ultimate goal of dissolving nation states and the history and traditions on which they were founded. “The Bolsheviks treated the Russian people as inexhaustible material for their social experiments,” he wrote:

They dreamt of a world revolution that would wipe out national states. That is why they were so generous in drawing borders and bestowing territorial gifts. It is no longer important what exactly the idea of the Bolshevik leaders who were chopping the country into pieces was. We can disagree about minor details, background and logics behind certain decisions. One fact is crystal clear: Russia was robbed…

This was a rejection of the same doctrine that would condemn Akhmatova as a “living symbol” of a dead past that the Bolsheviks were trying to erase and replace. It was the ideology of this regime and its elite that was at fault (“a world revolution that would wipe out national states”), both Putin and Akhmatova claimed, rather than the nation itself or the people in it. “Communism vividly demonstrated its inaptitude for sound development, dooming our country to steadily lag behind economically advanced countries,” Putin declared in a speech delivered on the eve of his first presidency: “it was a road to a blind alley, far away from the mainstream of civilisation.” Within the space of a few years, having been snubbed by the key powers of the West, he would go further and see himself as destined to revive and safeguard a Pan-Slavic, Orthodox civilisation instead: all things with deep roots in Russian history that the Bolsheviks considered mortal enemies of their own anti-historical, anti-nationalist project. It is significant that in rejecting this project and definitively detaching it from Russian identity, Putin and his inner circle would find inspiration and recourse in the White side of the Russian Civil War. From Ivan III to Catherine the Great to Ivan Illich to Putin, this was a resurrection of the national narrative that the Bolsheviks had tried to end. Putin chose to serve an eternal Russian: the same people with their distinct history and culture that Akhmatova had addressed in her own poetry. The religious and national loyalties that she had been condemned for holding in the 1920s were now being promoted by the Russian state of the 2020s. (It is a peculiar irony — and testament to the complexity of Putin’s position — that he did not reject all of the Soviet legacy: as Boym was early to point out, the Putin years would also be characterised by cultural nostalgia for the Soviet era and a reluctance to examine or even open the archives.) 

Akhmatova’s patriotism had always been at the root of her popular appeal inside Russia. This was, to some extent, a different Akhmatova to the St. Petersburg dissident adopted by the exiles as one of their own. She did not necessarily see any distinction between her Russian and Petersburgian loyalties, but neither did she fully accept the image or expectations that these emigres created for her. They had ultimately made a choice that she rejected and her refusal to leave Russia became a central part of her own overlapping public and poetic identity inside the country itself. She had made an early connection between loyalty to the nation and refusal to leave, even when that nation had been effectively abolished by its new rulers. The October Revolution and its brutal aftermath triggered an exodus of writers and artists that seemed irresistible, and yet, very publicly, she had resisted:

A voice came to me. It called out comfortingly
It said, “Come here,
Leave your deaf and sinful land,
Leave Russia forever.
I will wash the blood from your hands,
Root out the black shame from your heart,
With a new name I will conceal
The pain of defeats and injuries.”
But calmly and indifferently,
I covered my ears with my hands,
So that my sorrowing spirit
Would not be stained by those shameful words.

What she found here, by declaring fidelity to her nation, was a public voice, and the most important discovery that she made was that so many Russians responded to it, even as the Bolsheviks tried to undermine, subordinate or exploit the concepts of Russian identity and loyalty to the nation. Both the exiles and the Bolsheviks, in their different ways and for different reasons, had suggested that the Russia they had all known had run its course as an ideal, an idea, and, finally a reality; all that was left was a new start, in a foreign country or a new communist society at home (a foreign country of a different kind).

But it was precisely this denial or disavowal of the Russian nation that Akhmatova refused to accept. The severity with which she described the psychological and moral condition of exile and her condemnation of those who chose it was partly explained by her view of it as the physical and spiritual rejection of Russia itself. Akhmatova, in stark contrast, would rather die in her country, she told Isaiah Berlin, “no matter what horrors are in store.” To do anything else was considered a moral abdication that was the result of a spiritual sickness. “I am not one of those who abandoned their land,” she wrote in July 1922: “to me the exile is forever pitiful/Like a prisoner, like someone ill.” “But here,” she later declared, on behalf of those who stayed and suffered:

 …in the blinding smoke of the conflagration
Destroying what’s left of youth,
We have not deflected from ourselves
One single stroke.

To stay loyal to your nation was to stay true to yourself: this was a moral choice. But, in 1919 and 1922, even in 1940, the nation was not the ideology or the leader or the regime; at least, they did not mean the same thing for Akhmatova. 

Akhmatova’s Russia was a land, a language, a culture, and a spirit. In the judgement of Berlin, her “deep patriotism was not tinged by nationalism,” and this was largely because she did not view the Russian “soul” through the lens of state ideology or power. In 1935, she spoke of “innocent Russia” writhing “under bloody boots,” a collective body and a spiritual space under brutal psychic and physical attack by a pitiless regime imposing an alien ideology on the Russian people. In ‘Petrograd 1919,’ she recalled “the lakes, the steppes, the towns/And the dawns of our great native land” that “confined to this savage capital” she had “forgotten forever.” In the 1961 poem ‘Native Land,’ the nation found its true expression not in nationalist ideology, military glory, banners, flags or uniforms, but in the connection between the people and the “mud,” “grit” and “dust” — literally the “soil” — of the Russian earth:

We don’t wear her on our breast in cherished amulets,
We don’t, with wrenching sobs, write verse about her.
She does not disturb our bitter sleep,
Nor seem to us the promised paradise.
We have not made her, in our souls,
An object to be brought or sold.
Suffering, sick, wandering over her,
We don’t even remember her.
Yes, for us it’s the mud on galoshes,
Yes, for us it’s the grit in our teeth.
And we grind, and we kneed, and we crumble
This clean dust.
But we lie in her and we become her,
And because of that we freely call her — our own.

This is the authentic voice of the Akhmatova who, in 1915 and 1916, lamented the fate of the grieving mothers and their sons who had been killed on the Russian front while her husband wore his own “cherished amulet” to fight the imperial cause with enthusiasm. Gumilyov had surrendered himself to a form of state patriotism that, in Akhmatova’s view, brought only destruction and drenched the Russian soil in blood. This was an anti-propaganda poem, written against the abstract and romantic use of patriotism for the ends of state power that nevertheless extolled a physical and spiritual bond between the land and its people (Akhmatova would sometimes adopt the persona of a Russian peasant woman in the war poems of 1914-17). In her view, this land belonged to the people, who were closest to it, not the regime that violently expropriated it (she also considered Ukraine to be ‘Russian land’ in this context) — the “we” that Akhmatova freely addressed in her poems with the (correct) assumption that she had an audience of millions who would recognise themselves in her words. Given the Soviet claim on the property and identity of the Russian people, this “we” would always be treated as an implicit threat to the sovereignty of the regime. 

But the moment that the Soviets found a use for Russian patriotism they also found a use for Akhmatova. As Amanda Haight writes, the Nazi invasion was a liberating event for her as a writer and as a Russian: “the enemy was no longer within but without. People were united once again in a common aim…it was a relief to be obviously and openly at one with her fellow country-men once more.” Haight quotes Pavel Luknitsky, who visited Akhmatova at this time and observed: “She is a patriot and the knowledge that at the same moment she and everyone else are thinking and feeling alike cheers her.” In the face of an existential challenge to the state, Stalin and Zhdanov now considered the national loyalties evident in her work to be a potential propaganda asset rather than a threat. Exiled to safety in Tashkent, she was still expected to contribute her talents to the war effort and was more than willing to do so. “We know what lies in balance at this moment,” she wrote in 1941, in her most popular poem of the period, ‘Courage’:

And what is happening right now.
The hour for courage strikes upon our clocks,
And courage will not desert us.
We’re not frightened of the hail of lead,
We’re not bitter without a roof overhead —
And we will preserve you, Russian speech, 
Mighty Russian word!
We will transmit you to our grandchildren
Free and pure and rescued from captivity
Forever!

If the land is taken, what is left of Russia? The “Russian word,” “Russian speech,” what Akhmatova calls, elsewhere, her “Native Tongue.” This was not simply a linguistic question — although that was very important, and Akhmatova had no sympathy for the claims of the Ukrainian language — but of the Russian word as the primary vessel for Russian culture and identity. But when Akhmatova spoke about her “native tongue” she did not mean regional dialects or local speech, she meant the Russian of Pushkin and Dostoevsky. The Russian spirit was expressed in its poetry and literature and this is what gave her mission its special significance and character. By carrying this legacy in her own verse she was preserving the continuity and existence of the Russian people. 

Akhmatova’s sense of both belonging to and speaking for a people, her identification with the land, her role in persevering the literature and language of Russia, provided the foundations of a deep and instinctive patriotism that remained detached, to a degree, from the Russian state or any particular political regime. This did not mean that it did not have some political power or, even, application — as the Soviets knew from the very beginning and as the educational apparatus of the Putin regime also understands. Whereas a poem like ‘Requiem’ could (and still can) be claimed by dissidents and exiles, a poem like ‘Courage’ can always be used by Russian nationalists and state propagandists. The question of Akhmatova and nationalism cannot, then, be as easily or cleanly separated as Berlin assumed. Akhmatova’s rehabilitation took place not only in the literary circles or the cultural space of the Russian Federation, but in the post-Soviet school system: the poem ‘Native Land’ remains part of a revised curriculum that was designed, during the second Putin term, to emphasise and promote cultural nationalism. It was not just Akhmatova who was rehabilitated in the Yeltsin and Putin eras but her whole family — including her son, Lev Gumilyov, whose Eurasianist, ultra-nationalist ethno-historical theories have had some influence on the revisionist ideology and expansionist policies of the later Putin terms. 

The historical ambiguity of Akhmatova’s position is, in a sense, as ambiguous as Russia’s own position in the world, caught between the competing poles of Eurasianism and Europeanism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism, the desire to belong to Western civilisation and the temptation to reject it. It is, of course, difficult to make these kind of judgements, but, given her own statement and positions, it is possible to believe that while Akhmatova would have no theoretical objection to Putin’s view of Ukraine, she would instinctively revolt against his “civilisational” conflict with the West. This would be to pit the two things she loved most against each other. The divisions and complexities evident in Akhmatova’s own work and life could also, at different moments and sometimes only in specific poems or parts of poems, find a form of resolution. This is why, despite the patriotic ideas which do retain — superficially at least — political and ideological utility for the Putin regime, Akhmatova’s work ultimately offers a more subtle alternative: a different understanding and conception of Russia and another route that it can take. 

 

 

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Saddam and his Enemies

Review of Samuel Helfont, Iraq Against the World: Saddam, America, and the Post-Cold War Order (Oxford University Press, 2023) 

On the morning of February 13, 1991, two U.S. Air Force GBU-27 smart bombs demolished ‘Public Shelter No. 25’ in the wealthy Amiriyah district of West Baghdad, killing 408 Iraqis. General Merrill McPeak, the USAF Chief of Staff, later claimed that the shelter was being used as a command and control base by Saddam’s intelligence services, but most of the dead turned out to be women and children. Within hours, graphic footage of their charred corpses was being transmitted on Iraqi state TV. This was not simply a controversial targeting decision or a tragic mistake: it was a strategic PR disaster for the U.S. and a propaganda coup for the Ba’ath regime.

In his new book, Iraq Against the World: Saddam, America and the Post-Cold War Order, Samuel Helfont identifies this as a turning point in the Gulf War. “Prior to al-Amiriyah,” he writes,

the Iraqi regime tried to hide civilian casualties in an attempt to project strength. After the bombing, the regime went to great pains to highlight Iraqi casualties. Saddam realized that the narrative of a weak and helpless Iraq being bullied by a neo-imperialist superpower was much more effective than a narrative of a strong Iraq standing up to the United States. (1)

Along with SCUD missiles fired at Tel Aviv and the Iraqi assault on the Saudi town of Khobi, this became a key component in the way that Saddam chose to conduct the fight: aware that he could not compete with U.S. firepower, he tried to wage a war of symbolism instead. As Helfont writes, he “quickly recognized the political power that existed in the gap between the justification for the war and the conduct of the war” (2) and was determined to prise that gap open. It was the only real advantage he had in the emerging post-Cold War system that was being rigged against him. 

One of the things you realise reading Helfont’s study is that, as far as it went, this was a very effective strategy. Unlike his enemies, Saddam had the benefit of three clear objectives: to undermine the weapons inspection regime; to remove UN sanctions; and to destroy America’s ‘New World Order’. By the end of the 1990s, he was close to achieving all of these aims. UNSCOM inspectors had been kicked out of Iraq in 1999; the UN Oil-for-Food programme had degenerated into a corruption racket that Saddam used to finance his own ambitions; and, most important of all, the fragile comity of nations had been shattered: America (and the UK) was now at odds with France, Russia, China and most of the developing world over the issue of Iraq. To show how the Ba’ath regime played an active role in creating these conditions, Helfont has made forensic use of Iraqi state records captured by the U.S. military and Iraqi dissidents after 2003, including Iraqi intelligence and military documents, transcripts of closed-meetings between Saddam and his senior advisers and the archive of the Iraqi Ba’ath Party secretariat. (The big missing prize here is the collection of Foreign Ministry files that mysteriously disappeared during the mass looting that consumed Baghdad in March 2003.) These documents enable him to fill in significant gaps in the narrative, detailing methods used by the Ba’ath regime to manipulate peace activists, humanitarian NGOs, foreign journalists, politicians and UN member states to meet its own objectives. The Amiriyah shelter bombing is where this all began — the inspiration and blueprint for a new strategy. 

Maybe it is significant to note here that the Iraqi Ba’athists always had a political use for images of violence, pain, torture and gore. In Republic of Fear, Kanan Makiya described a scene from the aftermath of the 1963 coup, when a faction of the briefly victorious Ba’ath party broadcast pictures of Prime Minister Qassem’s bullet-ridden body on Iraqi state TV:

Night after night, they made their gruesome point. The body was propped up on a chair in the studio. A soldier sauntered around, handling its parts. The camera would cut to scenes of devastation at the Ministry of Defence where Qassem made his last stand. There, on location, it lingered on the mutilated corpses of Qassem’s entourage (al-Mahdawi, Wasfi Taher, and others). Back to the studio, and close-ups now of the entry and exit points of each bullet hole. The whole macabre sequence closes with a scene that must forever remain etched on the memory of all those who saw it: the soldier grabbing the lolling head by the hair, came right up close, and spat full face into it. (3)

The Iraqi Ba’athists specialised in snuff movies. Saddam’s 1979 party purge was filmed and then broadcast on national television so that Iraqis could see government officials being led from the room, terrified, to certain death, or begging for their lives. The regime’s security services routinely recorded their own sessions of torture, rape and murder on videos which they used to blackmail or simply break surviving family members. Some of these showed up on the Iraqi black market after the fall of the regime. In his memoir Known and Unknown, Donald Rumsfeld recalled watching one recovered from Baghdad by the U.S. army:

It was a twelve-minute film Saddam’s internal security services had put together. The video documented various methods of torture that his regime used, including beatings, limb and tongue amputations, and beheadings. Men were thrown off three-storey buildings. Some were forced to hold out their arms to have them broken by lead pipes. Saddam’s men proudly videotaped their atrocities to terrorize others. (4)

Video was one of the key tools of terror used by the Ba’ath party: they instinctively understood the power of the recorded image and the impact of showing unfiltered violence and body trauma. The way the regime used and reused the bloody footage of the Amiriyah victims was in this tradition: it showed a willingness to exploit the most graphic and gory images available for maximum political effect. 

The effect was to shatter the consensus that existed after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait. For a while, Iraq was considered a “test case” for this new international liberal order: a symbolic precedent that would establish “the soundness of the new thinking, the new system of international relations,” as Helfont puts it (5). Saddam knew that the fate of this order rested on how he behaved and so he felt no incentive to comply with the conditions that it set. The “new system” that was now emerging required his surrender in order to validate itself. This would fundamentally redefine the nature of his rule and would almost certainly trigger the coup that the Americans wanted anyway. But he wasn’t interested in validating the new system. He didn’t feel suicidal. This was a problem, but the lesson of the Amiriyah massacre and the unfolding disaster of UN sanctions gave him a solution. The “strategy of weakness” had found its definitive subjects: the suffering Iraqi children. This was effective because Iraqi children were suffering. The sanctions, ostensibly designed to drive a wedge between the regime and its people and starve it of any materials that could be weaponised, were in practice cruel and illogical. The regime elite did not suffer — Saddam carried on building luxurious new palaces and Uday continued to collect his Ferraris and Lamborghinis — but it fully leveraged the desperation of its own citizens. Under the tenure of Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN tried to establish a new framework for conflicts fought in the name of collective security and humanitarianism. Saddam clearly understood that this ideal, which by its very nature was designed to exclude a regime like his, could be undermined by presenting images of starving, malnourished children as direct victims of a “criminal embargo” imposed by the UN itself.

This resonated with a large and receptive audience in the Arab and Muslim world which Saddam also exploited, as the documents that Helfont has uncovered show in detail. The Gulf War created the conditions for a new alliance between the Arab nationalists of the Ba’ath party and the developing Islamist networks of the early 1990s. For one thing, they had clearly defined, common enemies: America, Israel, and the West. For another, rapprochement with Sunni Salafist groups helped Saddam to tap into a powerful stream of populist sentiment in the region without compromising his hostility to Iran. This had begun, tentatively, in the 1980s, but found its true raison d’etre once Iraq was engaged in a conflict with America. Saddam’s grand strategy was to pry Sunni Islamists away from the Gulf States and Iran and to link the plight of Iraq to the fate of Palestine. Saddam’s key insight here was that he could place Iraq at the heart of a MENA master narrative that linked Western “neo-imperialism” to Zionism in a broad conspiracy against the Arab and Muslim world. He conspicuously rewarded the families of suicide bombers in the Occupied Territories with cash bounties to boost his credentials in the struggle to liberate Palestine. His defiance of UN inspectors and allied No-Fly Zones was the visible evidence of his war against the West. This brand of populism gained traction and had the effect of isolating the more conservative rulers from their populations, thereby constraining the public support the US received from regimes that otherwise hated him. He also partly believed his own propaganda: raised in the Ba’ath tradition, these ideas were easy to reconcile with the anti-Zionist, anti-colonial Weltanschauung of Pan-Arabism. Saddam’s own religious observance was mostly for show and he continued to enjoy his Mateus Rosé and Cuban cigars inside his rapidly proliferating palace complexes. The reconciliation with Islam (and Islamism) was ambiguous, conditional and opportunistic: it was, nevertheless, real. Downplayed by CIA analysts who got distracted by the regime’s secular habits, this became very important for a shaken and suspicious Bush administration in 2002. 

Popular support for the Iraqi Ba’ath regime in the Middle East and North Africa was supplemented by the increasing visibility of sympathisers in the West: not only those who could be directly persuaded or corrupted by the Ba’ath party’s international networks, but those willing to play a “voluntary role” by participating in and organising anti-sanctions protests and campaigns. The files Helfont uncovers reveal the scope of Ba’ath influence operations and the active role that party agents took in these efforts. This kind of covert subversion was not inconsequential. As Helfont argues, the Iraqi strategy was to change, to shape, the narrative that had been formed by the U.S. and the UN in the aftermath of the Cold War. The aim was to unpick the consensus that knitted together the coalition arranged against them. Russia was a primary target here: the Iraqis knew that the key to breaking the ‘New World Order’ was to fracture the emerging relationship between Russia and America. This succeeded to the extent that the relationship did break down and, as Helfont shows, Iraq was the aggravating factor:

Iraqi records suggest the Ba’athists helped transform Moscow’s policy in Iraq into a wedge issue…Communists and hardline nationalists in Russia were inclined to push back against Moscow’s pro-Western, post-Cold War foreign policy even without Ba’athist prodding, but Iraqi machinations and Baghdad’s ability to create opportunities spurred these Russians to turn those inclinations into actions. (6)

Pressure paid off: by the end of 1992, Yeltsin had changed Russia’s policy on Iraq and broken with the U.S. position. Crucially, as Helfont notes, the timeline demonstrates that tensions with the West during the Balkan wars did not influence Russia’s attitude towards Iraq. Instead, the growing disagreements over Iraq exacerbated disaffection with America’s (and therefore NATO’s) position on Serbia and, later, the Baltics, Ukraine and Georgia. The Iraqis did not cause this split but, Helfont argues, they had a key role in magnifying and promoting the divisions that ultimately led to it. 

The implementation of the 1991 ceasefire and Security Council Resolution 687 did not end the war for Saddam. In fact, it had only just begun. He never renounced his claims to Kuwait and he never accepted the validity of UN-mandated weapons inspections, the demand to disarm or the NFZs. For Saddam, all of this amounted to a violation of sovereignty. (This was a point that others appreciated, notably Russia and China.) He sometimes used brute force to show his enemies that he remained defiant, but the campaign he waged was largely non-military: the war of spectacle that he had tried to fight in 1991 had developed into a more sophisticated media assault, reinforced by diplomatic strategy and covert influence operations. The final weapon in his campaign of subversion was possibly the most important of all: corruption. The Oil-for-Food programme was a prize for the regime, if not for the Iraqis themselves. By the end of the century, it had transformed Saddam’s fortunes: by exploiting UN maladministration, he was able to seize billions in oil sale revenues that he then used to buy influence and import banned items. Helfont notes that the OFFP “gave Iraq the political and economic tools to keep the Security Council divided” (7) and the confidence and assurance with which the Iraqis used these tools was justified by their success. Since the early 1990s, the regime had courted French and Russian politicians with the lure of oil but now they could literally allocate barrels to their international supporters.

The Iraqi corruption of French politics helped to drive a wedge between Washington and Paris and the chief architect of this break was Jacques Chirac, the man who had supplied the Iraqis with weapons and nuclear technology in the 1980s and had his own deep Gaullist hostility to U.S. power. “Following Chirac’s election”, Helfont writes,

Tariq Aziz declared that Iraq was giving French businesses a privileged position and a wave of French companies rushed to make deals with Baghdad in 1995 and 1996. By April 1996, Chirac broke with the United States, openly declaring that the time had come to welcome Iraq back into the international community. (8)

This policy reached its theatrical climax with Dominique de Villepin’s speech at the UN Security Council in February 2003; a grotesque, grandstanding performance that, almost as much as anything else that happened, made war a certainty. The Iraqi regime believed that this strategy had worked and that they would now be protected from regime change. The failure of the US and UK to impose further sanctions on Iraq in 1997, blocked at the UN by France, Russia and China, was viewed (correctly) by Saddam as a major strategic victory. It exposed the new divide that split the global community, a divide that Saddam, as much as anybody else, had opened up. By 2001, the conflict was being described by anybody who was paying attention to it as a “forgotten” or “silent” war (9). Meanwhile, France and Russia worked hard to finish off sanctions and kept their eyes on the final prize: the Iraqi oil fields.

Twenty years after the Iraq War the archives are being opened up to reveal lost details and put decisions and actions in their correct context. As a new account of how the Gulf War led to the Iraq War, Iraq Against the World puts a lot of useful new material in the public domain. Helfont has revealed what he describes as the “bitter irony” of the fact that the war itself was a result of the unraveling of an international system that Saddam had spent a decade trying to destroy: 

the breakdown in global order that he worked so hard to accomplish also untethered the American power that ultimately overthrew his regime. Saddam’s highly politcized view of international politics biased him to see mass public opinion and diplomacy as the drivers of international relations. This view blinded him to the raw power of military force when backed by a determined leader. (10)

Saddam and his closest officials simply did not believe that the Americans would take the action they did. Even the more pessimistic forecasts inside the regime did not predict the full invasion and occupation of Baghdad; given the violence and paranoia of Saddam’s inner circles, maybe it was impossible to clearly see the direction of events or to speak honestly about it. The final, fatal, paradox of the enterprise was this: by short-circuiting the UN process, Bush actually believed he was defending the system that the UN had designed. Saddam had been violating Security Council resolutions since 1991 and the inability to effectively enforce these resolutions threatened the credibility of the entire institution. To a certain extent, Bush thought that he had to risk destroying the system in order to save it. He did not save the system. It’s possible, as certain people in the administration did believe, that the system itself was beyond salvation, but the Iraq War at the very least accelerated its disintegration. Everything that has followed was given space and oxygen by this collapse, including the regional rise of Iran and the Russian wars of restitution. 

  1. Samuel Helfont, Iraq Against the World: Saddam, America, and the Post-Cold War Order (Oxford University Press, 2023), p.56
  2. Helfont, p.57
  3. Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (University of California Press, 1997), p.59
  4. Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (Sentinel, 2011), p.417
  5. Helfont, p.59
  6. Ibid., p.98
  7. Ibid., p.156
  8. Ibid., p.132
  9. Ibid., p.164
  10. Ibid, p.184

 

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Ann Clwyd, 1937-2023

Ann Clwyd was every Labour whip’s worst nightmare — a campaigning politician who was prepared to put principle ahead of party discipline. It was for this reason that she was sacked from shadow cabinet positions by two party leaders and was initially blacklisted by New Labour’s inner circle. “I fully understand the need to support party policy,” she wrote in her memoir, Rebel with a Cause, “but I also believe there are times when you simply have to act with your conscience.” It did not help that one of Ann’s most determined political foes was also a veteran whip with direct influence on the internal disciplinary process. Summoned to Blair’s office to explain why she had traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan without permission in 1995, Ann could immediately detect the black hand of Ray Powell, who still held a grudge after their clash at a murky Ogmore by-election ten years earlier. The whips duly had their revenge, ensuring that she would be the first victim of the new regime, dumped from the opposition front bench for the transgression of witnessing a Turkish military assault on her Kurdish friends. Pointing to chief whip Derek Foster, one of Powell’s old USDAW comrades, she left the room with a parting shot: “He’s your problem. He’s old Labour. He’s the man you ought to get rid of.”

Ann Clwyd was a rebel and a fighter. These were the qualities that defined her political career and they were also the reason she could not be called a career politician. Three core principles rooted her political identity. First, she was an internationalist: as an MEP and then as Shadow Secretary for International Development, her commitments and connections fanned out across continents. But this did not make her a relativist and she always refused to abandon human rights to the dogmas of nation, religion or tribe. Second, she was a democratic socialist, a partisan of the labour movement that the Labour party had originally been created to represent. The second was bound up with the first: in the European Parliament of the early 1980s, surrounded by her Eurospectic Labour colleagues, she tried to remind them that “socialism did not stop at our borders; in fact the whole history was one of internationalism.” Third, she was a pragmatist, using the tools of parliament, the art of lobbying and the resources of the press to achieve her aims. She was always prepared to work across party lines in pursuit of a cause and would judge people by their actions rather than party allegiance. Corruption and hypocrisy were among the most pernicious sins in her eyes, but she did not consider them to be the preserve of any particular political persuasion. 

Ann was elected to parliament in May 1984, at the beginning of the Miner’s Strike that would soon evolve into an existential struggle for the entire labour movement. The strike of 84-5 turned out to be a twilight battle and the final defeat of the NUM would mark the end of the organised working class as a political force in the UK. For Ann, as a new NUM-backed MP representing an iconic Welsh coal community, this outcome was not in any way predestined and she would fight hard to secure victory for the miners’ cause at local and national level. This was a position that could not be taken for granted in the Labour party of the time. Neil Kinnock, the son of a Tredegar miner, had deeper emotional ties to the coal heartlands of South Wales than Ann, who grew up in a small hillside village in North Wales, but was trapped by the logic of his own leadership and personal contempt for Arthur Scargill. Ann had no such qualms: whatever she thought of Scargill and his politics, he was defending the livelihoods of her constituents and she was perfectly happy to march alongside him at the head of a flotilla of NUM branch banners or to share a speaking platform at the Aberdare Miners Institute. When it came to her maiden speech in the House of Commons, there was only one possible subject: “I followed the convention and paid tribute to my predecessor and painted a picture of the constituency. Then I let rip.” 

Ann’s defining cause was her support for the victims of Saddam Hussein. She first encountered the world of the Iraqi exiles in Cardiff in the 1970s and was elected chair of the Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI) in 1986. This was a bleak time for the enemies of Saddam. In the context of the Cold War there was nobody else outside of Iraq and the immediate Middle East with any strong reasons or motivations to care about the crimes of the regime. British government policy was worse than indifferent. As the Iran-Iraq war dragged into a deadly stalemate, the Foreign Office noted Saddam’s unquenchable appetite for weapons and decided to treat this as an opportunity to do business. Ann would become one of the most dogged hunters of Trade Minister Alan Clark and pursued a relentless campaign to expose Tory links to the Ba’ath regime. This led, with a kind of remorseless and satisfying logic, to the Scott Report and the ‘arms to Iraq’ scandal, which played its own part in the demise of the Major government. Ann could never forget or forgive Clark’s insouciance and wrote scathingly that he had

summed up the arrogance of ministers when he dared to suggest that Labour MPs were a bit dim not to understand that, from 1987 onwards, they were being misled by the government and that we should have known Britain was selling arms to Iraq. We did suspect it, we did try to expose it, but he and his colleagues lied to cover it up.

But Clark was not alone. When Ann confronted FCO minister William Waldergrove with credible rumours of a chemical weapons attack on Halabja, she was told that there was “no proof.” “I told him to go and get it,” she recalled. (In the end, CARDRI would have to provide this service.) A few months later, she was appalled to see David Mellor shaking hands with Iraqi regime figures at the Baghdad trade fair — again, on behalf of the FCO. This is what the campaigners against Saddam had to face: a solid wall of indifference and cynicism that could rarely be penetrated. It was also an early taste of the amoral realpolitik of Douglas Hurd’s foreign office during the Bosnian war. For those who had been working on behalf of Saddam’s victims from the start it was a record of horror and hypocrisy that never seemed to end.

Ann developed a close bond with the Kurds of northern Iraq. She knew all of the main players and did what she could to publicise their plight in parliament and the media. In the aftermath of the Gulf War she traveled to the Zagros mountains, meeting Kurdish refugees fleeing the prospect of the regime reprisal killings they saw being unleashed on the towns and cities of the southern Shia. Returning to the House of Commons, she “wanted parliamentarians to feel some of the desperation that I had felt and, above all, I wanted the British government to take action.” Her speech in parliament would prove to be the crucial intervention that prompted Major to sponsor no-fly zones and a safe haven status for Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iraqi Kurds accorded her such respect that she was able to act as a mediator between the two main Kurdish factions, facilitating a tense prisoner exchange during the Kurdish civil war of the mid-nineties. Her closest allegiance was to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and she was a loyal friend to its ruling dynasty, the Talabanis. In her memoir, Ann recalled her trip to the Pentagon in 2004 to meet Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz. When the conversation came around to the topic of Iraqi presidential candidates, Ann spoke in favour of Jalal Talabani. Talabani would eventually become the first Kurd to hold the office and in this post he kept the Iraqi political establishment together during the civil and sectarian wars of 2006-8. Many of Ann’s old friends — usually Kurds — would rise to positions of prominence in post-Saddam Iraq, often proving to be the most competent and responsible ministers. These included Barham Salih (Deputy Prime Minister 2006-9, President 2018-22), Hoshyar Zebari (Foreign Minister 2003-14, Finance Minister 2014-16) and former Minister of Water (2003-10) and current President Latif Rashid.

Ann’s position on Iraq never changed. She believed that the Ba’ath regime had to be held to account for its crimes, even if this required military confrontation. She believed this before Tony Blair did. “He eventually came round to my point of view,” she liked to point out. From her position in CARDRI and its successor INDICT, she pursued the legal and moral delegitimization of the Iraqi Ba’ath party, keeping the plight of the regime’s victims as visible as possible and pursuing its agents and allies outside of Iraq. This all came to a head in 2003, in the shadow of a looming war, when she was invited to open the Kurd’s genocide museum in Halabja. The Kurds were still legitimately terrified of Saddam’s chemical weapons and she watched as women brought nappies from markets to use as gas masks and convoys of terrified families streamed out of the towns and cities of Iraqi Kurdistan. Her old friend Hero Talabani, the dynamic PUK matriarch, took her to Chamchamal to show her the rocket launchers that surrounded the town. “That’s where they’re going to fire their chemical weapons from,” she told her. In this atmosphere of tension and fear, the contents of the museum served to magnify Ann’s own sense of futility and loss and to reinforce the tragic scale of past events. Even so, her reaction was a surprise:

The day I opened the museum it was snowing, grey and icy. Hundreds of relatives of the dead and victims queued up to watch and tell me their stories. One old man showed me a photograph of fifteen members of his family; he was the only survivor. I was asked to cut the ribbon, but I could feel my voice breaking. I have given thousands of speeches but I simply could not speak. I started walking around the room, trying to compose myself, but when a Kurdish cameraman asked me how I felt I burst into tears. I had never cried in public before.

This was maybe the most eloquent response that she could have given. Her tears were broadcast on television and echoed around Kurdistan. It was the culmination of years of fighting and frustration — years when her commitment had only been matched by the indifference she encountered. She considered this indifference to be a moral abdication, a stain on the human conscience. This was the context of her support for regime change in Iraq.

Ann stood down as MP for the Cynon Valley after the 2019 election. Over the last couple of years she had collected together all of her papers from decades of campaigns and political activity and donated them to the political archive of the National Library of Wales. She would have liked to have entered the House of Lords, not for the pomp and ceremony but for the platform it would have given her to continue campaigning in the way she had always done. This did not happen because of the intrigues of old enemies in the Labour leader’s office, but it did not stop her working for the simple reason that it could not stop her. For Ann, every day was a new day with new challenges and new outrages and new opportunities. Life was activity and action. “The campaigns go on,” she wrote in the prologue to her memoir, “and so do I.” 

R.I.P., Ann.

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Italy Needs Me: The Life and Death of Silvio Berlusconi

The life of Silvio Berlusconi had one great theme: man’s battle with time. Vigorous daily exercise routines and public jogging sessions; an obsession with personal hygiene driven by a deep phobia of germs; an epic struggle against hair loss that transfixed a nation: all of this played its part in his relentless war against age. Perhaps Berlusconi’s greatest weapon in this fight was his dedication to the cult of positive thinking. His outlook was optimistic, even utopian, and in his ideal realm everybody would be young and energetic and look good. Immaculate Caraceni suits and a healthy hairline had their own spiritual qualities, but, ultimately, served the same end: to signal physical and psychological omnipotence. Berlusconi’s personal doctor Umberto Scapagnini once described his patient as “technically immortal” and dedicated a large part of his career to this pursuit of longevity. The “elixir of youth” prescribed by ‘Dr. Fuck’ boosted Berlusconi’s libido well into his seventies, with dire political consequences.

Despite his best efforts, Berlusconi proved mortal. His death will have no real impact on the contemporary Italian political scene, but it does mark the passing of one of Europe’s great cultural and political innovators. If Italy is the political laboratory of Europe, then what Berlusconi created with Forza Italia in 1994 is part of that tradition. He dedicated his life to transforming Italy in his own image and in the process pioneered a political style that would eventually be replicated across the continent. Berlusconi’s physical vanity was matched, maybe even exceeded, by an egotism that was not simply venal, but idealistic. His first property development, built on a piece of wasteland on the outskirts of Milan, was more than simply a housing project: it was an attempt to create the kind of model community that he would want to belong to. “I wanted to continue with my dream of building new towns,” he explained:

My idea was to achieve this with a very modern style of urban planning for the time that included lots of green, lots of bicycle paths, roads and walkways. We had to build a place where a young mother could send her kids to school without worrying, where you could love and work and shop and pray and go to the sports club and use the tennis courts and swimming pools and have everything that a family could desire. My idea was to make it possible to do everything at Milano Due so that you would never have to leave. (1)

Berlusconi was not simply selling real estate at Milano Due but a lifestyle, targeting a new breed of bankers, business executives and media operators who came to embody “a kind of counter-counter-culture” (2) at the heart of the Milanese revival. This was a model that would be applied, in different ways, to the rest of the country. 

Milano Due’s private cable TV station was the seed of Berlusconi’s first commercial network, Canale 5. Through this channel, Berlusconi led a populist assault on RAI’s national monopoly, investing funds from private advertisers in Hollywood film rights, sleazy game shows and foreign TV imports like Dallas and The Smurfs. For the intelligentsia and their political allies this was a cultural apocalypse, but the Italians were ready for it — they wanted what Berlusconi was offering. He had, in fact, triggered a cultural shift with political implications, as Mediaset president Fidele Confalonieri quickly recognised:

You have to understand the context, the way things were back then. By the 1980s, Italy had been living through years of recession and austerity and Red Brigades terrorism and the strong and continuing influence of the Italian Communist Party on society. In that context it was pretty revolutionary for Silvio Berlusconi to launch his commercial TV challenge against RAI. He was going against the prevailing culture and mindset of the Italian establishment. He was offering an alternative lifestyle. That, in itself, was a political act. (3)

When the courts tried to exact revenge by closing down his network, they inadvertently provoked what could be called The Great Smurf Revolt. “The public rebelled,” Berlusconi recalled: 

There were children protesting in the streets, carrying placards that read ‘Give Us Back The Smurfs!’ We had entered into the lives of the ordinary people and we had become part of the family life of millions of Italians. (4)

This time, Berlusconi was rescued by his political patron, the Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi. It is one of the peculiarities of Berlusconi’s early career that the main emissary of the Reagan revolution in Italy would find his closest political ally in the Italian Socialist Party (PSI). Except that, put in context, it wasn’t strange at all. The Craxian Socialists of the 1980s were, for Italy, a new breed of left-wing reformer — anti-Communist, pro-NATO, and intensely relaxed about people getting filthy rich, particularly themselves. Their social liberalism was matched by a ferocious economic liberalism, exalting competition, individualism, entrepreneurship and a permissive consumer creed that would prove to be fatally attracted to power and wealth. The PSI hierarchy would become the political patrons of Milano da bere: a corrupt and opulent world of expensive nightclubs, exclusive restaurants, tailored clothes, haute couture mistresses, recreational drugs and fast cars. As Paul Ginsborg wrote:

to be a Socialist politician in Italy in these years meant to have a portable telephone and a BMW, to mix with high flying lawyers and businessmen, to lunch at Matarel or Savini in Milan’s Galleria, to have a good line of conversation on information technology and to take exotic holidays. (5)

This was the surface of things, but the foundations revealed a complex network of bribery, kickbacks and mafia contacts that would prove fatal for the PSI and most of the Italian political class. In this context, Craxi was the king of graft: he kept a villa in Tunisia (to which he fled after being investigated for corruption in 1992), apartments in New York and Barcelona, and occupied an entire floor of the Hotel Raphael in Rome where he entertained his mistress, the Tenebrae and Inferno starlet Ania Pieroni. (Berlsuconi would also claim his own Argento victim: Veronica Lario, who famously had her arm chopped off in the bloodbath that concluded Tenebrae, would become his mistress and second wife.) The great unraveling began in Milan when the Socialist politician Mario Chiesa tried to flush 30 million lire of bribes down the toilet as the police raided his apartment. Publicly disowned by Craxi, Chiesa brought the whole house down: Tangentopoli led to Clean Hands which led to the destruction of the First Republic.

Milan was the powerbase of Craxi and this was the most important thing for Berlusconi: it was the foundation of their political and business partnership as well as their genuine personal connection (Craxi was godfather to Berlusconi’s daughter with Lario and Berlusconi would later be accused of transferring millions of lire to him in Tunisia). In contrast to the Communists with their intellectual tradition and theoretical canon, television was the primary mode of communication for the Socialists and so Berlusconi was important to them; in his hands, the PSI message was reduced to a form of public relations crafted around the ruthless charisma of Craxi himself. “By the early 1980s,” wrote Michael Ledeen, “[Craxi] had become the John F. Kennedy of Italian politics, and in Milan, as in Rome, the most glamorous women, the elite of Italian cinema, the new pinup stars of Italian business, and the heroes of Italian soccer joined the party” (6). Craxi was the dominant personality of the PSI, the alpha male, the apex predator, providing a political template for Berlusconi himself. Every element had been put in place to make sense of this strange alliance between the capitalist media baron and the Milanese Socialists: the love of money, the pursuit of power, a relaxed attitude to political principle, a pro-business Lombard identity, a rampant consumer culture, fantastic women, but most of all a dedication to the image

In the ruins of the First Republic, when Berlusconi finally decided to enter politics, the power of the image was his guiding principle. He was already a television evangelist in one very specific sense: he believed that the world presented on television superseded reality and could therefore be used to shape that reality for the better. As he once told an adviser: “if something is not on television, it doesn’t exist. Not a product, a politician or an idea.” Combined with this belief was his self-described role as a “missionary of commercial television” in Italy: Berlusconi considered his assault on the commanding heights of RAI to be a key battle in the cultural and political liberation of the country he loved. Where others saw predation and monopoly, he saw deliverance and emancipation; he was helped by the fact that viewers and advertisers largely agreed. The legal cases that followed his entry into television and politics were, from this perspective, rooted in the challenge he presented to the monopolies and interests of the “left-wing” establishment. He dismissed each case as politically motivated, publicly accusing Italian magistrates of conspiring with “Communist enemies” to destroy him, just like they did to Craxi. For Berlusconi, truth was a matter of perception: he had alternative facts, his own truth, and if this truth did not match the ‘reality’ being presented by his enemies, then he had a duty to transform that reality. 

It was Berlusconi, more than anybody else, who led Italy into the new world of mass media and consumerism. He made the postmodern condition a living reality for millions of Italians. He was a man made for the age of seduction, simulation and hyperreality; if he didn’t exist, Umberto Eco would have had to invent him. His mutable values and understanding of truth and reality were primed to exploit the triumph of relativism, the deconstruction of meaning and the end of ideology. He was an unconscious apostle of the Society of the Spectacle, a concept that was both useful and natural to him and that he sought to build rather than destroy. He safely navigated the corruption scandals that undid the First Republic and went on to play a key role in dismantling the sclerotic structures of the old cultural and political elites of Italy, constructing a new Empire of Images in their place. Like Rupert Murdoch, his values and beliefs were conservative but his instincts and his actions were disruptive and radical. Both men helped to create a new political reality, but in Italy Berlusconi took this a step further by deciding to become its face. 

The legacy of Berlusconi’s political career is less significant for what he did (or didn’t do) in office than for the political style he created. The content of the ideology that littered his speeches and articles was fairly consistent and suited his business interests, but it was politically superficial. Free market liberalism was the creed he espoused and probably did genuinely believe in, but it was not what he delivered or prioritized when he was in power (judicial and constitutional reform took on greater urgency as the courts hunted him down). Berlusconi’s innovations had nothing to do with policy and everything to do with organization and presentation. Forza Italia gave Italy a type of politics it had never seen before: a party rooted in a private corporation and exploiting the new political technologies of market research, advertising, branding, commerce and mass media. There were precedents, which the new Berlusconi political machine drew upon: polling techniques perfected by James Carvell for the ‘91 Clinton campaign; advertising methods developed by Saatchi & Saatchi for the Conservatives in ‘87 and ‘92; the Labour party rebranding of ‘87 (although this had echoes of Craxi’s own adoption of the red carnation as a party emblem). But Berlusconi took all of these political tools and used them to create a new political party with no traditional roots or political base within a matter of months and then win power

Berlusconi always insisted that he was not a professional politician but an entrepreneur. In truth, he was a political entrepreneur and one of the most skilled and creative in Europe at that time. The 1994 Forza Italian election campaign was his masterpiece: the Italian public and what remained of the old political parties (operating under new names but showing no ability to successfully rebrand) did not know what had hit them. Berlusconi unleashed a phalanx of untested candidates firmly embedded in the Fininvest family and instructed to pay towards their own media training and ‘kit del candidato’ (“a luxurious bag ‘full of surprises’ — ties, adhesives, lapel badges, a videocassette with the party’s programme, musical cassettes of Forza Italia’s anthem to sing along to’, 7). Forza Italia combined the corporate sales pitch with the lifestyle brand to shape an entirely new political product, communicated in simple soundbites and mediated by images. The core message that the party presented was simultaneously vague and direct: Italy needed Berlusconi to save the country from “Communism” and associated calamities. (Indeed, Berlusconi needed power to save his TV empire from being dismantled by the state.) Policy statements, such as they were, were not promises and certainly not commitments, but tactical messages designed to sell the product rather than articulate a party programme. Winning power was the only priority. 

In the event, this wasn’t a complete success and Berlusconi had to cobble together an unlikely coalition with Umberto Bossi’s separatist Northern League and Gianfranco Fini’s postfascist National Alliance in order to win. But this fragile marriage provided Berlusconi with the opportunity to launch another political innovation: a coalition of right-wing parties that would eventually help nurture the rhetoric and policy platforms of a new European populism. This was a testament to Berlusconi’s opportunism and personal ambition, but also revealed his almost total lack of ideological commitment or principle. In fact, the abandonment of ideology was part of the point and the appeal. Despite the constituencies and votes that his coalition partners provided, it was Berlusconi who would always benefit from these arrangements, as the most visible and popular leader of the New Right that he had, essentially, created himself. He was a billionaire with suspected mafia links and a historical connection to the old disgraced Socialist elite and yet he was able to present himself as a man of the people and a fresh alternative to the politics of the First Republic. He continued to promise deregulation and privatization while channeling the anti-establishment, anti-elite disaffection that fuelled the rise of a party like the Northern League. By adopting this pose he created a model for an Italian anti-politics that would eventually find its purest form in the Five Star Movement of Beppe Grillo. His ‘Contract with the Italians’ shamelessly plagiarized Newt Gingrich, but his rhetoric both defined and was shaped by parochial anxieties – notably, the increasingly important issue of immigration. Enemies were dismissed as “Communists”, a term he used promiscuously and which came to symbolize a broader threat to liberty and private initiative posed by all politicians of the left, a broad category that included the technocrats and intellectuals of the liberal center (he held particular animus for Prodi and Draghi).

His attack on this “left” resonated widely and was therefore highly effective in political terms; it also displayed a certain relish in blurring truth and distorting reality. This example was useful for the other parties of the populist far-right that were beginning to advance across Europe. It could be argued that Berlusconi set a precedent for the post truth politics of the twenty-first century: mass media democratic populism combined with his own unique attitude towards reality to spawn a new mutant strain of political communication. As Indro Montanelli, the editor of Il Giornale when Berlusconi owned the paper, later remarked: “[he] is a man with an entirely personal view of the truth, so that whatever he says is true. He tells lies, but he believes them” (8). Berlusconi was known to tell prospective advertisers that “powerful images are more important than facts” (9) and, for him, reality was defined by perception and the primacy of the image. Directly linked to this highly personal understanding of truth was an undermining of the concept of objectivity. This is where Berlusconi fatally connected the power of mass media to the politics of anti-politics. Italy had lost its political bearings after the political purges of Clean Hands; the state became a blank slate and the public space a void. This vast chasm looked set to be filled by the remnants of the PCI, reconstituted as the Democratic Party of the Left, but would be most effectively exploited by Berlusconi and those new populist and far-right mutations, Matteo Salvini’s Lega, M5S and Fratelli d’Italia. The primacy of perception and presentation that undermined the belief in universal truth allowed this New Right to follow Berlusconi’s lead by manipulating facts and redefining reality in their own image. They didn’t invent anything: the popular desires and resentments they channeled were authentic enough, but they became increasingly skilled at crafting the public discourse around their own messages and imagery, harnessing technology to curate their own mass constituencies. With the exception of the postfascists, these were the political progeny of Berlusconi, and his true legacy. 

It was odd, then, that during the election of 2022 — in a political environment that he had done more than anybody to shape — Berlusconi looked irrelevant, lost. He was running for office again and trying to capture the old magic. He took to TikTok to tell the world: “Italy Needs Me!” The result was not disastrous, but also not successful: he would be found flanking Giorgia Meloni, the woman he once claimed could not run to be mayor of Rome because she would have to look after her children, as she announced her first cabinet as Prime Minister. (The only person who looked more miserable here was Salvini, standing on the other side of her.) But he was still alive. He had survived the indignity of being barred from public office. The European elites had tried to kill him off. Angela Merkel could never forget, or forgive, being called an “unfuckable lard-arse” (“I never said it!” Berlusconi told a visibly delighted Gerhard Schroder). Sarkozy loathed him for other, not always tangible, reasons, exacerbated by his sudden passion to depose one of Berlusconi’s political pals, Gaddafi. Together they instigated a virtual coup d’etat during the Eurozone crisis, ejecting Berlusconi from office in favor of an unelected ‘technical administration’ led by Mario Monti (“Senior officials could be heard boasting: “We do regime change better than the Americans””, 10). This terminal humiliation was, in the end, nothing of the sort: he was still there, giving Meloni a run for her money, l’immortale.

The very things that the EU grandees despised about Berlusconi were the very things that kept him alive: his vulgarity, his personal ambition, his lack of shame, his sheer elan. This was Berlusconi’s own personal touch and it was the final key to his political success: the role of personality in post-ideological politics. What seemed unique to Berlusconi in this regard would eventually be adopted more widely. His distortions served to redefine ‘truth’ as another form of belief. What were seen as flaws by his opponents became assets in the eyes of his supporters. As Mariella Pandolfi told the New Yorker in 2003, 

the language that unites Italy today is Berlusconi’s television language. His grammar is dreadful. He gets the subjunctive wrong. Give him three seconds on television and he makes four mistakes. But you discover that everybody loves his mistakes. That’s his power. (11)

He defined the paradox of the new populists: here was a billionaire, a real estate and media tycoon, channeling the voice of the people. He could do this because so many voters admired his wealth and his success. The more he flaunted, the more they liked it. The bunga parties beneath the Renaissance paintings of Arcore; the replica Greek amphitheater and remote control volcano at his Sardinian Villa Certosa; the helicopter landing on the pitch of San Siro Stadium; the St Moritz pad purchased from Shah Reza Pahlavi. None of this mattered in the way it was supposed to. The ‘Communists’ that Berlusconi conjured out of the air as demons and phantasms did not, in fact, exist as a real threat: the old world of class loyalty that the PCI built their networks on had disintegrated. When Berlusconi declared, “I am the Italian dream!” enough people agreed (or at least didn’t care enough to object) for it to be important. His own grievances became public prejudices. His failures and his criminal convictions fed into everybody’s cynicism so that it did not matter; he would never really have to shoulder responsibility for his own actions. He created his own electorate out of the hollow space left by the Communists and the Church. He created a new culture, and so became a cultural phenomena in his own right. He simply did not understand what conflict of interest meant, or pretended not to, and, accordingly, broke the norms of democratic conduct. Whether he had been watching or not, Berlusconi’s greatest success was, finally, Trump: at the head of the greatest power on earth was a political creation that almost exactly fitted the style he set. But there was one more twist: looking at this kind of cracked mirror image, he did not like what he saw. This was the final indignity. 

  1. Silvio Berlusconi quoted in Alan Friedman, My Way: Berlusconi In His Own Words (Biteback, 2015), p.38
  2. Alexander Stille, The Sack of Rome: Media + Money + Celebrity = Power = Silvio Berlusconi (Penguin, 2007), p.28
  3. Fidele Confalonieri quoted in Friedman, p.56
  4. Silvio Berlusconi quoted in Friedman, p.60
  5. Paul Ginsborg, Italy and its Discontents 1980-2001: Family, Civil Society, State (Penguin, 2003), p.151
  6. Michael Ledeen, Freedom Betrayed (AEI Press, 1996), p.124
  7. Paul Ginsborg, Silvio Berlusconi: Television, Power and Patrimony (Verso, 2004), pps.68-9
  8. Indro Montanelli quoted in Stille, p.258
  9. Stille, p.23
  10. Adam Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crisis Changed the World (Penguin, 2018), p.412
  11.  Mariella Pandolfi quoted in Jane Kramer, ‘All He Surveys’, The New Yorker, November 2, 2003
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‘Time Reigns’: Vernon Watkins and Wales

I: ‘Welshness’ and Poetic Identity

Vernon Watkins did not measure success in terms of book sales or critical acclaim. He was not indifferent to literary trends or the demands of the book trade, but maintained an uncompromising, if polite, disdain for fashionable writers, “contemporary poets” and the literary power brokers who came to symbolise, for him, something misguided and even corrupt. In 1938, W.B. Yeats told him:

My quarrel with those Londoners
Is that they try
To substitute psychology
For the naked sky
Of metaphysical movement,
And drain the blood dry.

All is materialism, all
The catchword they strew,
Alien to the blood of man. –’
One ranting slogan drew
That “Poetry must have news in it”:
The reverse is true.’ (1)

“I’ve never cared much about fashion,” Watkins claimed in a 1967 radio interview: 

I think a poet has to think in terms of centuries. It’s a critic’s business to think in terms of decades and to sort out what is happening. Fundamental truths don’t change and I’m a metaphysical poet. I’m entirely concerned with those. (2)

His own separation from the “materialism” of “those Londoners” was rooted in the psychological breakdown that he experienced at the age of 23, an event he would later describe as “a complete revolution of sensibility” that made all of the poems he had written until that point obsolete (“I could never again write a poem which would be dominated by time,” he recalled 3). In the shadow of this, making it on the London scene did not seem very important, and, if his work subsequently failed to attract popular or critical acclaim, then it was partly the result of his own sense of isolation from the literary capital. This would subsequently have an impact on his reception and his reputation: to this day, academic interest has focussed on his position as a ‘Welsh’ or ‘Anglo-Welsh’ poet; if he is remembered more widely it is as the “Poet of Gower” or friend of Dylan Thomas. But while Gower was integral to his poetry and the world of South Wales provided him with some of the physical and symbolic resources for his writing, did this make him a “Welsh” poet? Born in Maesteg to Welsh-speaking parents, Watkins lived and worked for most of his life in Cardiff, Swansea and Gower and this made him, at least, a Welshman who was also a poet. The correct, and more complex, question is: was he a poet of Wales?

There is very little evidence in his own writing or in the recollections of his friends that Watkins considered Wales to be a “cause” that he needed to or should write for. His own answer to this question was precise: he called himself “a Welsh poet writing in English” rather than an ‘Anglo-Welsh poet’ and the significance of this was language. Watkins was not a Welsh-speaker or reader and his connection to the early literature of Wales, whether it be the Mabinogion, Taliesin, Aneurin or Llywarch Hen, was limited to childhood memory and English translation. This provided just enough to feed his imagination and, later, some of his poetry, but, as his close friend Glyn Jones pointed out, “it is vain to look in his work for the influence of Welsh-language poetry, ancient or modern” (4). He didn’t adopt the extreme rejection of ‘Welshness’ itself that became common in the anglicised South East, but this was the world in which he grew up and which he knew best. A generation of children raised in South Wales had not been taught any Welsh at all; even their Welsh-speaking parents often considered their native language to be a parochial and archaic irrelevance with no place in the dynamic industrial society being forged around them. Watkins’ mother, specifically, left rural Carmarthenshire to be educated in London and then Bolkenhain in the Sudetenland; rather than teach her son Welsh, she encouraged him to learn German, a language in which he became fluent and enabled him to produce translations of Holderlin, Heine and Goethe. Even though he expressed some regret about not knowing Welsh he never actually attempted to learn it, although he did make the effort to learn French, Italian, Spanish, Hungarian and Latin to complement his already fine German. 

Watkins was a talented linguist with no personal or professional use for what others considered to be his stolen native tongue. “Wales is my native country,” he wrote, “and English the native language of my imagination” (6). Roland Mathias would later claim that Watkins had been “deprived” of his Welsh heritage by losing the language, “the common fate of the first main generation of Anglo-Welsh writers” who were the unwitting victims of petit bourgeois “snobbery” and an English assault on Welsh culture (6). To the extent that this was true, Watkins more than compensated for it by his fluency in European literatures and his participation in the outward thrust of the culture of South Wales at this time, a direction of travel shared by Marxist colliers in Tredegar and Rhymney and the middle class professionals of Swansea, Cardiff and Newport. The actual influence of the Bardic tradition and the Welsh language on his work was, by Watkins’ own account, a matter of rhythm and sound: “my verse is characteristically Welsh in the same way that the verse of Yeats is characteristically Irish…because rhythm and cadence are born in the blood” (7). Like Dylan, whatever ‘Welshness’ was there existed in the sound effects that shaped an English verse otherwise dominated by Blake and Yeats and Hopkins. Watkins’ widow Gwen Watkins would later claim that he

never wished to write in Welsh, because the richness of the English language satisfied him completely; and though he saw no meaning in a narrow nationalism, and loved many countries, Wales always held a chief place in his heart. (8)

Wales was important for many other reasons, but the poetic traditions that he really identified with were not Welsh at all: they were English, German, French and, in the form of Yeats, Anglo-Irish. The ‘Welshness’ of his poetry was evident in the cadence, traditions and landscapes that he used, but these did not define the total ambition of his work which was aesthetic and spiritual rather than ideological or material. He was not extolling the land — he was trying to overcome the tyranny of time. 

It was left to an English critic to mistake Watkins for a Welsh bard. Kathleen Raine was a prominent champion, describing him as “the greatest lyric poet of my generation”, and, as critical accolades of any kind were relatively rare for him, he appreciated the support. But the problem was that her view of what he was actually doing was false: the image of Watkins she painted was a Celtic mirage that provided greater insight into her own fantasy world than the poems she was writing about. For Raine, Watkins was “an heir to the bards”, a poet of “the Celtic tradition” and “the spiritual knowledge of the Druid tradition” (9). While she acknowledged his expertise in German and French literature and his immersion in English culture, to her the “bardic tradition” was the thing that really mattered in his work. She was able to discern the influence of Eliot on Watkins, but found Yeats to be far closer “in his understanding that tradition is not anything and everything that has historically occurred, but a few heroic and religious themes, passed on from age to age” (10). She was partly right about this, but perhaps did not fully appreciate the extent to which the nationalist impulse behind the revival of Irish legends and myths was precisely the thing that Vernon rejected in Yeats. This would lead her to take his talk about rhythm being in the blood to its logical conclusion by identifying “a voice…of the race” in his verse and attributing his “intricate rhythms and assonances” to an intrinsic and immutable Celtic identity that he not only (in her view) consciously adopted, but could not escape from even if he wanted to. But this doesn’t really seem to have been what he had in mind. It was certainly too much for Roland Mathias, Raine’s editor at the Anglo-Welsh Review, who accused her of “not having read his work carefully enough” (11) and pointed out that “there is very little evidence that the bardic spirit had any place in Vernon Watkins’s approach to poetry” (12). 

Watkins did adopt the legendary figure of Taliesin in six of his poems, which possibly set Raine down this wrong path in the first place, but these do not do enough to justify her claim that “the Lay of Taliesin” constituted “his classical ground” (13). In fact, he did not so much adopt as adapt: Taliesin gave Watkins a poetic device that he could use in the service of his own obsessions. This had almost nothing to do with ancient knowledge, the Druid tradition or the bardic inheritance and everything to do with his own philosophical project, for which he took everything he could. Mathias notes that Watkins came to associate Taliesin with Gower based on a tenuous connection with its own source and uses:

In Lady Charlotte Guest’s Mabinogion (1877) there are extensive notes of the text account of the life of Taliesin: one of these quotes a document from the Hafod Uchtryd Collection which, while following Anthony Powel of Llwydaeth in making Taliesin the son of Saint Henwg of Caerleon and having him captured by the Irish while coracle fishing in the course of a visit to the court of Urien Rheged at Aberllychwr, alleges that, escaping, he was cast ashore on the coast of Gower rather than at Aberdyfi. (14)

Watkins used this slender reference as his starting point, a fixing point, for his Taliesin poems: it allowed him to place the legendary poet in the landscape he knew best and could interpret. Mathias is particularly good at showing how Watkins was able to fit Taliesin “the time conqueror” into his own “post-Blakean spirit of cosmic mystery” and “practical Christianity” in poems like ‘Taliesin in Gower’ and ‘Taliesin and the Spring of Vision’. A shard of Mediaeval biography, Heroic poems, the figure of the shapeshifter and the prophet are incorporated into a developing theological superstructure with no regional or nationalist relevance. Watkins’ adoption of Taliesin did not add anything substantial to the old heritage but became a vessel for something altogether new and personal. 

For example, ‘Taliesin in Gower’ presents a “vision” of “the landscape to which I was born” where the gulls, curlews, kestrels, larks, lapwings and herons of Gower are “holy creatures” that “proclaim their regenerate joys” (15). Nature is encountered as a script, a recital (“the script of the stones…the tongue of the wave”) that is played out on the “mighty theatre” of Oxwich, Pwlldu and Three Cliffs Bay. Taliesin defines his role as an interpreter of this natural drama, striving to “loosen this music” of nature, to “celebrate…marvellous forms” and  “make manifest what shall be.” ‘Taliesin in Pwlldu’ unites this neo-Platonism with a more pragmatic Christian vision:

My Master from the rainbow on the sea
Launched my round bark. Through darkness, trailing hands,
I drifted. Wave-gnarled images of gods
Floated upon the whale-backed water-plains.
I looked; creation rose, upheld by Three. (16)

This reconciliation is advanced in ‘Taliesin and the Spring of Vision’, the most explicit exposition of Watkins’ personal philosophy:

Life changes, breaks, scatters. There is no sheet-anchor.
Time reigns; yet the kingdom of love is every moment,
Whose citizens do not age in each other’s eyes.
In a time of darkness the pattern of life is restored
By men who make all transience seem an illusion.
Through inward acts, acts corresponding to music. (17)

If time reigns, then it can be tempered by duality and regeneration and, finally, defeated by human memory and art: “the measure of past grief is the measure of present joy” and, so, “time’s glass breaks, and the world is transfigured in music.” This Taliesin is a prophet who can penetrate the secret patterns of nature and reveal the final triumph over time that finds symbolic form in the natural world and poetry itself (“the soul’s rebirth”). The land to which Taliesin “belongs” and with which he “identifies” is not simply the Gower coast to which his wooden boat returns, but an interior landscape in which he can trace the abstract, hidden patterns of nature and therefore God.

II: Swansea and Memory 

There is no Welsh ‘tradition’ to which Watkins truly belonged, other than a sketchy ‘Anglo-Welsh’ lineage traced by Mathias, Kiedrych Rhys, Glyn Jones and Raymond Garlick, a literary identity that he himself categorically rejected. But there was one Welsh group that Watkins did identify with and this was no tradition at all, nothing like a movement and barely existed as a tendency. To the extent that it did, it displayed no particular interest in the parochial concerns of local heritage or tradition.

The “gang” that met in Swansea’s Kardomah Cafe before the Second World War was hardly anything more than a group of very talented friends with wide interests and varied talents. This was a largely middle class set with mild bohemian pretensions that was well represented by Dylan Thomas and Watkins, both products of the increasingly affluent and self-confident society of the Swansea bourgeoisie. Watkins was the son of a bank manager and Thomas the son of a grammar school teacher; they were both raised in the elegant suburban splendour of the Uplands, safely removed from the dirt and danger of the slums and docks, watching over an infernal landscape of industrial production. If there is one thing that the ‘Kardomah boys’ all shared then it was their refusal to set limitations on their intellectual or artistic ambitions. Their bourgeois Swansea enclave — and even Wales itself — was simply too small to contain them. It is where they came from, where they lived and where they usually worked, but they were always scanning wider cultural horizons and plotting their escape. Their conversations had a cosmopolitan range that revealed their expansive aspirations and was captured by Thomas in Return Journey: “Einstein and Epstein, Stravinsky and Greta Garbo…Communism, symbolism, Bradman, Braque, the Watch Committee, free love, free beer, murder, Michelangelo, ping-pong, ambition, Sibelius, and girls(18). Inevitably, they would look back on all of this with a mixture of nostalgia, idealism, even awe, and the destruction of the old cafe on Castle Street during the Swansea Blitz hit them hard, especially Thomas, maybe the most sentimental of the lot. 

For Watkins, Swansea had multiple and overlapping points of significance: it is where he first discovered the treasures of English poetry; where he first watched his heroine Pearl White plunge to her death on the Uplands Cinema screen; where he first met Thomas (like many others, he would forever associate Cwmdonkin Park with his dead friend); and where, in the Kardomah, he came closest to finding an artistic community in whose company he felt like he belonged. For those reasons and others too, Swansea had positive associations for him. In his 1962 ‘Ode to Swansea’ he even treated the town’s industrial legacy in laudatory terms, eulogising the “merchants, traders, and builders” moving through the streets and the “hammering dockyards/launching strange equatorial ships” (19). Swansea, “dense-windowed, perched/high”, remained “anchored” by its own “myth”: a “Leaning Ark of the world…taking fire from the kindling East” and linked into a maritime trading empire that stretched far beyond the Devon horizon. This was a time when Swansea was still a vital place: not just in terms of its cultural and social vibrancy but also industrial power. The combination of coastal ports with coal fields and copper, iron, steel and tin, had, by the time Watkins was born, produced one of the first developed industrial societies in the world. While this was not to everybody’s taste and provided the most powerful challenge to the nationalist focus on the Welsh language and rural communities, it was also the most effective catalyst for wealth creation, political development and social progress the country had ever witnessed.  Swansea was in the vanguard of this industrial drama and it was this town that Vernon chose to mythologise. The industry and the ships, the smoke and the noise, were all part of its culture; in fact, they were the reason it existed in the ambitious, dynamic form that he saw in the artistic coterie that assembled at the Kardomah. 

So, in the symbolic network of his poetry, Swansea took on eternity:

Would they know you, could the returning ships
Find the pictured bay of the port they left
Changed by a murmuration,
Stained by ores in a nighthawk’s wing?

Yes. Through changes your myth seems anchored here.
Staked in the mud, the forsaken oyster beds
Loom; and the Mumbles lighthouse
Turns through gales like a seabird’s egg.

That emphatic “yes” serves a dual function: to confirm change wrought by time and to affirm the eternal and indestructible identity of the town itself. Here time is manifest in seasons, cycles, the rhythms of commerce and industry, the daily routines of work and the turning of the Mumbles lighthouse, but the eternal and unchanging identity of the town itself ultimately defeats its passage. On a personal level, it would serve this function too, becoming a site of memorial on multiple levels. During three nights in February 1941 the centre of the town was almost entirely razed by German air raids (see my previous essay ‘The Town Blazing Scarlet’: Swansea’s Blitz) and the landscape of Watkins’ youth and early adulthood changed forever. His long war poem ‘The Broken Sea’ was, in part, a eulogy for this erased landscape that also attempted to immortalise its physical landmarks in verse. These were, for Watkins, the landmarks of memory, both collective and individual:

Child Shades of my ignorant darkness, I mourn that moment alive
Near the glow-lamped Eumenides’ house, overlooking the ships in flight,
Where Pearl White focused our childhood, near the foot of Cwmdonkin Drive,
To a figment of crime stampeding in the posters’ wind-blown blight. 

I regret the broken Past, its prompt and punctilious cares,
All the villainies of the fire-and-brimstone-visited town. 
I miss the painter of limbo at the top of the fragrant stairs,
The extravagant hero of night, his iconoclastic frown. (20)

When he is writing with this level of concrete, physical clarity it is usually to enrol nature in his thematic universe. In this case, he comes close to doing what he usually avoids: the poem almost serves a public function by creating a memorial for a lost town littered with images that defined it. But then these landmarks are also personal: the Uplands Cinema screening Pearl White serials, Cwmdonkin Drive (home to the young Thomas) and the College Street flat of the painter Alfred Janes. This is not only a memorial to a physically destroyed town, but also to the loss of the Kardomah gang, dispersed by ambition, opportunity and the passage of time rather than Luftwaffe bombs. 

His memories of the town also became entwined with the memories of Dylan Thomas. He would write a series of poetic eulogies to his friend, not all necessarily tied to Swansea, although he could never write about the town without some direct or occluded reference to Thomas. In the poem ‘A True Picture Restored – Memories of Dylan Thomas’, Cwmdonkin Drive and the park become the site of a slightly overwrought origin myth:

Climbing Cwmdonkin’s dock-based hill,
I found his lamp-lit room,
The great light in the forehead
Watching the waters’ loom,
Compiling there his doomsday book
Or dictionary of doom.

More times than I can call to mind
I hear him reading there.
His eyes with fervour would make blind
All clocks about a stair
On which the assenting foot divined
The void and clustered air.

That was the centre of the world,
That was the hub of time…(21)

For those familiar with the biographies of the two men and the physical reality of the Uplands, this is not obscure at all: Watkins is writing about Dylan’s childhood bedroom, in which he lived and where he wrote most of his early poems while working as a reporter for the Swansea Evening Post. This is where Watkins first met Dylan and shared something like a moment of sublime recognition, a poetic epiphany: at a certain time, artistically and emotionally, this was the centre of the world for him. Maybe it was ground zero for Swansea’s artistic renaissance. 

Being engaged in a personal war on time it was inevitable that Watkins would become a serial eulogiser: it was one of the most powerful weapons at his disposal. Dylan Thomas was only one of his subjects and many other poets and friends received the same treatment. In each case this served a specific emotional purpose, but it ultimately served the same end: the attempt to conquer time. Whether fixing the image of Dylan writing in his bedroom or composing visual images of a town flattened by the Nazis, memory and the act of memorialistion became potent weapons in this psychological battle. Before his breakdown, he had treated poetry as a romantic vocation, but afterwards it would become a means to overcome the otherwise inescapable reality of death. Places and people were part of this struggle rather than subjects in their own right.

In a talk titled ‘The Place and the Poem’ Watkins directly addressed the relationship between place and memory in his work. “Memory itself works very intricately,” he noted, 

episodes and half-episodes are photographed obliquely: a hundred thousand moments of transience are recorded in minute detail. At first they look like small coloured pictures stuck in a scrap-book by someone with no discrimination. The Swansea of my childhood’s scrapbook, so much of which has been destroyed, is full of such pictures. (22)

Among the most potent of these memories was the silent movie actress, Pearl White:

The first Great War had broken out, and we were full of stories of heroism; but the heroine of many of those serials was Pearl White, the American actress who could express horror with wider eyes than anyone else, and who really used to throw herself off buildings into rivers and risk her life in the making of the films. She was always my heroine, and I looked to her to do all the heroics which I knew I would not dare to do myself, and felt a vicarious sense of achievement when she performed them. Her name became the centre of many fights and struggles.

I grew up out of her memory. (23)

In the poem ‘Elegy on the Heroine of Childhood’, composed after Watkins read about White’s death on the eve of the Second World War, the silent Hollywood star is not simply a dead movie icon. Her memory is the memory of childhood itself, evoking the early days of the First World War (“the time when Arras fell”) and the childhood locations of the Uplands (“From school’s spiked railings, glass-topped, cat-walked walls…We run to join the queue’s coiled peel”). Her pale image, resplendent and flickering on the cinema screen, becomes the ghost that haunts Watkins’ mature imagination:

Week back to week I tread with nightmare speed,
Find the small entrance to large days,
Charging the chocolates from the trays,
Where, trailing or climbing the railing, we mobbed the dark
Of Pandemonium near Cwmdonkin Park.

Children return to mourn you. I retrace
Their steps to childhood’s jealousies, a place
Of urchin hatred, shaken fists;
I drink the poison of the mists
To see you, a clear ghost before true day,
A girl, through wrestling clothes, caps flung in play. (24)

Her image is entwined completely with the physical recollections of childhood (“episodes and half episodes…photographed”) and her multiplying death scenes become a cheap way to cheat death: her resurrection and immolation in each new movie becomes a symbol of cycles, renewal and therefore permanence. Pearl White defeated time until she actually died in real life and this immaculate image was brought back to reality and childhood ended:

How near, how far, how very faintly comes
Your tempest through a tambourine of crumbs,
Whose eye by darkness sanctified,
Is brilliant with my boyhood’s slide.
How silently at last the reel runs back
Through your hundred deaths, now Death wears black.

While it is true that Swansea was a positive place for Watkins — after all, along with the Gower, it was the place that healed him and gave him back his life — in these poems it is usually defined by loss and grief: the elegies to Dylan, his childhood and Pearl White, and the town demolished in the Blitz. The fact that they record the things that have been lost in the end serves to preserve them. For Watkins, this process is fundamental to his understanding of life, death and art.

If Watkins could mythologise Swansea in this way it was because, for him, the town was already a symbolic place, a site tied into his own, extended, poetic universe. It was a tribute to the vitality and atmosphere of the place that it could sustain such pressure. How true this view was is not really the point. The “loitering marvel” that he painted was a place of the imagination, which made it immortal. It was a half-truth: at a certain moment Swansea had a creative vitality and depth that was unusual, not only for Wales. This meant everything to Watkins and partly gave him back the paradise he lost when he left Repton College: a circle of inspiration, comfort, camaraderie and love. For him, Swansea was like a town from the Italian Renaissance but without any patrons, and so he made high claims for it:

Swansea is a town where art is alive. If it became a cultural centre or a resort where art was fashionable and where it was always being discussed but never created, it would be a town where art was dead. Such a Swansea, such a Salzburg-on-the-Tawe I could not imagine; but a Swansea without art I cannot imagine either. There is no room in Swansea to be pompous without it being ludicrous. But the town itself, the town of windows between hills and sea, is unforgettable. What should Swansea become? It should, I think, generate its own species and become what it is now, a town where art is alive. If you give Swansea more power, make it the capital of Wales, then you spoil everything. I want Swansea to be, not the capital, but the interest of Wales. (25)

In the ‘Ode to Swansea’ he made this loyalty to his half-imagined utopia clear:

Prouder cities rise through the haze of time,
Yet, envious, all men have found is here.
Here is the loitering marvel
Feeding artists with all they know.

Swansea, a once great town of global significance, provided him with a symbol of creativity and the immortality of man. 

III: Gower and Landscape  

But what about Gower, “the first of places for him,” in the words of his widow, Gwen (26)? 

His friend, the poet Michael Hamburger, wrote that “the Gower landscape is as inseparable from my recollections of Vernon as his poetry and person are inseparable from the place in which he chose to spend all his mature years” (27). His sometime neighbour, the Swansea painter Ceri Richards, described the experience of being given a tour of Watkins’ “immediate and familiar” Gower: 

He took you straight to his personal vantage points. He was remarkably sure-footed. Far down on the foreshore, when you called to see him, and the tide was right — you saw him from aloft — and he was master with the prawns, crabs and lobsters, striding through pools, over rocks slippery with seaweed, up rocky faces and sand dunes, and through acres of bracken and gorse, in his own natural diversity of ways. (28)

This was the south coast of the peninsula, the golden belt of sandy bays, remote coves, prehistoric caves and limestone cliffs extending from Bracelet Bay sitting in the lap of Mumbles Lighthouse to the grand sweep of Rhossili and Worm’s Head (“end of Earth, and of Gower!” 29). Watkins once defined the geography that shaped the early imagination of Dylan Thomas as “the sea town, the park, and the Gower peninsula stretching from Mumbles to Rhossili, and from Rhossili to Worm’s Head,” (30) and this almost exactly demarcated his own interior landscape, too. Unlike Swansea or Germany or the Ireland of Yeats, South Gower was, for him, a self-enclosed world, a permanent and privileged micro-continent that supplied him with many of the tools he needed for his own work. He was a part of this landscape and was fully attuned to all aspects of its environment. He could read it closely and created a network of symbols out of its raw materials: the sea, geology, birdlife and vegetation; the storm beaches and sand dunes; the seasonal winds and the changing light. 

The first true success of Watkins’ second period of poetry (that is, the period of poetry he was content to see published, rather than incinerated) was ‘Griefs of the Sea’, an elegy to dead sailors that he “heard” one day “coming out of the grasses of the cliffs of Pennard and Hunt’s Bay” (31). Gwen Watkins recalled that

the spring and autumn equinoxes were times of great fascination for Vernon; the gales then came more exactly to the dates than they seem to now, and the idea of day and night standing equal as the storm-winds raged round his home was immensely exciting. (32)

In this poem the wild Gower winds are the driving element of natural chaos that once claimed the lives of the sailors that the poem mourns: “a horrible sound”, “a wicked sound…that follows us like a scenting hound”, the sound of death and therefore time. Some of the symbols are established here that would recur in the rest of his work: the “blind” waves and their “wild wreath of foam” and “weeds…beneath the sea”; the wild wind and the ominous stars (33). This is the beginning of a private network of imagery that would become more elaborate and complex over time; the poem lacks the taxonomy of colour and the precise inventory of Gower’s wildlife that would become central to his work, but it is the first example of the Gower being used by Watkins in the way it would always be from then on. The landscape inspires “thought” which, in turn, “changes” or transfigures it: a walk on a windy day to his favourite bay sparks a vivid meditation on death, mourning and memory. Random natural elements are transformed by a cosmic drama that is, ultimately, the same thing as his own human drama. As he would later put it, “a place is altered by a poem” (34). 

One of the most important places in Watkins’ elect landscape was Pwlldu Bay at the mouth of Bishopston Valley, a recurrent location with its own natural and symbolic properties. In ‘The Return of Spring’, the stream that winds through the valley down to the beach is a fresh course of water in which “all secrets under the Earth grow articulate” (35). These are the secrets of time: at the bottom of the valley, beyond the great shingle bank that separates the beach from the wood, the stream and the reed beds, “the eyes turn seaward/To laugh with waves that outlive us”; “the receding seawaves…knock at the hour-glass,” a majestic and immortal rhythm that finds its cyclical residue in the sand, pebbles and rocks that construct the landscape of the bay. Meanwhile, in the valley, leaves mend “Winter’s wild net”, “taut branches exude gold wax of the breaking buds”, “sweet finches sing” and “diamonds of light” suffuse the woodland as life returns to “bring beauty to Earth.” But with the annual regeneration of nature there is also darkness, decay and death: as Roland Mathias recognised, “an awareness of the necessary interlocking of light and dark, of death and life” was a central tension, or balance, in Watkins’ work. For Mathias, “grief and darkness” lay at the heart of Watkins’ Christianity and his conception of life itself: “it was through grief and darkness, not through the near-whites of nature or human satisfaction, that he had perceived the single, yet multiple, pattern of Christ” (36). This is what he saw at Pwlldu, with spring light breaking through Bishopston Valley (“I divine those meanings/Listening to tongues that are silent”): the secret patterns of natural regeneration, cycles of life always touched by death. This was the balance that he found in Plotinus and the New Testament that provided him with some measure of understanding to replace dread: “What first I feared as a rite I love as a sacrament”.

At Pwlldu, the “waves…outlive us” and Bishopston stream is witness to the regeneration of life within the cycle of seasons. The beach and valley are sites of eternity, an idea revisited in ‘Ballad of the Equinox’ which emphatically declares Pwlldu “an eternal place!” Again, the landscape is a stage on which this cosmic human drama is played out: 

There the great shingle-bank
Props a theatrical scene
Where guess the generous dead
What lovers’ words may mean. (37)

In ‘The Return of Spring’, Watkins writes: “Thunder compels no man, yet a thought compels him.” The natural world has no meaning, symbolic or otherwise, without the “thought” that makes meaning. It is the human faculty to divine the patterns of nature — or in the poet’s own theological system, the patterns of God — that recreates the landscape and makes it intelligible in artistic and philosophical terms (“a place is altered by a poem”). In ‘Ballad of the Equinox’ this process is at work, and explicitly so: for Watkins, the world’s a stage, but man is no mere player: he makes meaning

In ‘Return of the Spring’, Bishopston stream carries light and life in its cool and fast flowing water; in ‘Ballad of the Equinox’, this same water flows into the pool at the foot of the shingle bank, under the stones and into the sea. “The black stream under the stones/Carries the bones of the dead,” Watkins writes, transforming Pwlldu into a dark memorial, a “sterile porch of Hell” with “the devil…in the wild winds” and “the tides of the grave” dispensing in its foam “A spent and weary log/A crab with a million eyes/And a cast-up, wicked dog”. In a later poem, ‘Bishopston Stream’, the water is still “black” but once again functions as a symbol of renewal, balance and life: “Out of the wood I come, astonished to find you/Younger and swifter” (38). The stream is loaded with dual meaning in this poem, as the water speaks with two voices: a meeting place and an image of separation. The duality, the balance, the tensions between light and dark, white and black (black water, white stars, white foam) hold the key to Watkins’ method and thought. Opposites are never reconciled and so nothing is resolved in this way. Opposites exist within each other without losing their separate qualities. The lack of resolution is the resolution. The poet’s only answer to the problem, or the tragedy, of time is to learn how to interpret it: “Even by day you run through a continual darkness/Could we interpret time, we should be like the angels”. 

Pwlldu, Hunt’s Bay, Rhossili, Oxwich, Three Cliffs, Paviland Cave, Worm’s Head, Crawley Wood: these are the Gower landmarks that populate Watkins’ poetry and are transformed by it. They have the same tangential relationship to memory and lived experience in the poems as Swansea does. As Gwen Watkins remembered it, the poem ‘Rhossili’ was partly inspired by “a disastrous canoe trip which Vernon made at the beginning of the war” with his friend David Lewis: 

They intended to arrive on Rhossili beach and camp for a night or two; but their failure to practise double-paddling or to check the times of the tides, or to load their gear evenly, led to their arrival very late at night. They were instantly apprehended by the local Home Guard as German airmen coming ashore. Their English public-school accents did not help matters, but after hours of questioning, they were allowed to camp for the rest of the night. David Lewis went home by the first bus the following morning, but Vernon stayed on, and went out to the end of the Worm. (39)

This mildly calamitous expedition is reimagined as an epic Homeric voyage: Worm’s Head becomes  “The rock of Tiresias’ eyes!” and Watkins a latter-day Odysseus, battling through the currents from Pobbles to “the needle around which the wide world spins,” about twelve miles west. He climbs the face of the worm and is attacked by screaming herring gulls who lunge at his head, “crazy with fear for the loss/of their locked, unawakened young”; later, lying on the sands at Llangennith, he watches “dolphins, plunging from death into birth” that are “held by the Sybil’s trance!”

Rhossili figures quite precisely in this account and anyone familiar with the terrain would be able to recognise the wreck of the Helvetia or the blow hole near the centre of the Worm. But these physical landmarks are filtered through the transformative properties of memory which, in this case, finds expression in the mock heroic narrative. Like ‘Elegy to a Heroine from Childhood’, ‘Rhossili’ is a particular type of memory poem that does not try to precisely recall the past, but attempts to convey the way memory works in the imagination, combining recollection with sensation and experience. ‘Rhossili’ was not written for the sake of describing Rhossili: it was not about the place. The origin and content of the poem remain oblique without Gwen’s account of Vernon’s canoe trip or some familiarity with the physical and natural features of landscape and geography. The poem exists to question the nature of memory on a personal scale and within the wider context of human perception and creativity. 

The presence of Gower in the poetry of Vernon Watkins is not just evident in, say, poems named after beaches. Kathleen Raine was correct when she noted that all of Watkins’ poems “seem…like parts of a single poem” (40) and Roland Mathias made a similar point when he wrote that “the truth he was after had been caught, if at all, only in an endlessly mended net of words and symbols” (41). The natural imagery of the peninsular is woven densely into these poems and across the whole body of his work. But however precise, evocative or vivid these details were, he was not writing about the landscape of the Gower for its own sake. He was not a landscape poet. He never intended to be merely descriptive, a point he made explicit to George Thomas in 1967: “I’m fundamentally a religious and metaphysical poet. I’m not a nature poet or a descriptive poet” (42). And, in a talk delivered in 1961 (‘Poetry and Experience’), he explained:

Constancy within change is the theme of so many of my poems, and until it enters a poem I can never find my imagination wholly engaged. I marvel at the beauty of landscape, but I never think of it as a theme for poetry until I read metaphysical symbols behind what I see. (43) 

By all accounts the Gower was the most important place on earth for him but it had a strictly demarcated role in his poetry. It served a function, however rich and complex that function was. The Gower was one stage for his own human drama which, for him, was the human drama: to escape the domination of time and transcend the final fact of death. Even if it was the most important stage he had, it was still a stage: he was never really writing about Gower because he was writing about his own conflicts and concerns. As Mathias put it, Gower epitomised the entire world for Vernon Watkins and what he found here was not simply the pleasures and interests of the landscape itself or his own personal memories, but the ultimate revelation of truth and order. 

IV: Nationalism and Poetry

In this sense, then, Watkins barely wrote about Wales at all. He loved Wales, but he had no intention of tying his work to the earth. Poetry, for Vernon Watkins, was an existential art, a private, even hermetic, affair. It was not meant to proselytise for a cause, however noble or historic that cause may be. And, importantly, Watkins did not consider Welsh nationalism to be a noble cause. 

This was the one point of contention between Watkins and Yeats in 1938, recorded in ‘Yeats in Dublin’:

We talked of national movements.
He pondered the chance
Of Welshmen reviving
The fire of song and dance,
Driving a lifeless hymnal
From that inheritance.

I thought of rough mountains,
The poverty of the heath.
‘Though leaders sway the crowd’, I said,
‘Power is underneath.
The sword of Taliesin
Would never fit a sheath… (44)

In the same year, Keidrych Rhys tried to recruit Watkins to his new Welsh poetry movement with the taunt: “Did you know Yeats believes in National Poetry?” At their meeting, Yeats had asked Watkins about the state of Welsh poetry and told him, “Poetry must not be nationalist, but must be national” (45). Watkins responded: “How can there be a national poetry?” The idea was inconceivable, a tragic limitation on the imagination. Taliesin himself could not be reduced to the national question; apart from anything else, the working bard was employed by rival and sometimes warring princes and could therefore just as easily be considered a symbol of national disunity. In fact, nationalism was the one thing that had, in Watkins’ eyes, blighted some of Yeats’s own work, which was otherwise beyond criticism. 

Despite the hairsplitting (‘national’ rather than ‘nationalist’), Watkins recognised Yeats as the “great nationalist” that he was and therefore, in this regard, considered him subject to an “arrogant blindness” (46). He was responding here to a political condition later diagnosed by Conor Cruise O’Brien as an Anglophobic aristocratic nationalist authoritarianism that contained within it a “sometimes mildly critical…never hostile, almost always respectful, often admiring” attitude to fascism (47). In contrast, Watkins, though politically naive in many ways, detested fascism and Nazism on first contact. He had witnessed the Nazi book-burnings while on holiday in Germany with his sister Dorothy and almost caused a diplomatic incident, as Gwen Watkins recalled:

Vernon told me that two German friends had taken him to a Nazi gathering…and they discovered Nazi officers lighting a bonfire and people were bringing books and laughing and cheering. The Nazis shouted out the names of the authors as they threw the books. The friends wanted to leave, but Vernon heard the name of Heine shouted out, and began to try to push to the front to save the books. The two friends rapidly took his arms and rushed him away in spite of his struggles. He would say jokingly that if the officers had caught him I would probably have had to find someone else to marry. (48)

This was a visceral response to the violent philistinism of the Nazis; Watkins would also recoil from the totalitarian racial utopia that they planned, a vision that was anathema to his own personal and universalist creed. As Nazi and fascist power grew in Europe his instincts diverged from Yeats, who became more excited and enthusiastic with each victory. Writing to a friend on the day Chamberlain flew to Munich, Watkins used unusually vulgar terms: “Don’t you think that all racial purists ought to be pissed on hard and long — or isn’t that too good for them?” (49). In the end, it was his fluent German that would enable him to fully contribute to the anti-Nazi cause when he was recruited to Bletchley Park in 1941. 

As Gwen later wrote, Watkins “saw no meaning in narrow nationalism” of which Nazism was one particularly virulent manifestation, but which he would also reject in the more benign form of a proposed Welsh poetry movement. When he was invited to join the  ‘national’ poets of the ‘New Wales Society’ in 1939 (of all times!) his response was scathing: “those nationalists who are most bitter at this moment should try to distinguish between the imperfections of their country and the imperfection of their style” (50). They would, in effect if not intention, be making the same errors as Auden and Yeats, but without the talent to back it up and built on a brittle foundation of parochial resentments and historic grievance. He held nothing but contempt for this position and was more than happy to make common cause on this point with Dylan Thomas: “We were both Welsh, both Christian poets, we both preferred the sea to politics and hated nationalism” (51). As Watkins’ biographer Richard Ramsbotham noted: “what was important for Watkins about Yeats had nothing to do with nationalism or political causes, but with the universal character of his individual imagination” (52). Universality was the only legitimate aim for poetry; the imagination its only cause. 

The whole objective of Watkins’ life as a poet was to escape the limits of time. Memory and the act of eulogy were key components to this, but he did not intend to use them to put new or different limitations on the imagination. As Raymond Garlick noted, there is a strain of Anglo-Welsh literature in which “the past is a constant theme, triumphant and golden”, a consciousness of belonging to “a country of great age,” as R. S. Thomas put it (53). This was a tendency that would attempt to find its voice in the New Wales Society and really would find a voice in R. S. Thomas’s own work, but it was not a concern for Vernon Watkins. Even when he invoked Taliesin, the historical associations were slight and the intention to revive “tradition” largely absent. His mature work was driven by his own revolt against time, in which all of the material that he had collected from his past and his present was put to use. Time reigned, but not the national timeline. The idea of a collective past, a national history or a Welsh tradition had no purchase on his true ambition. He was not a poet of Wales, writing to extol the landscape or glorify the past. For this reason, his refusal to fully exploit “Welsh heritage” or take it up as a cause was not only a necessity, but a source of strength. He consciously avoided all of the traps that caught Yeats. He had no interest at all in adopting the collective grievance fueled by the nationalist party. He refused to produce propaganda, however erudite it may have been.

Mathias recognised that there was no “revolt or reconciliation” (54) in this attitude, even if he did not fully approve of it. This was not a fight or an argument or a revolution, it was a matter of fact and fate; the result of private experience and personal philosophy. Vernon Watkins was a Welsh poet but he did not write for Wales and he did not belong to Wales. 

  1. Watkins, ‘Yeats in Dublins’ in The Collected Poems of Vernon Watkins (Golgonooza Press, 1986), p.65
  2. ‘Insert for Spectrum’, interview with Dr. George Thomas, 16th February 1967 in Vernon Watkins on Dylan Thomas and Other Poets & Poetry, ed. Gwen Watkins and Jeff Towns (Parthian, 2015), p.128
  3. Vernon Watkins, ‘Poetry and Experience’ in Vernon Watkins on Dylan Thomas and Other Poets & Poetry, p.155
  4. Glyn Jones, ‘Whose Flight is Toil’ in Vernon Watkins 1906-1967, ed. Leslie Norris (Faber and Faber, 1970), p.25
  5. Quoted in Richard Ramsbotham, An Exact Mystery: The Poetic Life of Vernon Watkins (The Choir Press, 2020), p.187
  6. Roland Mathias, Vernon Watkins (University of Wales Press, 1970), p.11
  7. Quoted in Ramsbotham, p.6
  8. Gwen Watkins, ‘Vernon Watkins 1906-1967’ in Vernon Watkins 1906-1967, p.15
  9. Kathleen Raine, ‘The Poetry of Vernon Watkins’ in Vernon Watkins 1906-1967, p.38
  10. Ibid., p.41
  11. Roland Mathias, ‘Grief and the Circus Horse: A Study of the Mythic and Christian Themes in the Early Poetry of Vernon Watkins’ in A Ride Through the Woods: Essays in Anglo-Welsh Literature (Poetry Wales Press, 1985), p.120
  12. Mathias, Vernon Watkins, p.97
  13. Raine, p.38
  14. Mathias, Vernon Watkins, p.98
  15. Vernon Watkins, ‘Taliesin in Gower’ in Collected Poems, p.184
  16. Watkins, ‘Taliesin in Pwlldu’, Collected Poems, p.353 
  17. Watkins, ‘Taliesin and the Spring of Vision’, Collected Poems, p.224
  18. Dylan Thomas, ‘Return Journey’ in Dylan Thomas – The Broadcasts, ed. Ralph Maud (J.M.Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1991), p.183
  19. Watkins, ‘Ode to Swansea’, Collected Poems, p.285
  20. Watkins, ‘The Broken Sea’, Collected Poems, pp.80-1
  21. Watkins, ‘A True Picture Restored — Memories of Dylan Thomas’, Collected Poems, p.286
  22. Watkins, ‘The Place and the Poem’ in Vernon Watkins on Dylan Thomas and Other Poets & Poetry, p.176
  23. Ibid., p.178
  24. Watkins, ‘Elegy on the Heroine of Childhood’, Collected Poems, p.4
  25. Quoted in Gary Gregor, ‘Swansea’s Other Poet: Vernon Watkins’ in The Journal of the Gower Society, Volume 65, 2014, pps. 55-6
  26. Gwen Watkins, ‘Vernon Watkins 1906-1967’, p.16
  27. Michael Hamburger, ‘Vernon Watkins, a Memoir’ in Vernon Watkins 1906-1967, p.48
  28. Ceri Richards, ‘Remembering Vernon’ in Vernon Watkins 1906-1967, p.95
  29. Vernon Watkins, ‘Rhossili’, Collected Poems, p.119
  30. Watkins, ‘The Wales Dylan Thomas Knew’ in Vernon Watkins on Dylan Thomas and Other Poets & Poetry, p.111
  31. Quoted in Ramsbotham, p.85
  32. Gwen Watkins, ‘Taliesin in Gower: Vernon Watkins — A Retrospect’ in The Journal of the Gower Society, Volume 48, 1997, p.23
  33. Vernon Watkins, ‘Griefs of the Sea’, Collected Poems, p.7
  34. Watkins, ‘The Place and the Poem’, p.175
  35. Watkins, ‘The Return of Spring’, Collected Poems, p.116
  36. Mathias, ‘Grief and the Circus Horse’, p.111
  37. Vernon Watkins, ‘Ballad of the Equinox’, Collected Poems, p.189
  38. Watkins, ‘Bishopston Stream’, Collected Poems, p.315
  39. Gwen Watkins, ‘Taliesin in Gower’, p.25
  40. Raine, p.40
  41. Mathias, ‘Grief and the Circus Horse’, p.91
  42. Interview with George Thomas, p.129
  43. Vernon Watkins, ‘Poetry and Experience’ in Vernon Watkins on Dylan Thomas and Other Poets & Poetry, p.163
  44. Watkins, ‘Yeats in Dublins’, Collected Poems, p.65
  45. Quoted in Ramsbotham, p.169
  46. Ibid., p.186
  47. Conor Cruise O’Brien, ‘Passion and Cunning: An Essay on the Politics of W. B. Yeats’ in Passion & Cunning: Essays on Nationalism, Terrorism and Revolution (Simon & Schuster, 1988), p.54
  48. Quoted in Ramsbotham, p.105
  49. Ibid, p.176
  50. Ibid., p.186
  51. Ibid., p.127
  52. Ibid., p.186
  53. Raymond Garlick, Introduction to Anglo-Welsh Literature (University of Wales Press, 1972), p.53
  54. Roland Mathias, Anglo-Welsh Literature: An Illustrated History (Poetry of Wales Press, 1986), p.94

 

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Archives of Pain: Kanan Makiya and the Politics of Iraq

That’s the hope I still have for Iraq — that it can rediscover its destiny as a richly various and pluralistic society, a meeting ground of all sorts of creeds and groupings. That’s the hope that sustains me.
Kanan Makiya, 1992 (1)

There is no political power without control of the archive.
Jacques Derrida

I: Sweets and Flowers

By the end of 2004, Kanan Makiya was beginning to lose hope. “My realisation…that Iraq was sliding toward civil war was a turning point in my life,” he explained in the afterward to his 2016 novel, The Rope:

the whole edifice of hopes that had clung to that slim possibility of a different kind of transition from dictatorship crumbled. Self-doubt began to eat away at the optimism that had sustained me since 1991. (2) 

This optimism had been both a source of strength and a liability. Makiya made plenty of enemies in the 1990s, but even friends and allies began to recognise the rather unreal quality of his ambitions and expectations for Iraq. Ali Allawi, Iraq’s first Finance Minister after the fall of the Ba’ath regime, dismissed his “solitary path in a campaign to mobilise Iraqis in exile behind a post-modern, somewhat ethereal, vision of a tolerant and pluralist Iraq” (3). George Packer, in his chronicle of the Iraq war, The Assassin’s Gate, saw “more than a little naïveté in Makiya – a worrying trait, given the project he was about to sign on for” (4). Fellow Iraqi exiles who returned to Baghdad at the same time and with some of the same illusions soon found his persistent talk of democracy and liberalism as the country disintegrated around them exasperating, even infuriating. One told Packer: “Kanan is living on another planet. He doesn’t have a clue. He drives to the Green Zone and back to the hotel” (5).

Kanan Makiya had a vision – but he was almost alone. In one way, Allawi was correct: within the exile community he cut a rather ethereal figure among the ex-Ba’athists, Shia clerics and Kurdish politicians who had their own ideas about what Iraq would look like after Saddam. Makiya was a secular liberal with a refined political sensibility informed by his late discovery of “Hannah Arendt…Isaiah Berlin, John Stuart Mill, Hobbes” (6) while writing Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq during the 1980s. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, Republic of Fear became an overnight bestseller largely because it was the only book in English that recorded graphic details of the secretive and brutal regime suddenly making global headlines. In the fractious world of post-Gulf War exile politics, Makiya joined Ahmed Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress (INC) to make the public case for regime change in Iraq. In 2002, during the run-up to the war, he worked alongside other Iraqis on the State Department’s Future of Iraq project and drafted the Democratic Principles Working Group’s ‘Report on the Transition to Democracy in Iraq’ which he used to articulate his own vision of a secular democratic constitution that would balance the competing interests of Iraq’s clans, tribes, ethnic groups and religious sects. He then pursued this plan with a sense of purpose that offended and alienated some his fellow exiles — hence, perhaps, Allawi’s curt dismissal. 

Given the factions that developed over Iraq it was perhaps inevitable that Makiya would take sides in the fierce civil war that broke out inside the Bush administration after 9/11. This period of internal conflict provided a key to the enigma of the 2003 war and Makiya had his own view on it. “The Department of State was seeking change from within the Ba’ath regime, not from without by means of the organised Iraqi opposition,” he explained, a decade later: “regime change led by former Ba’athists was their way to the future…it was about regime change without democracy” (7). In reaction to this, Makiya aligned with Chalabi’s allies in the Department of Defence and Vice President’s office, a neoconservative faction that had been engaged in ideological hostilities with the State Department for decades. This conflict spilled over into the Bush administration, both driving and derailing U.S. strategy when it came to Iraq. “Deep internal American conflicts hobbled the whole enterprise from the outset,” Makiya later claimed, “matters reached the level of hatred between and among Americans.” The post-Saddam collapse had its root in these departmental hostilities and bitter personal feuds — in effect, factional schisms within Washington’s foreign policy elite helped set the stage for an explosion of sectarian hatred in Iraq.

But Makiya was always willing point out that these divisions predated the American intervention and that it was the Iraqis themselves who chose to go to war with each other after 2003. His optimism was always tempered by experience. He knew all about the dangers of sectarianism and political mythology in the Arab world. He had seen his old comrades on the secular Arab left defeated by their enemies, former allies and, finally, their own degraded political culture. “We were locked in the dynamic and the language of the Lebanese civil war,” he recalled:

Issues of human rights, of building civil society, of dictatorship, of our own responsibility for our own ills, were all constantly being subordinated by the old language of anti-Zionism and anti-Imperialism. I had come along with Republic of Fear and said the most important thing is what we have done to ourselves. (8)

This was not always what people wanted to hear and when he applied this experience to Iraq in 1993’s Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising, and the Arab World (9) he made powerful enemies among the political and cultural elites of the Middle East, albeit not among the Iraqi exiles themselves. Cruelty and Silence, perhaps the most recklessly brave book written in the 1990s, exposed Arab complicity in the violence and repression of the Iraqi Ba’ath, a complicity that provided political cover for Saddam’s crimes in Kuwait and Kurdistan. Makiya saw only one route out of this for Iraq and the region: the removal of Saddam by the only power with the political will and military might to destroy his regime. This was a sin against Arab solidarity and honor, a taboo only the most desperate of Saddam’s enemies had been willing to break, and it would end in the Oval Office, with Makiya telling the President that American troops would be greeted with “sweets and flowers” in Iraq.

For Makiya, the 2003 war was — and remains, despite its failure — a war to liberate Iraq from Ba’athist tyranny. Like the Iraqis he wrote about, his past and his politics had been shaped by suffering and pain. His writing was a response to this; a way to understand and overcome it. His original Iraqi trilogy — Republic of FearThe Monument and Cruelty and Silence — was the work of a dedicated archivist: a collector of documents, stories, pictures and videos that detailed a history of Ba’athist violence and terror. Work on Republic of Fear began with his own files, a substantial collection even by the mid-1980s. This was later supplemented by material uncovered in public libraries; SOAS at first, and then the New York Public Library, where he discovered a large cache of Ba’ath pamphlets and documents. The Monument grew out of his father’s rich collection of architectural records which allowed him to enter the cultural life of Iraq both before and during the Ba’ath era, recovering a legacy of riches that would be tragically subordinated to the totalitarian propaganda of Saddam. Finally, the success of Republic of Fear made Makiya a recorder of testimony, as the regime’s victims sought him out and told their stories. These were collected in the first part of Cruelty and Silence, a work that planted the seed for his final archival project: the post-war Iraq Memory Foundation.

This was the foundation for all of Makiya’s work and helped to shape his understanding of Iraqi Ba’athism as the apotheosis of pan-Arab nationalism and an heir to Europe’s totalitarian parties and movements.

II: Republic of Fear and Arab Nationalism

Following the publication of Republic of Fear, Makiya noted an “upsettingly common reaction” among his Iraqi Arab readers: “Why did you give so much space to the plight of a handful of Jews in 1968? Didn’t every Iraqi suffer?” (10) His answer was obvious and important: how the regime treated its most vulnerable minorities revealed how it would treat all Iraqis in time. The “anti-Zionist” campaigns of 1968-70 “turned out to be the thin end of the wedge in a generalized campaign of terror that finally touched every Iraqi” (11).

It wasn’t the Jewish state that destroyed Iraqi Jewry but the conspiratorial and antisemitic pan-Arab ideology that found a home in the military regimes that would eventually rule Iraq. The first Jewish pogrom in the modern Middle East took place in Baghdad, encouraged by Arab nationalist allies of the Axis powers: the 1941 Farhud was an explicitly Holocaust-related event, incited by Nazi propaganda and pro-fascist militias. After the war successive pan-Arab regimes and parties would pursue this legacy across the Middle East and North Africa: 850,000 Jews fled these countries after 1948, driven out by the extended antisemitic campaigns of pan-Arab forces. This would prove to be a powerful weapon in the hands of the Ba’ath party, providing a model of persecution and control that would be applied for decades after. The ascendancy of pan-Arabism in Iraq was linked to ethnic persecution and violence from the beginning: Arab nationalist army officers cut their teeth during the Simele massacre of Assyrians in 1933 while the Farhud directly followed the overthrow of the pro-Nazi regime of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani. Ba’athism itself sought unity in its own pan-Arab ideology: it abhorred diversity and individualism, both philosophically and as a practical threat to its authority, which had to be total. The Jews were the most powerful and visible ethnic minority in Iraq and so they became a symbol of the very pluralism that had to be eradicated in order to forge a pure Arab identity.

If, as Makiya claimed in Republic of Fear, “the essential core of Ba’athism is pan-Arabism,” (12) then Ba’athism would finally become an Arab nationalist project to destroy the “embedded social pluralism” of Iraqi society. The central symbol of this pluralism was Baghdad, a city that was once a vital regional metropolis with the liveliest local nightlife outside of Beirut. Arabs, Jews, Christians, Shia, Sunni, nationalists, Communists, liberals, middle class professionals, artisans, artists, poets and musicians all contributed to its rich cultural and social fabric. In the end, the greatest threat to this would be the brand of pan-Arab nationalism pioneered by Sati al-Husri, Iraq’s Minister of Education who redesigned the country’s education system with the aim of eradicating the cosmopolitan and multi-ethnic reality of the capital. Tamara Chalabi, in her family memoir Late for Tea at the Deer Palace, vividly described the impact that al-Husri’s reforms had on her uncles in the 1930s:

Both Rusdi and Hassan noted with great unease how their school had become more militant and overtly nationalistic in its teachings, as had other schools. During morning assemblies, the boys winced as the school anthem kept changing, with more aggressive language being added to its verses. Their history books were full of alienating references to those who weren’t Arab Sunni, and all the students were encouraged to undergo military training…It was an uncomfortable atmosphere that, they felt, pushed each person towards his basic sectarian or religious identity. (13)

Like all such movements, including Ba’athism, al-Husri’s pan-Arabism proved to be narrowly sectarian in practice. He wasn’t just antisemitic, he also despised the Shia and barred their entry to higher education and teaching posts, much to the chagrin of the ambitious Chalabis.

It is important to understand the philosophical origins of al-Husri’s version of pan-Arabism in order to understand where it ended up and to fully grasp the scope of Makiya’s dissection of the Ba’ath in Republic of Fear. The nationalism of al-Husri and his disciples (which included Michel ‘Aflaq, cofounder of Ba’athism and hero of its Iraqi variant) was an authoritarian creed rooted in German romanticism and cultural nationalism. Observing the fragmented, polyglot countries of the Middle East and North Africa during the 1930s, al-Husri decided that what the Arabs really longed for was an “Arab 1871” – as if pan-Arabism was a regional parallel to pan-Germanism, then being pursued by the Third Reich. Pan-Arab nationalism was the movement that would restore the “glorious Arab past” which seemed distant and remote in the metropolitan milieu of modern Baghdad. It was al-Husri, wrote Bassam Tibi, “who began this tradition of populist germanophile Arab nationalism”:

His nationalism was not mystificatory, fanatic or fascist, but he laid the foundations for the kind of fanatical nationalism formulated by his disciple Michel Aflaq, which…found expression in the semi-fascist military dictatorship in Iraq and Syria under the aegis of the Ba’ath party. (14)

In Republic of Fear, Makiya devoted considerable space to Iraqi pan-Arabism and the pan-Arab roots of Ba’athism and showed how a movement founded by “the Arab Fichte” culminated in the “Arab Prussia” of Iraq’s military and Ba’ath regimes. Makiya saw Ba’athism as the logical conclusion of pan-Arabism and, for this reason, his project ranged beyond the specific details of Saddam’s regime to launch an even more ambitious attack on the very ideology that had captivated the Arab nations and led to their ruin. 

This had a key place in Makiya’s own biography. In 1967, as an Iraqi college student with an English mother, he had listened to BBC broadcasts during the Six Day War and learnt about the destruction of the Egyptian air force while his classmates were still digesting reports of Arab victories on Baghdad Radio:

All lies and bullshit. And I remember knowing that it was bullshit at the time. I had my first political discussion with young men and women of my age in Baghdad, at a public swimming school where we gathered. I said, ‘it’s lies, it’s lies, it’s not true.’ The Arab world was losing the war, superfast, but there was this denial. And ordinary people only had what the regular news was saying. I remember being infuriated by that obvious lie. (15)

Makiya was successfully inoculated against Arab nationalism by this experience. The Six Day War was a defeat that destroyed the pan-Arabism of Nasser but it did not die completely: it found a new, more brutal form in the Ba’ath regimes of Iraq and Syria. Republic of Fear was the book that rooted Ba’athism (and the dictatorship of Saddam) in the ideology and lineage of pan-Arabism and therefore held the “lies and bullshit” of 1967 to account.

For Makiya, the true legacy of Arab nationalism could finally be found in the military dictatorships and secret police states and their campaigns of antisemitism and ethnic cleansing that followed the Six Day War. The Jews of Iraq had once found hope in Iraqi nationalism, which could have included them, but fell victim to the triumph of pan-Arabism, an ideology that would gain coherence and strength through their exclusion, persecution and, finally, expulsion. The ultimate enemy of the pan-Arabists was Iraq’s social diversity and their target was its parliament. “In practice,” wrote Makiya,

the Iraqi parliament before 1941 was astonishingly vibrant as a mechanism for drawing out individuals from their communities. It was, moreover, the only institution responsible for inculcating and symbolising the true breadth of societal freedom – typified by a completely open press – in which every shade and current of opinion, however bizarre, resonated. (16)

To the pan-Arab imagination, the pluralism of the Iraqi parliament was a nightmare. The principle of political representation fundamentally undermined the purity of the Arab nation. From the pro-Axis coup of 1941 to the butchery of 1958 and the successive nationalist and military regimes that followed, the war on pluralism intensified in the name of pan-Arabism, finding perfection, finally, in the Ba’ath machine of terror.

The Ba’ath party could not tolerate diversity. Pan-Arabism could only work by defeating local nationalisms (Iraqi, Syrian, Egyptian) and eliminating all rival forms of identity, whether tribal, confessional or political. As Makiya illustrated, for Ba’athism — the final embodiment of pan-Arab politics — “the only freedom that is logically possible is the freedom to act as one with the mass, and be sacrificed to its cause” (17). This is the significance of the Ba’ath party’s pan-Arabism and the roots of pan-Arabism in German nationalist thought: here, the road also led to totalitarianism and genocide. Iraqi Ba’athism was “consistently egalitarian in its hostility to everything that is not itself,” (18); its idea of freedom was “total unity” which meant, in practice, the “obliteration of separateness, privacy, independence, difference, autonomy, variety, character, and personality” (19). Michel ‘Aflaq, the intellectual architect of Ba’athism, described the essential philosophy of the party as “love” and “faith” in the “Arab Spirit,” but the other side of this was a pure hostility to the enemies of Arabism. The Ba’athists proved to be great haters and the Iraq they created would be defined by fear, suspicion, violence and revenge. This would find apotheosis in a speech delivered by Saddam in 1978, in which he warned:

the revolution chooses its enemies, and we say chooses its enemies because some enemies are chosen by it from among the people who run up against its program and who intend to harm it. The revolution chooses as enemies those people who intend to deviate from its main principles and starting points. (20)

This was a politics of exclusion, something beyond Arab supremacy but also rooted in it, a statement that certified inclusion through loyalty to the principles of the Ba’ath, and therefore the ‘Arab Spirit’. True loyalty would be judged by the party — or the leader — on an arbitrary basis.

It was a formula for mass murder.

III: The Monument and Totalitarian Art

In the spring of 1980, Mohamed Makiya received an offer he could not refuse.

This was the first year of Saddam Hussein’s presidency and the new dictator was looking forward to hosting the Conference of Nonaligned Nations, an event that would inaugurate his leadership of the movement for the following three years. To prepare for the occasion, Saddam decided to completely renovate his capital city. He gathered his aides and asked who, among all the remaining Iraqi architects, could meet the challenge of redesigning and rebuilding Baghdad in the space of two years. There were only two candidates with the required experience and skills: Rifat Chadirji, who was in jail, and Mohamed Makiya, who was living in exile in London, having fled Iraq after being included on a Ba’athist blacklist in the early 1970s. When Mohamed was first offered the project, he refused, but the second approach, made with an assurance of “safe return” (“the most chilling part,” his wife Margaret would note), was too dangerous to ignore. Also, for an architect born in Baghdad, the commission itself was a historic temptation: Mohamed was being offered the chance to reshape the city of his youth, the second Arab city of the modern era, the old capital of the Abbasid Caliphate, the heir to Babylon itself. The Ba’athists seemed like a detail compared to this.

After the Iranian revolution Saddam turned his attention to Iraq’s Islamic heritage. He had been impressed by Mohamed’s redesign of the Khulafa mosque in central Baghdad, an early masterpiece that elegantly fused the International Style with Mesopotamian vernacular and would lead almost directly to Mohamed’s later commission. Back in Baghdad, working alongside his old friend Chadirji (now released from prison),  Mohamed was drawn further into Saddam’s project, inspired by the historical dimensions of the task. His son, Kanan, remained in London to manage Makiya & Associates on behalf of his father and did not approve. “I said we shouldn’t be doing this,” he explained in 1992,

We just shouldn’t be doing it. My father would answer, ‘This is for history. It’s not for the people there now. It has nothing to do with them – they’ll be gone. This is for Iraq – it’s for the future.’ And, in a way, in all this he was simply being consistent with his usual approach: he always showed total disdain for the client – because he wasn’t doing this for them, it was always for the future. Architects are such megalomaniacs. (21)

Mohamed Makiya was born “when the British entered Baghdad” in the words of his mother, although, as Kanan remembered it, nobody ever really knew if she meant 1914 or 1918 (22). He was from the old city. “It was like the Middle Ages,” he recalled decades later, in London:

I wouldn’t have to read about a medieval city because I lived it. There was no electricity, no water, no sanitation. I’m very much influenced by it. I’m deeply Baghdadi, and I’ve been thinking of Baghdad all my life. (23)

After graduating from the School of Architecture in Liverpool and completing his PhD at Cambridge University, Mohamed returned to Baghdad in time to benefit from Iraq’s newly revised oil concession in the 1950s. With money pouring into government accounts, the Iraqi Development Board hired newly qualified Iraqi engineers and architects to redesign and rebuild the capital. Prestige projects with big budgets lured the most famous architects in the world to Iraq. Walter Gropius was asked to design the new University of Baghdad, where, in 1959, Mohamed would found the School of Architecture that he led for over a decade. Le Corbusier was offered a sports complex (destined, one day, to be the Saddam Hussein Gymnasium), Alvar Aalto the national art gallery, and Frank Lloyd Wright completed his visionary, but unrealised, Plan for Greater Baghdad, which included an opera house on the banks of the Tigris. They were all guests in Mohamed’s home and he would later recall driving a “very bossy” Wright around Baghdad in his car.

Mohamed was a witness to the cultural and political revolutions that overtook Baghdad from the 1950s through to the 1980s, and participated in some of them. The period between the Second World War and the 1958 coup was a cultural golden age for Iraq and gave birth to an artistic and literary renaissance in Baghdad. This was the moment a generation of postwar Iraqi intellectuals came of age, influenced by communism, modernism, existentialism and liberalism, as well as Arab and Iraqi nationalism. In the Baghdad public library and the cafes and bookshops of Rashid Street, artists, writers and politicians debated Marx and Sartre and the Arab revival, formed new societies, rival parties, and political alliances. This was the city that gave birth to the first free verse movement in the Arab world and produced a deluge of newspapers, journals, poems and novels that rivaled the output of Cairo and Beirut. Thriving cinemas, first introduced by the British in 1917, fed the Iraqi hunger for Hollywood films, while theaters, clubs and concert halls contributed to the city’s vibrant nightlife. Glamorous Iraqi chanteuses, like the Armenian ‘Iraqi Blackbird’ Affa Iskandar and the Baghdadi Jew Salma Mural (‘The Voice of Iraq’), found fame across the Middle East and North Africa. Tamara Chalabi described family memories of a city “filled with music and verse” at this time:

In the small cafes in the old neighbourhoods, gramophones blared out Egyptian love songs and Iraqi melodies, increasingly performed by female singers. The music of Iraq catered for all tastes: there were popular tunes, Bedouin songs, gypsy songs, songs sung in falsetto by men dressed as women, women’s bands for female social occasions, the dirges of official mourners, religious music, the songs of labourers – ranging all the way to the more formal and elegant maqam that held a unique position in the high music of the region. (24)

The city’s nightlife was dominated by the Baghdadi Jews, who, along with the Christians, owned most of the clubs, concert halls and cinemas, primarily because of an old Ottoman convention that forbade Muslims from acquiring entertainment licences. Mohamed Makiya was part of this Baghdad, and the redesigned Khulafa mosque was his first and most significant contribution to its landscape. All of his big commissions from later years – the mosques and ministries and private residences in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and UAE – built on what he had achieved in Baghdad in 1963.

When Kanan began to write The Monument, Saddam had not yet invaded Kuwait and Republic of Fear was only being read by regional specialists and Iraqi exiles. The project was completed alongside a lavish monograph on his father’s work (Post-Islamic Classicism, 1990) and both books, in different ways, touched upon a similar theme: the achievements and failures of a postwar generation of Iraqi intellectuals. At the centre of The Monument stood the pioneers of modern Iraqi art from the ’40s to the ’60s — architects, sculptors and painters like Rifat Chadirji, Jewad Selim, Khalid al-Rahal, Mohammed Ghani and, among them, mixing modernism and Islamic tradition, Mohamed Makiya. “Largely through their efforts,” Kanan wrote,

Baghdad became in the 1950s the centre of some of the most dynamic and original experimentation in the visual arts anywhere in the Arab world. Certainly in no other Arab country did visual talent cohere into such a powerful, self-reinforcing, particular way of looking at felt reality, rooted in Iraqi experience. An indisputably Iraqi way of thinking about the plastic arts came into being, made up of talented, opinionated and generally very productive individuals knocking against each other, yet springing out in different directions. (25)

This lasted longer than the monarchy but it didn’t last any longer than the final Ba’ath coup. Until then, the nationalists had some use for the modernists and gave them some latitude. Jewad Selim’s Freedom Monument, a complex bronze mural influenced by Picasso and completed in 1961, was originally commissioned by Qasim to extol Iraq’s republican revolution. It still stands in Liberation Square and provided an ironic and tragic backdrop to the anti-Zionist lynching’s of 1969.

Makiya would describe the Freedom Monument as the last legitimate product of Iraq’s cultural renaissance as well as the last large-scale public art work to be attempted in Iraq until al-Bakr and Saddam’s Baghdad development plans. As such, it presented “a kind of bridge between the Baghdad of the 1940s where a remarkable artist achieved artistic maturity, and the Baghdad of the 1980s” (26). The second renovation of Baghdad was, ultimately, Saddam’s project, driven by his determination to construct a new Iraq and to shape the new Iraqis who would serve it. This is the moment that aesthetics and totalitarianism fused, a moment Mohamed chose to participate in. He wasn’t alone: as Kanan noted, Baghdad at this time was a major testing ground for postmodern architecture as the regime used the resources provided by Saddam’s nationalisation of oil to rebuild the city. In an echo of the oil-driven rebuilding of the 1950s, the greatest architects in the world were invited to enjoy the spoils and did so without any obvious reservations. “Overnight Baghdad became a giant construction site,” wrote Makiya

new and wider roads, redevelopment zones, forty-five shopping centres in different parts of the city opened to the public by 1982, parks (including a new tourist centre on an artificial island in the Tigris), a plethora of new buildings designed by Iraqi and world class architects, a crash programme for a subway system, and many monuments – all were put in hand. (27)

The transformation was not just cosmetic, but also ideological – an attempt by the regime to “translate the collective force of the Iraqi people…into symbols” (28). By this point, “the Iraqi people” had been fully excluded from the public realm and the regime no longer permitted them to exist as individuals. Their worth was measured as a mass, a collective body at the service of the Ba’ath revolution and pan-Arabism. Something in Ba’athism still aspired to mass politics as George L. Mosse understood it: a civic religion with its own myths, symbols, rituals and monuments. This new Baghdad was not built for people as individuals; it was a landscape of power.

As the money poured in and the regime further degenerated into a tribal fiefdom, the city also became a landscape of vulgarity and kitsch. An emblematic project of this era was the 1982 competition for a new Baghdad State Mosque. Mohamed Makiya’s entry was monumental and made direct reference to the Abbasid tradition; likewise, the Japanese architect Minoru Takeyama took inspiration from the original circular plan of Baghdad and the Great Mosque of Samarra. But for Kanan Makiya the most interesting and apposite entry came from Robert Venturi, who submitted a design that resembled “something out of Disneyland crossed with the scenery from Errol Flynn’s film, The Thief of Baghdad” (29). Venturi’s veneration of kitsch, irony and populism found a new and appropriate place in the Baghdad of Saddam’s imagination. For Makiya, he became an emblematic figure: a patron saint of totalitarian kitsch. But, in the end, there was nothing that Venturi could say or do that would compare to the brutal vulgarity of the Victory Arch, commissioned and partly designed by Saddam after the Iran-Iraq war, with monstrous bronze replicas of his arms and piles of helmets collected from the corpses of dead Iranian soldiers. For Makiya, the next question was key:

What would have happened had Venturi’s mosque been built in the city of Saddam Hussain’s monument? In place of art, ugliness – which Venturi wanted to extol – has acquired a meaning that he never intended. Thus although the vulgarity of Saddam Hussain’s monument takes it out of the realm of art, in the end by playing this game, the President defeats art. (30)

Makiya’s portrait of the Iraqi intelligentsia in The Monument was, finally, a study of defeat: the defeat of individuals condemned to death or incarceration (like Chadirji), exile (like his father) or compromise (like Khalid al-Rahal and Mohammed Ghani Hikmat who helped Saddam design the Victory Arch). This was the difference between the 1940s-50s – a time of experimentation, modernism, pluralism and relative tolerance – and the 1980s, the Iraq of Saddam and his internal empire of totalitarian kitsch. Apart from the landscape of power he planned for Baghdad, with its superficial veneer of prestige lent by international celebrities, the aesthetic reality of Iraq in the 1980s and 90s was a banal wasteland of presidential portraits staring out from wristwatches, billboards, posters, and statues; sickly murals of Saddam as a modern day Saladin, riding a white horse destined to liberate the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem; the nouveau riche excess of his gold and marble palaces; or the gangster chic of Uday and his high rolling security detail. This was an aesthetic of conspicuous wealth and raw power to which the surviving artists and writers of Iraq were forced to submit their talents. 

All of this was the outcome of 1958 and the dreams and hatreds of pan-Arabism taken to a logical extreme. “Romanticism in art and romanticism in politics met in Iraq in the shape of the twenty-year-old Ba’thi regime,” wrote Makiya, and in many ways this was the final, degraded aesthetic residue of al-Husri’s Germanophilia (31). Successive military regimes, increasingly in thrall to pan-Arabism, shrank the space between politics and culture so that “culture itself as an aloof, professional and critical enterprise began to give way to propaganda” (32). The immediate requirements of ideology and power combined in the goal of “unity” which was reached by a pitiless war against pluralism partly fought in the realm of aesthetics. “The idea of unity,” wrote Makiya,

played the same metaphysical role in Arab culture as the tradition of organicism and a return to nature in romantic Western thought. In both, an illusory hunger for wholeness is at work, originating in a deep hostility (albeit contradictory) to the pluralistic, fragmented, schizoid, individualised nature of modernity. (33)

To achieve this aim of unity, Saddam became a myth-maker – an “artist-President,” to use Makiya’s phrase. This myth-making had many objectives: to extol the Iraqi masses, to serve the Ba’ath revolution, to unify Iraq under Ba’ath rule, to promote the cult of Saddam and to elevate Iraq’s role as leader of the pan-Arab revival. Like Mussolini and Hitler, Saddam took a keen interest and even active involvement in the cultural productions of his regime. Projects like the Victory Arch or the regime-financed 1983 film Clash of Loyalties – a truly unique attempt to produce a homegrown David Lean-style epic about the 1920 Revolt starring an extravagantly drunk Oliver Reed – were as intrinsic to Saddam’s regime as internal terror and regional war. Personal proclivities were not as important here as the question of control:

To find, as in post Ba’athist Iraq, boxes of file containing hundreds of pages of correspondence from the Office of the President providing guidance on the minutiae of wall posters and paintings and murals and monuments made in Baghdad under Saddam, even as he was waging wars with Iran, Kuwait, and the United States: this is the true measure of totalitarian culture…(34)

But the notion of Saddam as an “artist-President” went deeper than his interest in aesthetics and propaganda: if Saddam was an artist, then his raw material was the Iraqi people. Like Italian Fascism and Soviet Communism, Ba’athism, from Aflaq through to Saddam, had strived to create a new mass man — a new Arab, an ideal Ba’ath subject. And like Mussolini contemplating his raw material of lazy, pasta-eating Italians, Aflaq’s dream ultimately led him to despair:

the perfection of his ideal Arab…made him recoil from the real Arabs all around him. Here were ordinary people, who, like the rest of us, had their foibles, prejudices, and simple wants and desires. These filled ‘Aflaq with contempt, a condition bordering on hate. (35)

Late Ba’athism, in particular the party of mass terror perfected by Saddam, was made of stronger stuff: torture would become a tool to “reform” and “mold” people. “When the Ba’ath talk about the “new man” and the “new society” they wish to create, these are not metaphors,” Makiya observed in Republic of Fear:

The objects of torture are not criminals but sick patients or morally incomplete individuals whose deviancy lies in the subjective realm, rather than in concrete transgressions. Torture goes about fashioning them anew, and if death is a frequent result, at least somebody cared enough to try. (36)

Ba’athism was a permanent revolution, “a dream of change”: “their programme is not to win over the masses, but to change them” (37). In this programme, the individual did not matter because society, represented by the state, owned by the Ba’ath, with Saddam as its ideal, took priority over the individual, who represented, if anything, an atomised enemy of Iraqi unity and the pan-Arab revolution.

Except, of course, the individual did matter, precisely as this enemy, which Ba’athism needed in order to define itself. As Makiya wrote in Cruelty and Silence (at the very moment the regime’s programme was disintegrating in the aftermath of the Gulf War): “Saddam Hussein invents and reinvents his enemies from the entire mass of human material that is at his disposal” (38). At some point, the purpose of the Ba’ath party in Iraq went from moulding the new man and the new society to engineering a unitary state that only existed to protect and project its own power. This was the moment when Saddam’s regime, which had partly transcended sectarian divisions, became the principal agent of sectarianism. Torture and individual executions escalated to ethnic cleansing, genocide and ecological destruction. Baki Sidqi’s massacre of Assyrians of 1931 showed that Iraqi pan-Arabism already contained the seeds of ethnic mass murder, but it was the Ba’ath who turned mass murder into an art form in Iraq. The ‘Arabisation’ of the north, partly achieved through dispossession, forced migration, the raising of villages and chemical extermination, was an attempt to permanently change regional demographics by displacing the Kurds and Assyrians. From the perspective of the Ba’ath this was not simply revenge, but a technical solution to a political problem. This existential, ethnographic project had its sequel in 1993, when Saddam chose to solve the problem of Shia militias in the south by draining the marshes and destroying the ancient communities and culture of the Marsh Arabs. This was another creative, technical response to a purely political problem, and on a grand scale: the construction of dams, dykes and the realignment of the Tigris river banks was a vast civil engineering project designed to achieve a new demographic and political reality. 

Ultimately, the draining of the marshes had the same political and philosophical root as the redesign of Baghdad undertaken by Mohamed Makiya and his colleagues in the 1980s. Saddam, the artist-President, used all the tools at his disposal in the attempt to create a unitary Iraqi state in line with the ideology of the Ba’ath, the dream of pan-Arab revival and the projection of his own personal power. In order to build this new society, art, architecture, engineering and propaganda served the same end: the destruction of pluralism and liberty in Iraq.

IV: The Rope and the Shia

In January 2007, a battle took place between U.S. forces and an obscure messianic Shia sect called Jund al-Samaa’, or the Soldiers of Heaven. Jund al-Samaa’ believed it had a duty to hasten the return of the Hidden Imam and the Day of Judgement by fomenting chaos and insurrection. The Americans had been given a tip-off that they would use the ceremonial procession of Ashura to attack the holy city of Najaf and massacre its grand ayatollahs. In The Rope, Makiya’s narrator — a young Sadrist — blames the father of his best friend for their demise:

A great mystery surrounds this operation, but it later transpired that the Americans were acting on false information supplied by the House of Hakim. Uncle believed the villain was Abu Haider; he had fabricated a claim, backed by his friend the governor of Najaf, a man also from the House of Hakim, that the Soldiers of Heaven were a Shia offshoot of al-Qaeda; and the credulous Americans believed him, even though everyone else in Najaf knew this was nonsense. Why the Occupier did not know these things, and was so wasteful of his own military resources, is a mystery only known to God. Mercifully, Haider, who was in the habit of relaxing and unwinding in their company, was not visiting the camp at the time of the air strikes. Several hundred harmless innocents were killed in a matter of hours – men, women, and children. Afterward, everyone – the Americans, the House of Hakim, and the government – colluded to cover up the outrage. (39)

In his personal note at the end of the novel, Makiya returned to the subject:

I had access to a detailed Iraqi police report written in the immediate aftermath of the attack, replete with pictures, smuggled to me by an Iraqi security officer who was one of the first to visit the devastated area after the event. I do not know if the Americans knew what they were doing, and I am inclined to agree with Iraqis on the ground who told me they were tricked into it by Shia enemies of Jund al-Samaa’. (40)

This episode, and Makiya’s description of it, provides one small glimpse into the dark world of betrayal and conspiracy that confounded the Americans during their years of occupation. According to the account presented in The Rope, the Soldiers of Heaven were not simply victims of American arms: their corpses were the collateral of intra-Shia rivalry. This fratricidal conflict erupted alongside the ongoing war against the Sunni insurgency, itself a deadly but conditional collaboration between Abu al-Zarqawi’s international jihadi brigades and the tribes of Anbar. It is maybe ironic that Makiya – who would later become known and even ridiculed for his dream of a democratic, pluralistic Iraq at peace with itself – actually predicted this civil and political meltdown in 1991.

Cruelty and Silence was a bleak book steeped in Iraq’s confessional and ethnic dysfunction following decades of Arab nationalist revolution, tyranny and war. But, for Makiya, the Intifada that it described also represented a watershed moment in the history of Iraq, one that provided hope for life after Saddam. Of course, it wasn’t quite that simple. The revolt against the regime had two fronts and the most organised groups were also the most prominent. The Kurdish parties and peshmerga led the rebellion in the north, while Iraqi Shia militias in the south found little resistance from the regular Iraqi army, which rapidly disintegrated. The revenge of the regime was intense – and sectarian. By 1991, Ba’athism in Iraq had degenerated into the rule of a tight clique around Saddam made up of old party comrades and purge survivors, Tikriti tribesmen and the dictator’s extended family. But during the Intifada, large numbers of Iraqi Sunni, terrified by the Shia revenge killings in Southern cities and the lynching of Ba’ath party officials, rallied behind Saddam. “The soldiers deployed”, reported Makiya,

appear to have been selected from the Sunni towns of Hit, Mosul, Shirkat, Beigi, and from the Yazeedi community, a tiny sect based in Northern Iraq which has a history of conflict with Shia Muslims…The slogan painted on the tanks of the Republican Guard, “No more Shia after today,” was clearly not a local initiative; it was official policy. (41)

In the midst of this counterattack, special units burned precious books and manuscripts and incinerated libraries, religious schools and seminaries in Shia towns, as Saddam made good on his promise to target the very roots of Shia identity. Regime newspapers described the Shia as being “anti-Iraqi” and inflated Iran’s role in the uprising. Makiya recorded eyewitness accounts of advancing Badr Corps units – SCIRI’s paramilitary wing, the army of the House of Hakim – burning bars and casinos and decorating southern towns and cities with posters of Khomeini and Ali Khamanie. The regime convinced its supporters – and possibly even believed – that the combined forces of Badr, the old Shia party Dawa and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards were pouring over the Iranian border to lead the revolt.

In fact the Iranians expected a rout and did not encourage their Iraqi assets to waste their lives. The battle of Karbala ended with Republican Guard soldiers executing doctors and nurses and throwing patients out of hospital windows, shelling the Imam Hussein Holy Shrine and arresting and executing any Shia male over the age of 15 who crossed their path. With no discrimination, helicopter gunships strafed anyone trying to escape the besieged city. Over a decade later, Patrick Cockburn recorded a conversation with a Shia dissident from Basra who claimed that SCIRI and Badr Corps

played no part in igniting the uprising, which was a spontaneous reaction to the army’s defeat in Kuwait and the reckless and foolhardy actions of Saddam. Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and his people, supported by Badr, were supposed to come through Mehran to Kut, but they never came. This was one of the reasons for the hostility later between the Sadrists and al-Hakim. (42)

Shia rivals still accuse Badr and SCIRI leaders of speaking Farsi among themselves and maintaining families back in Iran, a detail later picked up by Makiya in his depiction of Abu Haider in The Rope. They are considered “external” agents who betrayed the Intifada, standing aside as their fellow Shia were slaughtered. They were rumoured to have been the most enthusiastic and brutal torturers of Iraqi captives during the Iran-Iraq War.

As Makiya feared, the uprising left nothing but a legacy of conflict everywhere in Iraq, even in Kurdistan, where partisans of the KDP and PUK fought a battle for power that threatened the very existence of their hard-won autonomous region. This was inevitable in the polity forged by Saddam where the assault on pluralism in the name of Arab unity had the effect of intensifying ethnic and confessional identities. “What will happen tomorrow in Iraq?” asked Makiya in 1993:

Kurdish nationalism is stronger and more aggressive today than at any time in the past, fueled by a growing realisation of what an Arab state did to the Kurdish people…Sunni-Shi’i hatred is today the most virulent potential sources of new violence. These forces are Saddam Hussein’s legacy to all Iraqis. (43)

The central theme of The Rope had been foreshadowed over a decade earlier in Cruelty and Silence: “If Iraq dissolves into even more chaos and bloodshed in the post-Saddam era, it will be principally because Shi’i political leadership failed to rise to the historic occasion and to the responsibilities which its own numbers imposed on it” (44). By 2016, Makiya’s verdict was in: the Shia leadership had failed.

The defining event was the murder of Abdul Majid al-Khoei by supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr on April 10, 2003, the day after the fall of Baghdad. As with Sadr’s conflict with the House of Hakim, the murder of al-Khoei was the result of family rivalry: a fight for supremacy in the Holy city of Najaf. Aside from the personal animosities, tactical and doctrinal disagreements divided the houses of Sadr, Hakim and al-Khoie, as well as a deep antipathy between those who had left Iraq to escape Saddam and those who remained and suffered. Abdul Majid al-Khoei had been a well-connected exile in London and America, a friend of Makiya and Cockburn, with allies in the U.S. and European governments. This was only one reason for his eventual demise in Najaf, but in some ways it was enough. In The Rope, Makiya’s narrator sees al-Khoei dying in a back alley after being stabbed to death at the door of Muqtada al-Sadr’s residence and asks his Uncle, a Sadrist, who he is: “an American agent,” is the reply (45). The role of the Sadrists in the murder of al-Khoei would eventually be covered up by the political leaders of the Shia in Baghdad, the group of exiles who went from the Governing Council to running Iraq and who saw the Sadrists as key to securing their own power. These were men, according to Makiya, who sacrificed Iraq to sectarian war in order to secure their own futures, and the cover-up of al-Khoei’s murder was a key part of this. In an interview with Dexter Filkins in 2007, Makiya recalled the new attitude among his fellow Shia exiles, including, to his dismay, the man he believed had “broken the mould of Arab politicians,” Ahmed Chalabi: There was this attitude: “This is a war, this is it — the showdown — why don’t we just gird ourselves for it, why not recognise it as a war and fight it to win? Because we can win” (46).

It was this background that would inform his later, only very lightly fictionalised, account of Shia machinations on the Governing Council:

He was in a room with them one day when a secular Sunni Arab Council member from London, a close personal friend of his Shia Council members, also from London – they all went to the same clubs – realised his Shia friends were up to something. Following a succession of speeches made by members of the House of the Shia to cover up how they had secretly decided to vote, it suddenly dawned on this Sunni council member that a hidden agenda was being advanced under his nose, and by his London Shia pals. His face turned ashen in utter disbelief. In the deathly silence that filled the normally noisy room, sectarian politics was born. (47)

For Makiya, the disintegration of Iraq happened because the politics of sectarianism was adopted by the new rulers of Iraq, not just grassroots militias or foreign terrorist gangs. With sectarian division baked into the political structures designed by the Americans, the Shia politicians, as the majority identity in Iraq, inherited responsibility for the country’s future. When they chose to cover up the murder of somebody as significant as al-Khoie — their old friend from years of exile and opposition to Saddam — they chose to compromise their own victory. The first Shia democracy in the Arab and Muslim world began with a “big lie” at its heart and this was not just a detail, it was a deliberate choice that would determine how the country would be governed. Makiya’s novel was an indictment of this choice and those who made it, “the men who created the politics that gave rise to all the killing, all friends of mine,” (48) who came to see Sadr and his Mahdi Army as “the shock troops in the Armageddon against Sunni Arabs that was being prophesied” (49). “The cover up,” Makiya would conclude, “lies at the core of the Shia elite’s failure after 2003” (50).

There were different poisons entering the bloodstream of Iraqi society: the poison of Najaf between the three clerical houses of the Shia and the poison of Sunni resentment at their loss of authority. The second poison found its voice in Fallujah and the other iconic cities of the Sunni insurgency that had attacked the American occupation with such fury, before turning its attention to the Shia. The Shia instruments of restitution and revenge were twofold: de-Ba’athification, which became a tool for sectarian vengeance, and the Ministry of the Interior which was occupied by Shia militias that became death squads, roaming Baghdad at night and leaving the corpses of their enemies lying in the streets or washing up on the banks of the Tigris to be discovered in the morning. While the Sunni jihadis gained international notoriety for their blades and beheadings, Shia killers also had their own grisly signatures. In The Rope, the narrator’s best friend Haider leaves Najaf to become a notorious Shia militiaman in Baghdad, renowned and feared for his inventive brutality:

His name popped up whenever a new pile of Sunni corpses was found with holes drilled into their hands and feet, and especially when the coup de grace took the form of a hole drilled all the way through the victim’s skull. Rumour said that the electric drill was Haider’s trademark. Sunni killers preferred the knife – the Prophet’s Companions used knives, they said – beheading their foes, not crucifying them. The Sunni knife was pitted against the Shia drill all through the battle for Baghdad. (51)

This was not a fictional embellishment on Makiya’s part. Anybody could see Sunni handiwork for themselves: they posted videos of their ritual beheadings on the internet. Shia violence was told in stories and rumours: Patrick Cockburn, a useful source for Makiya, described the work of Mahdi Army leader Abu Rusil, who “would leave a note on the bodies of dead Sunni saying ‘best regards’”:

‘There is no innocent Sunni,’ he said, claiming that his brother had been shot dead at a Sunni checkpoint. Abu Rusil’s victims are found with drill holes in their bodies, their bones smashed by being pounded with gas canisters, and their hands and feet pierced with nails. Once a poor man, the death squad leader preyed on his victims, confiscating their goods. He now has a house and three sport-utility vehicles, and consequently an incentive for the killing to go on. It would only end, Abu Rusil said, when every Sunni had left the country and Muqtada al-Sadr was the ruler of Iraq. (52)

Sometime in 2006, Meghan O’Sullivan, the Deputy National Security Adviser for Iraq and Afghanistan, who shared the same hopes for Iraq as Makiya, had a frank conversation with Bush: “Baghdad is hell, Mr. President,” she told him, bluntly. In the sweltering nights, pitch black because there was no electricity, murder and kidnapping and sectarian conflict raged. In the city, there was a deadly plurality of groups whose enemy was pluralism and who sought, by means of violence, purity. When The Rope’s narrator attempts a taxonomy of all the armed groups in Iraq at the request of his Sadrist uncle he is defeated by the task: “This list is incomplete. There are other groups about which I know nothing, not even their names” (53). His uncle reads the final report in despair. Even the arch-sectarian – the man who gloried in the murder of al-Khoie in the alley outside al-Sadr’s residence – recognises the significance of Iraq’s descent into militia rule, each loyal to its own sect, its own rulers and ideologies:

Iraq is just a name, son, no longer even an idea, much less a nation. A name…one more to add to the two hundred sixty-eight other names you have just given me. Would that I could say otherwise, but I cannot; I would be wrong. Perhaps its fragility is why it never ceased to require the presence of a strongman to arbitrate between its different factions. But now even the name is fast disappearing. Notice not one of the organisations on your list confers allegiance to something called Iraq. That was never the case in the past. (54)

V: All Of Us Who Leapt Into the Future With Our Eyes Shut

“And Iraq?”
“It has turned into a question for itself.”

So what did Kanan Makiya expect? What did he want?

Democracy, of course, was important — particularly because, as Makiya saw it, the usual solutions to Saddam offered up by the CIA or the State Department Arabists or the merchants of realism in Europe or other interested parties in the region tried to elide democracy altogether in the name of an authoritarian remedy that they could manage. But also key — again, as Makiya saw it — was Iraq’s historic destiny as a pluralist nation: a counter example to the pan-Arab nightmare made by the Ba’ath parties of Iraq and Syria, or to Lebanon’s sectarian carnival of death. Finally, he wanted to preserve Iraq itself – or to help the nation to redefine itself, to forge a new Iraqi identity.

As everything unravelled, the fundamental question emerged: what was Iraq? “Under Saddam, the overwhelming majority of people had been brutalized, and this brutalization had led to a very deep atomization of society – of the destruction of Iraqi identity,” Makiya explained to Dexter Filkins in 2007. “And so I asked myself: how can I find hope in this darkness? Upon what do you hang a new Iraqi sense of identity?” (55) His answer was a mutual recognition of suffering by Iraqis from every part of Iraqi society, and his practical contribution was the Iraq Memory Foundation: an archive of suffering assembled from Ba’ath party records and video interviews with victims of the regime. He hoped this would play its part in a truth and reconciliation process modeled on post-apartheid South Africa. He planned to build a museum for it on the site of the Victory Arch. But, as early as 1993, he had also spotted a problem with this:

The fact that Iraqis are already competing with each other over who has suffered the most is a sign that whether or not Saddam is still around in person, what he represented lives on inside Iraqi hearts. Herein lies the greatest danger of all for the country’s future. (56)

It was this legacy of victimhood – combined with the lure of power – that drove the decisions made by the Shia on the Governing Council to embrace, rather than transcend, their sectarian identity at the expense of Iraq itself:

In the end, they couldn’t think of themselves as Iraqis. They didn’t realise the greater prize, the whole country, is far more important than the prize of just competing with Sunnis or Kurds over who gets the most out of the pie that they now inherit. They kept on thinking of themselves in that small-minded way. Therein lies a large portion of [The Rope]. I deal with these ideas: how men internalise their victimhood, how they are unable to rise to the occasion of governance. (57)

More than the Sunni insurgency – which had its seeds in an underground network of safe houses and arms caches prepared by the Fedayeen Saddam and the Ba’ath Party militia – the breakdown of Iraqi politics along sectarian lines and the resulting civil war was Saddam’s most effective revenge on those who deposed him:

the competition over victimhood – ‘we suffered, you suffered, I suffered, I suffered more than you so I should get more’ – is a natural outgrowth of Saddam’s tyranny. The politics of victimhood is one of the diseases that tyrannies leave behind within terrorised populations. (58)

“My past,” explains Makiya’s narrator in The Rope, “the past of all of us who leapt into the future with our eyes shut in 2003, is the rule of the Great Tyrant” (59). And this past determined the future: the leap into the future was a leap into the dark.

One of the tragic ironies of post-Saddam Iraq is that the political system that the Americans helped the Iraqis to build actually embedded sectarianism within the new institutions of state. The makeup of the first Iraqi Governing Council established this error: the apportion of seats along sectarian and ethnic lines set the pattern for competition rather than collaboration, as Makiya illustrated in The Rope. The American attempt to manage plurality and balance interests, made in good faith, ended up creating a state structure that simply exacerbated conflict. (Some Iraqis concluded that this had been the plan all along.) As Emma Sky noted in her memoir, “the focus on subnational identities was at the expense of building an inclusive Iraqi identity,” an oversight that led directly to the unravelling of that very identity (60). Makiya would make a similar point at the end of The Rope, accusing the Americans of “promoting and instituting sectarianism into the body politic” (61).

The institutions of state would eventually become weapons wielded by sectarian actors – in this case, the triumphant Shia. The practical consequences of this were stark. Ahmed Chalabi, for example, took control of De-Ba’athification and converted it into a naked tool for sectarian revenge, ensuring that the Shia reckoning with the past would be violent. The Sadrists took over the Ministries of Transport and Health, which meant they could control who flew in and out of Baghdad International Airport and hospitals became sectarian killing grounds. The Interior Ministry and National Police were infiltrated by Shia militias and so became, effectively, a force of sectarian death squads, engaged in extra-judicial executions, running private prisons and kidnapping Sunni targets. Iraq’s very diversity worked against it: as Makiya had feared, nobody was willing to speak for the country as a whole or across confessional and ethnic lines. Identity politics triumphed at the expense of pluralism. 

The rich fabric of Iraq’s most diverse cities was ripped apart again. By 2006, Baghdad was being partitioned along sectarian lines, with entire neighbourhoods cleansed of Sunni and Shia, leaving a patchwork of purified confessional cantons at war with each other. In Kirkuk, the outcome of ‘Arabisation’ under Saddam was reversed by Kurds who expelled Arabs from their homes and began a process of ‘Kurdification’. This kind of ambitious demographic engineering was also adopted by the Iranian-backed Shia militias who took advantage of a key turning point in recent Iraqi history: the rise of ISIS, which temporarily threatened the existence of Iraq’s borders. Led by Iran, Shia militias were organised into a broad front – the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) – which eventually helped to defeat and clear ISIS out of northern Iraq. But then they never left: the militias, mostly from southern and central Iraq, now proceeded to seize property, agricultural land and oil fields in Mosul and the rest of Ninewa province, effectively displacing former Sunni occupants and Christian residents who had fled ISIS genocide. The PMF temporarily symbolised the deep overlap between state institutions and Shia militias whose loyalty to the idea of Iraq was, in some cases, highly dubious. But it also exposed another fault-line that now overshadows Iraqi politics: intra-Shia rivalries and feuds. The backbone of the PMF was the Badr Corps and other Iranian-aligned militias, but it also contained units loyal to Ayatollah Sistani and Sadr: its decline in late 2021 degenerated into a fight between these factions, with the Sadrists in the ascendancy. This is now, in August 2022, reaching a climax, as Sadr and his street gangs hold the entire Iraqi political process hostage.

So Makiya’s idea of – or hope for – a democratic Iraq collapsed as these conflicts emerged and raged. His dream of democracy was destroyed by the death of pluralism in Iraq. Early on, he understood that peaceful coexistence could only be achieved on the basis of mutual agreement on basic values, or a shared idea. Ultimately, this had to be the idea that Iraq was a coherent state in which majorities and minorities shared a common destiny. Not a commonality based on ideological unity, but forged by plurality. Makiya was not a political philosopher who sought to define a new theory of pluralism in his writing. He was influenced most closely by Arendt in his defining work, Republic of Fear, but did not attempt grand theories like she did in The Origins of Totalitarianism.  Instead, he studied her work and found in Ba’athist Iraq something close to her totalitarian idea: an architecture of fear and a political aesthetic; an intricately designed network of para-state party organisations, secret services and systems of torture and surveillance; a programme of ethnic and sectarian genocide pursued in the name of an expansive, apocalyptic ideology.

Makiya’s own vision of post-Saddam Iraq was something else again: a confluence of influences, allegiances, vague tendencies and — more importantly, and a running theme until the bitter end — hopes for what could come after. This was encouraged by his own experience and studies of what Iraq had once been and had offered the world before the pan-Arabists imposed their own dreams on the country. Undoubtedly he had also been influenced by his adopted countries during exile – Britain’s parliamentary democracy, of course, but mostly America, which had built a system based on pluralism by writing a constitution for the states that chose to unite after a revolutionary war. The constitution written for Iraq after Saddam – by Iraqis but overseen by the U.S. – did not achieve this balance: it was either too soon or too late; it was certainly flawed, and encouraged the sectarianism he had hoped it would destroy. Dialogue died, and violence and dreams of power replaced it. Despite his own hopes, Makiya had himself recorded and explained the reasons why this would happen from his earliest writing on Iraq. But even at the end, at the final moment of despair, he would not concede its inevitability:

Civil war and a complete breakdown in Sunni-Shia relations were not inevitable consequences of war and occupation; Iraqi leaders knowingly or unknowingly willed them into existence. Individuals with weight, who would not cater to the basest sentiments, might have made a difference. (62)

They never did; to this day, they still haven’t. For Makiya, this was, in some ways, the most bitter lesson of all.

  1. Quoted in Lawrence Weschler, ‘Architects Amid the Ruins’, New Yorker magazine, January 1992
  2. Kanan Makiya, The Rope (Pantheon Books, 2016), p.303
  3. Ali Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (Yale University Press, 2008), p.72
  4. George Packer, The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2005), p74
  5. Quoted in Packer, p.179
  6. Alan Johnson, ‘Putting Cruelty First: An Interview with Kanan Makiya (Part 2)’, Dissent magazine, 2006: https://www.dissentmagazine.org/democratiya_article/putting-cruelty-first-an-interview-with-kanan-makiya-part-2
  7. Ibid.
  8. Ibid.
  9. Kanan Makiya, Cruelty and Silence: War, Tyranny, Uprising and the Arab World (Penguin, 1994), see Section 2, ‘Silence’.
  10. Ibid., p.80
  11. Ibid.
  12. Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (University of California Press, 1998), p.149
  13. Tamara Chalabi, Late for Tea at the Deer Palace: The Lost Dreams of My Iraqi Family (HarperPress, 2011), p.157
  14. Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation State (Palgrave Macmillan, 1997, 3rd Ed.), p.118
  15. Quoted in Johnson, 2006
  16. Republic of Fear, p.
  17. Ibid., p.256
  18. Cruelty and Silence, p.219
  19. Republic of Fear, p.257
  20. Quoted in Republic of Fear, p.20
  21. Quoted in Weschler, 1992
  22. Kanan Makiya, Post-Islamic Classicism: A Visual Essay on the Architecture of Mohamed Makiya (Saqi Books, 1990), p.18
  23. Guy Mannes-Abbott, ‘Mohamed Makiya: Deeply Baghdadi’, Bidoun: https://www.bidoun.org/articles/mohamed-makiya
  24. Chalabi, p.166
  25. Kanan Makiya, The Monument: Art and Vulgarity in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (I.B.Taurus, 2003), p.79
  26. Ibid., p.82
  27. Ibid., p.20
  28. Ibid., p.22
  29. Ibid, p.62
  30. Ibid., p.66
  31. Ibid., p.113
  32. Ibid.
  33. Ibid.
  34. Kanan Makiya, ‘What is Totalitarian Art?: Cultural Kitsch from Stalin to Saddam’, Foreign Affairs, Vol 90, No.3, May/June 2011
  35. Republic of Fear, p.204
  36. Ibid., p.69
  37. Ibid., p.141
  38. Cruelty and Silence, p.219
  39. The Rope, p.198
  40. Ibid., p305
  41. Cruelty and Silence, p.97
  42. Patrick Cockburn, Muqtada al-Sadr and the Battle for the Future of Iraq (Scribner, 2008), p.68
  43. Cruelty and Silence, p.212
  44. Ibid., p.226
  45. The Rope, p.31
  46. Quoted in Dexter Filkins, ‘Regrets Only?’, New York Times, October 7, 2007
  47. The Rope, p.91
  48. Ibid., p.301
  49. Ibid., p.303
  50. Ibid., p.308
  51. Ibid., p.187
  52. Cockburn, p.186
  53. The Rope, p.202
  54. Ibid., p.206
  55. Quoted in Filkins, 2007
  56. Cruelty and Silence, p.219
  57. Quoted in Lawrence Weschler, ‘We didn’t have politicians up to the task: A conversation with Kanan Makiya’, Public Books, November 2016
  58. Quoted in Johnson, 2006
  59. The Rope, p.185
  60. Emma Sky, The Unravelling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq (Atlantic, 2015), p.60
  61. The Rope, p.317
  62. Ibid., p.316
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Roman Tragedy: Lucio Fulci’s ‘Beatrice Cenci’

Guido Reni’s portrait of Beatrice Cenci retains pride of place at the Galleria Nazionale d’Arte Antica in Palazzo Barberini, just off Piazza Barberini in Rome. The old story that it was completed by Reni on the eve of Beatrice’s execution has since been discredited by art historians; it now hangs with the slightly more neutral title Portrait of a Young Woman in a Turban and a tentative attribution to Reni’s fellow Bolognese artist Ginevra Cantofoli. In the same gallery you can see Caravaggio’s gory masterpiece Judith Beheading Holofernes, a painting reputedly composed after Caravaggio witnessed the decapitation of Beatrice first hand, standing among the crowds at her execution on September 11, 1599. Everything about Beatrice Cenci has since become shrouded in mystery and romance, including the origins of these two paintings, the bare facts of the case long superseded by legend. 

The story of Beatrice Cenci was a violent Roman family tragedy that would have suited the darker stages of Jacobean England. The Rome of the sixteenth century was a city that had been rebuilt by great noble dynasties like the Colonna, the della Rovere, the Farnese and the Borghese (the Barberini came later). The Cenci were among the most dangerous and volatile of these families and their story would be defined, in the Roman style, by extravagance, violence, ambition and tragedy. Even by the standards of his ancestors, Francesco Cenci stood out for his depravity and corruption. The physical and psychological cruelty he inflicted on his own family was relentless and extreme, and he was rumoured to have raped Beatrice, his only daughter. This violation would drive her to murder, she claimed, enlisting her brothers, mother-in-law and two vassals in a conspiracy for which she would be tried and executed. This is where the legend began: by killing her father and not yielding to her papal tormentors she became an icon of resistance for the people of Rome, a symbolic challenge to the depravity of the Roman aristocracy and the corruption of papal rule. Later, this local populist legend — or, more specifically, the lovely ‘Reni portrait’ — fed a Romantic infatuation that would inspire Shelley, Stendhal and Słowacki to produce minor works based on her story, exporting her name outside Italy and keeping the memory alive.

Even so, the popular image of Beatrice consistently overshadowed her aesthetic representation in all of these works, as they failed to do full justice to the deep drama of her Roman martyrology. In this regard, Antonin Artaud’s The Cenci was, in some ways, yet another failure: his most ambitious Theatre of Cruelty production, it closed, unloved, after a run of 17 days in the spring of 1935. Susan Sontag, in her essay on Artaud, judged that “The Cenci is not a very good play, even by the standards of convulsive dramaturgy which Artaud sponsored, and the interest of his production of The Cenci, by all accounts, lay in ideas it suggested but did not actually embody.” In his manifesto ‘The Theatre and Its Double’, Artaud described a show that would “centre around famous personalities, horrible crimes and superhuman self-sacrifices, demonstrating that it can draw out the powers struggling within them, without resorting to the dead imagery of ancient Myths.” And, in fact, The Cenci did put some of this down on the page, if not on to the stage. Artaud presented the story of Beatrice, with all of its stark mythological power and unhinged sadism, as a moral challenge to all authority — a connection also made by Pope Clement VIII. Later on, key themes sketched out in the skeletal frame of the play — Beatrice’s agency, the revolt against authority, and the deconstruction of papal hypocrisy  — would all find their way into Lucio Fulci’s own adaptation of the legend, which was surely informed by Artaud, one of the dyspeptic director’s few heroes.

Filmed and released in 1969, Beatrice Cenci could be seen as one more Cenci failure: Fulci expected the film to be his artistic and commercial breakthrough, but it was a box office flop that received mixed reviews from Italian film critics and quickly fell into obscurity. But in other ways – visually, dramatically – the film was a triumph and one of his greatest achievements. Until this point, Fulci had largely specialised in popular comedies, so the opportunity to shoot the story of the Cenci with a decent budget was a potentially life-changing opportunity for him. As a Roman native, a Catholic who was hostile to the Church and a socialist partisan, the subject matter and themes the story offered would prove an ideal fit. He would also bring elements of his own nascent sensibility to the work: an obsession with violence and decay, a devotion to the aesthetics of shock, and a dark, Gothic cynicism. This resulted in a handsome period drama that seethed beneath decorous finery and did not flinch from the most controversial and dangerous elements of the Cenci mythology: Church corruption, institutional torture, capital punishment, incest and rape. Framed by cinematographer Erico Menczer’s painterly compositions and gritty textures, Fulci’s violence was harsh and graphic, lingering on as much detail as the censors would allow. This, along with his 1966 western Massacre Time and 1968 giallo One on Top of the Other, marked the true beginning of a “Fulci style” that would emerge over the following decade and finally explode onto the international stage in full, gory, eye-gouging glory with Zombie Flesh Eaters in 1979.

But in 1969 the explicit violence was not just aesthetic – it had thematic purpose. In Beatrice Cenci, the primary agent of terror is Francesco, played with flamboyant menace by the French actor Georges Wilson. A physically grotesque and intimidating tyrant, scornful of papal authority and holding his own family in contempt and captivity, Francesco’s animal brutality is underscored by a pack of rabid dogs he keeps in attendance and lets loose on an ally of the Colonna at the opening of the film, tearing at his flesh in raw, bloody detail until he expires. This was a minor visual theme in Fulci’s work: trained dogs let loose on the vulnerable and victimised, facilitating human cruelty. Massacre Time opens with a pack of hounds chasing down a man and ripping him apart; the dogs belong to the son of a local landowner, a demented sadist who uses the animals to wreak bloody revenge on behalf of the family name, just like the feared Cenci. In his 1972 rural giallo, Don’t Torture a Duckling, local witch La Magiara is chased through thick forest by police dogs as the mistaken suspect of a series of child murders in a scene that crystallises her world of persecution: hounded by state and Church officials, gangs of children and a group of vigilantes who eventually beat her to death in broad daylight. In Beatrice Cenci, Francesco’s dogs are tools of revenge and restitution, as they are for the Scotts in Massacre Time, but they also express his own savage, animal instincts. On the evening that he hosts a banquet to celebrate the death of his two eldest sons (“two less mouths to feed!”) and as he corners his defiant daughter in order to rape her, the hounds begin to snarl and howl — in the courtyard and inside his own skull. In these films, dogs become both symbols and agents of the irrational and sadistic exercise of power.

Francesco enforces his physical authority through terror but forfeits moral authority by his total abdication of family responsibility. He considers his children to be a drain on resources; he disdains and distrusts them. The only emotional connection he has is with Beatrice, and this is perverse and criminal, combining depraved urges with a pathological lust for power. Paternal authority is enforced through violence and money, and undermined by cruelty and cynicism. For Fulci, this story exposed the foundations of papal authority, so could therefore articulate his own personal and political concerns. Rome, after all, was the pope’s city and the capital of the Papal States, a territory in which spiritual and secular authority overlapped and often pursued the same objectives and interests. Following a spate of family murders in the city, Clement VIII had a point to prove, and, as Anthony Majanlahti noted in The Families Who Made Rome, “together they cast a different light upon the pope’s execution of the Cenci: there was clearly a problem with nobles taking the law into their own hands.” For Fulci, the key detail followed the sentence: once the Cenci had been eliminated, the pope seized their remaining assets and sold them with a large discount to Pietro Aldobrandini, the cardinal’s nephew. This was not simply a coda, but the context of the whole story. Money was at the heart of papal power. In the film, Francesco’s punishment for violating the Colonna is the state seizure of property amounting to one third of his fortune; later on, lawyers and cardinals discuss the value of the Cenci estate as arrangements are made for the torture and confessions of the family. Fulci foregrounded the material dimensions of the Cenci saga, revealing extortion and nepotism to be the primary methods of papal justice.

Fulci described himself as a Catholic believer who was hostile to the Church, and his treatment of it was certainly cynical and antagonistic, an approach that occasionally caused problems with producers and audiences. In his films, Church agents are either cynics or sadists, sometimes both; they rule with force and through fear, or by exploiting the subtle sinews of money and vice. The papal inquisitors escorting Beatrice and her stepmother Lucrezia to their final rites are hidden beneath sinister black hoods that are designed to force submission and repentance through intimidation and terror: Fulci frames them as if he is channeling the Gothic brutalism of Mario Bava’s Black Sunday. Francesco himself treats officials with contempt, avoiding or defying them when possible, but even this local and domestic tyrant is dwarfed by the casual, cruel power of the papacy, which hangs like a dark veil over everything that happens in the film. In Contraband, Fulci’s 1980 poliziotteschi, Naples is ruled and divided by crime families who unite to eliminate any internal or external threats, but in the Rome of Beatrice Cenci it is the Colonna and their papal allies who fulfil this function. Francesco and Beatrice threaten their interests in different ways, so must be punished. In Don’t Torture a Duckling, southern peasants are moral hypocrites prone to savage mob violence, but in Beatrice Cenci violence and corruption are the preserve of the aristocracy and clergy: the Roman masses are at their mercy, oppressed by ruling class avarice and exploitation and assaulted by the physical and moral violations of the Church. In this sense, then, Beatrice’s sacrifice is cathartic and redemptive: the young girl who struck back at cruelty and turned the logic of papal and patriarchal authority back on itself is, finally, martyred. 

However, like Artaud, Fulci fully exploits the ambiguity of her character. He shows Beatrice to be the principal agent of murder, scolding Olimpio and the bandit Catalano when they fail to go through with the act, “if you are such cowards I will do it myself!” Once they have done the deed she is the only one who can look at her father’s corpse and does so with gloating fascination – triumph, revenge and freedom can be glimpsed briefly in her otherwise blank eyes. At the required moment she is as hard and pitiless as her father and as cynical as she needs to be to succeed in her goal. She does not flinch in the face of violence and enlists Olimpio in her plot by seducing him. In the end he is willing to die to protect her in an act of self-sacrifice that is both noble and abject; without a flicker of emotion, she lets him. Like Olimpio, Beatrice is physically brave, holding firm against torture as her family succumb to the screws and branding irons, and this is the key to her redemption: courage is a quality, which she displays for the sake of her family as well as her own desire for vengeance. Adrienne La Russa hated Fulci and claimed that he treated her badly on set, so it’s possible this gave her performance its brittle edge and sense of bitter determination – at the very least, it must have helped. She portrays Beatrice as a young girl who is badly abused and betrayed by every male authority figure she encounters, but refuses to be broken or defeated, even when there is no hope left. At the very end, the inquisitors cannot even intimidate her with the threat of divine judgement: “there is no sign of remorse in your devotion,” they charge, correctly. Like Artaud, Fulci would not allow her to become an object of pity, or simply a victim. Having been subject to the Church’s spectacle of sadism, she is finally transfigured and becomes the popular martyr of Roman legend.

So this is Fulci’s world, alright – a domain of power, sexuality and violence. The physicality of Fulci’s cinema finds its expression here in the humid, clammy, claustrophobic atmosphere of sixteenth century Rome in summer, sweat pouring onto ruffs and bodices, but also in the physical torment the characters are put through. Olimpio is stretched on the rack and branded with scolding irons in excruciating detail. In real life, Francesco’s head was almost completely severed, but in his film Fulci initiates the first in a long line of iconic eye stabbings; at the end of the struggle Francesco lies prostrate and disfigured, like a victim of one of Fulci’s 1980s zombies. If there is any other work related to the story of Beatrice other than The Cenci that comes close to Fulci’s approach here it is Caravaggio’s painting: the explicit, gory detail of Holofornes’ decapitation and Judith’s contorted pose and look of fascinated repulsion is like a blueprint for the Fulci style, a harbinger of the eerily disembodied, graphic massacres to come. In Beatrice Cenci the connection between shock effects and moral polemic still exists: Fulci’s outrage had not yet hollowed out and the film pulses with anger and passion, however cold, hard and ruthless the execution. The cynicism, at this stage, was political, not misanthropic. Fulci could already depict human cruelty with an explicit fury, but this was borne of a basic humanism; the overt sympathy for victims and the fact that his most prominent martyrs are women would set these early films apart from the bleak, pitiless worlds of Contraband and The New York Ripper. Susan Sontag’s description of Artaud as “a connoisseur of despair and moral struggle” could also describe the Fulci of Beatrice Cenci – sensitive to the brutality and cruelty of life, but committed to redemption and justice. There is not necessarily any hope here, but there is still a moral force. 

Sontag would characterise Artaud’s body of work as “a broken, self-mutilated corpus, a vast collection of fragments,” and this was the same for Fulci. His “vision”, such as it was, did not appear fully formed like Dario Argento or reveal itself methodically like Michelangelo Antonioni. Instead, it was achieved in fragments, across decades and genres, in films often distorted by producers or mutilated by censors. His best work shared a distinct sensibility with Artaud, defined by extravagant sensory violence, a brutal shock aesthetic and a rejection of logic and narrative — the Fulci sublime. There was nothing accidental about any of this and, after all, Artaud was a great influence on him, a fact that was as visible in Beatrice Cenci as it was in more violent and abstract works like City of the Living Dead and The Beyond. If the best book on Fulci remains Stephen Thrower’s masterpiece Beyond Terror, then one of the most useful companion pieces is Sontag’s Artaud essay, because the frustrations, obsessions and themes she identified in Artaud’s scattered corpus all had close overlaps with Fulci’s own work. This was not a question of adaptation or appropriation or imitation, but of sensibility and technique. To a great degree he was able to realise on screen what Artaud failed to do on stage, and Beatrice Cenci was a good example of this: it contained all of the physical violence, psychological horror, corrosive cynicism and moral force of the popular Roman legend but delivered it in an immaculately rendered and dramatically rich period drama. Later, Fulci would present the Theatre of Cruelty in an infamous run of horror movies and Beatrice Cenci pointed towards this future, but then he would never do anything quite like it ever again. 

With the benefit of hindsight it is very difficult to separate the events of Fulci’s personal life from the films he eventually made or the way his work developed. One day in 1969, he would return home from editing the final cut of Beatrice Cenci to be met at the door by his mother and told that his terminally ill wife Maria had committed suicide. This searing personal tragedy combined with subsequent emotional and professional catastrophes to cast a shadow over the rest of his work. Certainly, as time went on the films got more despairing and more misanthropic, as if the route to The New York Ripper had been partly set by the darkness and drama of his own life. Apart from anything else, the commercial and critical failure of Beatrice Cenci would be among his first and deepest disappointments, so there is a poignancy to the fact that even after finding global fame with Zombie Flesh Eaters, Fulci would still describe this as the best film he ever made. Before she died, it was also Maria’s favourite. Perhaps this is because it is his most complete and coherent dramatic production, something more measured and refined than the morbid, mean-spirited, macabre nightmares he would eventually create: one example of an alternative Fulci, possibly one he really wanted to be. But I think this would be a mistake: in the end, Beatrice Cenci belongs to the same cold world as The New York Ripper and the only difference is the degree of despair. 

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On the Legacy of George L. Mosse

Past history is always contemporary.
George L. Mosse, The Nationalisation of the Masses

In Confronting History, his posthumously published memoir, George L. Mosse recalled the occupation of Mossehaus, the headquarters of Rudolf Mosse’s German publishing empire, during the Spartacist Uprising of January 1919. “My grandfather, still alive at the time, was not up to negotiating with [the Spartacus League],” he wrote, eighty years later:

and so my father went into the occupied building and talked all night to one of their leaders, Rosa Luxemburg, who wanted to prevent the publication of the Berliner Tageblatt, scheduled for the next morning. He managed to keep her in conversation until the paper actually appeared and was delivered in the early morning hours. (1)

“For the rest of his life,” Mosse commented, “this committed liberal and capitalist was fond of saying that Rosa Luxemburg was the most intelligent woman he had ever met.” In the following days, Luxemburg would be captured by Freikorps troops and executed, a casualty of the counterrevolution that would go on to contribute so many men to the ranks of the SA and SS. They had no way of knowing this, of course, but the Mosses would one day become victims of these same forces, targeted by the Nazis as “ready-made symbols of the so-called Jewish Press” (2).

George Mosse belonged to one of the most successful and assimilated Jewish communities in Europe. Walter Laqueur, writing about Ludwig Bamberger, the politician and scion of the Bambergers of Mainz, described his unbreakable faith in “the symbiosis, the identification of the Jews with the Germans”:

They had been thoroughly Germanised well beyond Germany’s border; through the medium of language they had accepted German culture, and through the culture, the German national spirit. He and his friends thought there was obviously some affinity in the national character which attracted Jews so strongly to Germany and the German spirit. (3)

This was a widely shared sense of cultural belonging that George, as a privileged child of Berlin’s liberal Jewish elite, also inherited. The Mosses were a fixture of the Berlin establishment and George did not consider his “opulent lifestyle” of country estates, urban mansions, servants and chauffeurs to be unusual or vulnerable in any way. “Like many liberals of his generation,” he recalled, “my father could bring himself only with difficulty to take the Nazis seriously. He used to say that Hitler did not belong in the front part of the newspaper, but in the Ulk, the comic supplement” (4). The Mosses considered themselves to be German “without giving it another thought” (5) and did not recognise the new reality that had been created by a regime that defined them, without any mitigation, as enemies of the völk. “To be sure,” he wrote, “such families as ours shared some of the self-criticism of Jews and had a lively consciousness of antisemitism, but in the last resort, German, Jew and family were interchangable concepts” (6). For the Mosses, German patriotism, liberalism and the tradition of the Enlightenment — which had, after all, secured their emancipation and provided them with the opportunity to succeed so spectacularly — also underpinned their anti-Zionism, a position that George would only abandon later in life. 

Everything changed in 1933 when the Nazi agent Wilhelm Ohst held George’s father at gunpoint, forcing him to sign over the Mosse firm as part of the mass expropriation of newspapers and publishing houses by the Nazis. An SA thug, racial occultist and petty criminal backed by the power of an antisemitic regime, Ohst was no Luxemburg, as Mosse later noted: “this indeed was a different sort of occupation from that of the Sparticists with whom [my father] had dealt so easily after the First World War” (7). With no prospect of negotiation, the family was forced to abandon their business and property and escape into exile in France. They would never return to live in Germany and the experience of dispossession and exile would define the rest of their lives. For George, it would determine his future course as a historian of fascism, nationalism and racism. “I could not simply walk away from the failure of socialists and liberals to understand National Socialism,” he wrote in his memoir, “this failure in which, as we have seen, my own family’s publishing empire had been involved, was constantly before me” (8).

It turned out that the Mosses were fortunate to have been targeted so early. By the Second World War they had settled in America, safe from Nazi extermination. Nevertheless, in an essay to mark his retirement, Mosse would conclude that

all my books in one way or another have dealt with the Jewish catastrophe of my time which I always regarded as no accident, structural fault or continuity of bureaucratic habit, but seemingly built into our society and towards life. (9)

Like Benedetto Croce, Mosse believed that “past history is always contemporary” and this was the root of his contention — by no means universally accepted — that the Holocaust was not a historical aberration but an event with deep roots in the European experience. “Nothing in European history is a stranger to the Holocaust,” he wrote. Croce had been a key influence on Mosse, and in 1976 he would tell the young historian Michael Ledeen that the Italian had “influenced me, above all, through his concept of the totality of history, something I believe very much — that outside history there is no reality” (10). His belief, in common with Croce, that the individual remained central to historical understanding enabled him to strike the delicate balance between political commitment and impartial analysis that would come to define his work. He would later acknowledge that his identity as a Jewish German exile and a closeted homosexual had largely determined his central historical themes, writing that

I have always been instinctively suspicious of historians who have held an overriding belief, including a faith in a traditional religion. Now I realise that this attitude, while still desirable as an ideal, was unfair…The temper of the times made a neutral stance impossible and perhaps even undesirable to maintain. (11)

But this was subtle: political commitment did not give way to activism. He would never explicitly link his research to a contemporary cause. Even though his work often overlapped with the Frankfurt School and he would come to scope out territory explored by Foucault and later occupied by Gender Studies, he would never join an intellectual movement or adopt the terms of passing theoretical trends. This was a form of freedom —  it is what gave his writing scope and clarity as well as informing his historical methodology.

Mosse believed that “empathy is the chief quality a historian needs to cultivate” (12) but when he tried to understand the interwar fascist movements in the way that they had understood themselves, he transgressed the “accepted” political boundaries of academic inquiry; as a consequence, his reputation would remain largely confined to the academic niche of Comparative Fascist Studies. In Italy, where he was genuinely and widely appreciated, fame was clouded by the scandal surrounding his friend Renzo De Felice that followed the publication of the 1974 Intervista sul fascismo with Michael Ledeen. As Ledeen recalled:

for months, it was virtually impossible to read a newspaper, watch an evening of television, or listen to a few hours of radio without running into a supercharged attack on De Felice, not only for the presumed ‘errors’ of his historical analysis but also for ‘corrupting Italian youth.’ More than one critic suggested that he be forbidden to teach at Italian universities. (13)

Mosse, for his part, publicly defended De Felice and the two historians found inspiration and support in each other’s ideas and work. Most importantly, they quickly acquired the same enemies and for largely the same reasons: by taking the ideas and aesthetics of fascism seriously, they found themselves accused of revisionism by critics who sought to make political capital out of the scandal.

At the heart of this was a deliberate misinterpretation of ‘historical empathy’ which Mosse himself defined as “putting contemporary prejudice aside while looking at the past without fear of favour” (14) but which was emphatically not the equivalent of sympathy. In practice, this method allowed Mosse to focus on the myths, symbols and perceptions of fascist movements, their supporters and mass participants. This was not limited to the study of high culture but also focused on popular culture and populist theories that ranged from pulp novels to occult movements. With this, Mosse broke academic etiquette in two ways: by treating seriously cultural materials that had been disregard by other historians, and by approaching fascism and Nazism as coherent ideologies. In the introduction to his 1999 essay collection The Fascist Revolution, Mosse wrote that

Fascism considered as a cultural movement means seeing fascism as it saw itself and as its followers saw it, to attempt to understand the movement on its own terms…only then, when we have grasped fascism from the inside out, can we truly judge its appeal and its power. (15)

His objective was not to rehabilitate fascism, but to understand it better — both its historical reality and its existing danger. 

Mosse’s breakthrough work of 1964, The Crisis of German Ideology, put forward a new, and for German historians difficult, proposition: that Nazism was made possible by a German völkisch movement that had “penetrated deeply into the national fabric” and “showed a depth of feeling and a dynamic that was not equaled elsewhere” (16). This was the first attempt to analyse the cultural traditions of Germanism and the institutionalisation of völkisch thought in the German Youth Movements, schools, universities, nationalist organisations and political parties of the right. (‘Leadership, Bund and Eros’, a chapter devoted to the links between masculinity, homo-eroticism and völkisch ideals, was a revolutionary piece of research and analysis in itself.) The point wasn’t that Nazism was an inevitable culmination of German history or an innate expression of German character  — the ‘From Luther to Hitler’ school or Sonderweg paradigm. Instead, Mosse argued that the success of völkisch ideas in a newly unified and rapidly industrializing Germany created the conditions in which Nazism could succeed through a general popular consensus. The “human perceptions, hopes and longing for the good life” (17) that contributed to this could not be seen in total isolation from broader economic and social forces common to other countries. But, equally, the specific historical reality of Germany could not be avoided: “as a result of the lost war, Germany became the nation in which the völkisch dream was realised [and] the alliance between racism and völkisch nationalism triumphed” (18).

Racism was key to the development of German nationalism and the central innovation of Nazism was to turn the German Revolution into an Anti-Jewish revolution (“the dehumanisation of the Jew is perhaps one of the most significant developments in the evolution of the völkisch ideology”, 19). Hitler’s defining achievement was to organise a diffuse völkisch movement into a new religion of state by combining the irrational mysticism of the Germanic Faith with ruthless and pragmatic political tactics. “Mein Kampf is devoted 50 percent to theory and 50 percent to organisation,” Mosse told Ledeen in a 1976 interview, “and that’s about right as far as Hitler is concerned because he believed that theory was all important — the myth was central — but it would be no good unless it could be translated into action” (20). The Nazi myth needed a tradition to activate and The Crisis of German Ideology was the first attempt to analyse and catalogue the origins, character and structure of that tradition. “You cannot have any successful myth without historical preparation,” Mosse explained, “I tried, then, to show the roots of this myth” (21).

The scope and range of Mosse’s work at this time was unique, although not everybody thought it warranted. Fritz Stern had covered similar ground a couple of years earlier but most of Mosse’s contemporaries still considered fascism to be empty of serious theoretical content. To a large extent, this was because it did not conform to their own self-imposed categories, as Mosse was more than willing to point out:

all fascisms rejected classical political theory, that is why Anglo-Saxon scholars have such a difficult time discussing it. They’re always looking for logical, consistent political theories. But fascism regarded itself, always, wherever it was, as an attitude of mind, an attitude towards life. (22)

Unlike Communism, with its foundation in the canonical works of Marxism, fascism was not a textual doctrine, but a visual revolution; it did not proceed by rational explication of theory, but by the mobilisation of masses of people through myth, symbols and ritual. This was the crucial insight that provided the foundation for Mosse’s 1975 masterpiece The Nationalization of the Masses which described the contribution that national monuments, sacred spaces, architecture, public festivals, theatre, cultural organisations and popular taste all made to the Germanic myth. Here Mosse touched on new themes that would contribute to a general theoretical framework for all of his work: the idea of politics as a civic religion; the continuity between fascist and bourgeois aesthetics; the connections between the French Revolution, the Enlightenment, nationalism and fascism; and the concrete objectification of myth in rituals, art and monuments. Mosse termed this the ‘New Politics’ and defined it as a secular political style that developed from the French Revolution to the Second World War “through the use of national myths and symbols and the development of a liturgy which would enable the people themselves to participate in such worship” (23). In Germany and Italy — the youngest of the major European nations — the end point of this was fascism, a political style that stood outside the rational, logical systems of traditional political theory:

the fascists themselves described their political thought as an “attitude” rather than a  system; it was, in fact, a theology which provided the framework for national worship. As such, its rites and liturgies were central, an integral part of a political theory which was not dependent on the appeal of the written word. (24)

This would later be described as Mosse’s “visual turn” — an analysis of fascism that redefined the terms of the debate through aesthetics and anthropology.

The Nationalization of the Masses — a relatively short work of 216 pages — established a new foundation for the cultural history of nationalism and fascism. The book had its greatest impact in Italy where it complemented the work of De Felice and set a new course for Emilio Gentile. In an interview published in Corriere della sera in 1985, Mosse speculated that his popularity in Italy was due to “the widespread diffusion in your country to think visually: a predisposition which is very important for understanding my writings, the encounter between symbols and myths” (25). During this time, the relationship between Mosse and De Felice was particularly productive; even their disagreements led to clarity and refinements. For De Felice, the differences between Nazism and Italian Fascism rendered any general definition of fascism futile, while Mosse would attempt a generic definition in his 1979 essay ‘Towards a General Theory of Fascism’. On the other hand, the distinction De Felice drew between the radical, activist ‘fascist-movement’ of the squadristi and the reactionary, establishment ‘fascist-regime’ of Mussolini found an echo in Mosse’s own analysis of Nazism as an “anti-bourgeois bourgeois revolution” (26) and the provocative link he made between Hitler’s apocalyptic racism and bourgeois tastes. For both historians the defining difference between the Nazis and Fascists was their view of human nature. The Nazis viewed human identity as biologically fixed and rooted in ancient history, while the Fascists saw it as open-ended and dynamic, a matter of ‘spirit’ rather than blood. These key distinctions, shared with slight nuance by both historians, directly challenged the received wisdom of Marxist and liberal historiography in Italy. They were bitterly contested. The “storm over De Felice” exploded precisely because the bestselling Intervista sul fascismo had presented his ideas with a clarity and concision not found in his other books. In fact, this clarity was important: rather than minimising the crimes of the Fascist regime, it helped to define its true nature. 

In 1978, Mosse finally reckoned with the origins of Nazi mass murder and produced one of the angriest books he ever wrote: his history of European racism, Toward the Final Solution. The anger, as such, did not communicate itself in the style or the tone or even the method, all of which was as cool and expansive as ever, but in the details of his analysis and conclusions. Mosse traced the roots of modern European racism to two traditions: Romanticism (also the root of nationalism) and the Enlightenment. Racism combined scientific classification with Greek ideals of beauty — eugenics and physiognomy put at the service of the Aryan stereotype. In Germany, this merged with völkisch nationalism to lead a nation down the fatal path of racial mysticism, race war and Lebensraum. Racism, as a political ideology, social aesthetic and national movement, required an antithesis and an enemy to give it dynamism. In Germany, Austria and Eastern Europe this could only be the Jew. The Jewish stereotype was given a distinct look that stood in direct contrast to the Aryan male, itself a derivation of Classical aesthetic models revived during the Enlightenment. Finally, the Jew came to embody everything that threatened or corrupted the national community: urban culture, finance capitalism, international cosmopolitanism, sexual and aesthetic decadence.

It was this middle class development and promotion of stereotypes that underpinned Mosse’s description of the Nazi as the ideal bourgeois and also inspired his depiction of the nineteenth century “struggle to control sex” (27) through stereotypes and manners in 1985’s Nationalism and Sexuality. This was an equally angry book and in many ways a companion piece to Toward the Final Solution. For Mosse, racism and respectability stemmed from the same impulse to classify and exclude, as well as the same fatal combination of science and aesthetics. The story of racism was not “the history of an aberration of European thought” but “an integral part of the human experience” (28), while

respectability provided society with an essential cohesion that was as important in the perceptions of men and women as any economic or political interests. What began as bourgeois morality in the eighteenth century, in the end became everyone’s morality. (29)

This was the paradox of the Enlightenment that Mosse identified — the very thing that gave birth to liberalism and led to Jewish emancipation also spawned the twin evils of racism and respectability. 

These were key concerns for Mosse because they were directly rooted in his own personal experience and his past. However, in his late memoir, he qualified one crucial aspect of this attack on the European bourgeoisie: “the repression involved in the maintenance of respectability seemed to strike reviewers, and indeed I might have overstressed this aspect of nationalism and respectability by failing to suppress sufficiently my anger over the fact that the strictures of respectability had made my own life so much more difficult” (30). Furthermore, in his preface to the republication of The Crisis of German Ideology, Mosse expressed second thoughts about the origins of National Socialism that had implications for all of his work on nationalism, racism and fascism:

If I were to write this book today…the First World War, which prepared the breakthrough of völkisch thought, would be given greater space. Not only because the myth of the war experience proved susceptible to völkisch ideas, but because, as a result of the lost war and its consequences, Germany became the nation in which the völkisch dream was to be realised. This could not have been foreseen before the war. (31)

Mosse redressed this in Fallen Soldiers, his 1990 study on the memory of war that finally gave the First World War the “space” it had not been accorded in his earlier work. Influenced by cultural historians such as Marc Ferro and Paul Fussell, Mosse came to see the First World War as the great catalytic event of the twentieth century, a collective experience that gave nationalism and racism the dynamism and momentum that led directly to fascism and the Holocaust. Fallen Soldiers drew together all the social, cultural and military trends that had developed from the French Revolution to 1914 in order to identify the defining features of the Great War and its aftermath: the myth of the war experience, the cult of the fallen, the worship of the nation, the brutalisation of politics, the mechanisation of all aspects of life and the dehumanisation of the enemy. For Mosse, “the encounter with mass death” during the war “took on a new dimension, the political consequences of which vitally affected the politics of the interwar years” (32). All of the nations involved felt these effects to different degrees, but none more so than Germany, a country both traumatised and brutalised by the war experience and with a völkisch ideology ready to be activated and exploited by the parties of the right, with the Nazis at the vanguard. The First World War was the decisive point at which all the key elements Mosse had traced in his work — from the stereotypes of race and gender to the ideologies of nationalism and völk — were fatally radicalised, with antisemitism, racial mysticism and the cult of violence moving from the margins to the centre of European politics. In the final analysis, it was the Great War that led to Nazi culture and Holocaust morality — the dark heart of European modernity. 

The last major works of Mosse — Fallen Soldiers and The Image of Man (1997) — developed all of the key themes and subjects from across his career, providing a rich coda to his long study of the politics of nation, race and gender from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries. Both books represented a final reckoning with his times and with his own personal experience; they were also his most beautiful and underrated works. After his death in 1999, tributes were paid to his influence and achievement in the form of obituaries, essays and conferences, and to this day his academic legacy is kept alive through programmes, funds, conferences and prizes all bearing his name and often paid for by the Mosse estate, stolen by the Nazis in 1933 and returned by the newly unified German state in 1990. Most significantly, in 2020 the University of Wisconsin Press finally began to publish Mosse’s collected works with new critical introductions, and as a result The Crisis of German Ideology, Nationalism and Sexuality, Toward the Final Solution and The Fascist Revolution all returned to print. I assumed this would be big news, but then I have not seen any acknowledgment of these new editions in the British or American press — not in the Times Literary Supplement, the London Review of Books, the New York Review of Books or even Commentary, a magazine that once published him.

Maybe this is to be expected because the innovations of Mosse still go largely unacknowledged, even in research areas he helped to establish. There are exceptions: Roger Griffin continues “the Mossean legacy” in his own work and Emilio Gentile still plots a course set by his original encounter with Mosse’s books. Their respective studies Modernism and Fascism (2007) and The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy (1993) are key works in the Mosse lineage. Furthermore, Mosse’s subliminal influence is  pervasive, as Griffin suggested in 2008 when he noted “the appearance of a series of books by a younger generation of historians who find it a matter of ‘common sense’ to engage with fascism not as a reactionary, backwards-looking force, but as a revolutionary, futural one deeply bound up with the early twentieth century revolt against existing modernity that took on myriad aesthetic, social and political forms” (33). The uncontroversial acceptance by contemporary historians writing about fascism of ideas first pursued by Mosse (along with De Felice) in the face of fierce ideological hostility is, in the end, the sum of his legacy. The same holds true for the wider terrain of cultural history (Linda Colley’s Britons seems to me to be a very Mossean book, but he appears to have no acknowledged impact on her method or thinking) as well as the various schools and departments of Gender Studies, Queer Theory and LGBT history in which he was a pioneer. The reasons are likely to be political or stylistic, which, if true, would be misguided: Mosse still has plenty to say about the world we live in now and always has done. “This is still the age of mass politics,” he once wrote for an untitled speech on the subject of indoctrination,

and the same longings which were operative in 1945 are still with us surely — the political process is still a drama transmitted to us by the media…the old traditions seem to have broken down, but now we have them again under a different form, mediating between us and the world, between us and our hopes in escaping from the crisis of our time, which is the crisis of mass politics and mass democracy. Indoctrination is in reality this mediation and it would not work if it did not represent a principle of hope. Rather than condemn it we must understand its function: then perhaps we can begin to escape its all pervasive present. (34)

I think we should be reading Mosse carefully and learning from him. 

  1. George L. Mosse, Confronting History: A Memoir (University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), p.40
  2. Ibid., p.66
  3. Walter Laqueur, A History of Zionism (Schocken Books, 2003), pps.30-1
  4. Mosse, Confronting History, p.41
  5. Ibid., p.43
  6. Ibid., p.26
  7. Ibid., pps.67-8
  8. Ibid., p.184
  9. Quoted in Steven E. Aschheim’s introduction to George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (University of Wisconsin Press, 2021), p.xxv
  10. George L. Mosse and Michael A. Ledeen, Nazism: A Historical and Comparative Analysis of National Socialism (Basil Blackwell, 1978), p.29
  11. Mosse, Confronting History, p.6
  12. Ibid., p.5
  13. Michael A. Ledeen, Freedom Betrayed (AEI Press, 1996), p.25
  14. Mosse, Confronting History, p.5
  15. George L. Mosse, The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism (Howard Fertig, 1999), p.x
  16. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, p.10
  17. Ibid., p.x
  18. Ibid., pps.x-xi
  19. Ibid., p.141 
  20. Mosse and Ledeen, Nazism, p.59 
  21. Ibid., p.32
  22. Ibid., p.108
  23. George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses (Cornell University Press, 1991), pps.2-3
  24. Ibid., p.9
  25. Quoted in Giorgio Caravale, ‘“A Mutual Admiration Society”: The Intellectual Friendships and the Origins of George Mosse’s Connection to Italy’ in George L Mosse’s Italy: Interpretation, Reception and Cultural Heritage, ed. Lorenzo Benadusi and Giorgio Caravale (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p.65
  26. George L. Mosse, Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality (Wayne State University Press, 1987), p.6
  27. George L. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe (Howard Fertig, 1997), p.9
  28. George L. Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism (Howard Fertig, 1997), pps. xxviii-xxix
  29. Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality, p.191
  30. Mosse, Confronting History, p.180
  31. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology, p.x
  32. George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (Oxford University Press, 1990), p.3
  33. ‘The Fascination of Fascism: A Concluding Interview with Roger Griffin’ in A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin, ed. Matthew Feldman (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.214
  34. Quoted in Karel Plessini, The Perils of Normalcy: George L. Mosse and the Remaking of Cultural History (University of Wisconsin Press, 2014), p.207
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Slaughter Commissions: Crime Films and the Italian Crisis

Review of the Arrow Films box set Years of Lead: Five Classic Italian Crime Thrillers, 1973-1977 (Mario Imperoli, Like Rabid Dogs; Vittorio Salerno, Savage Three; Massimo Dallamano, Colt 38 Special Squad; Stelvio Massi, Highway Racer; Vittorio Salerno, No, the Case is Happily Resolved)

Mario Imperoli’s Like Rabid Dogs opens with a brutal armed robbery that takes place in the bowels of Rome’s Stadio Olimpico during the 1976 Serie A play-off between Lazio and Sampdoria. This was a violent relegation fixture that was the first football match in Italian history to be patrolled by carabinieri with German shepherd dogs. Imperoli recycles television footage of the actual match, focusing on Luciano Re Cecconi, Lazio’s star centre, who would be shot dead a year later by the owner of a jewelry shop in Rome — “a victim of the same violence we see in the movie,” as the film critic Fabio Melelli puts it. Lucio Fulci once claimed that “violence is Italian art” and Like Rabid Dogs is a very Italian aestheticization of violence: it is a pure product of an imploding society.

All the films in Arrow’s Years of Lead: Five Classic Italian Crime Thrillers, 1973-1977 can be viewed as the joint offspring of Hercules and Rome, Open City: genre films that exploit the tools of neorealism. This was partly a matter of politics and partly technique. Like Rabid Dogs is filled with spectacular car chases, all of which were staged in the middle of Rome without permission from city authorities; the film was shot in the same year as Ruggero Deodato’s Live Like a Cop, Die Like a Man which opened with an explosive and infamous motorbike pursuit that was filmed, illegally, in the heart of the Roman rush hour. Like Carlo Lizzani, the Italian crime film pioneer, Deodato began his own career as an assistant director to Roberto Rossellini and would later combine the tricks of neorealism with the excesses of the mondo documentary in Cannibal Holocaust. The effect was to blur the boundaries between fantasy and reality, but this was just an extension of what was happening anyway: ‘Italy’ in the 1970s was nothing more than a series of linked fictions, a web of conspiracies, speculation, illusion and lies. The anarchy and lawlessness that Imperoli and Deodato put on screen did not simply represent what was happening: it was an integral part of how these films were actually made.

Like Rabid Dogs was loosely based on the 1975 Circeo massacre and, like Vittorio Salerno’s ruthless 1975 shocker Savage Three, it was also animated by the spirit of A Clockwork Orange. For Salerno, however, Turin was the symbolic city of the Italian crisis: home of Fiat and the Agnelli network, Red Brigade terror and wildcat strikes, it was a victim of its own history, both resented and envied, a racially and socially charged conflict zone primed to explode. Italian unification had been, in reality, a process of ‘Piedmontisation’ imposed on the peninsula and bitterly resisted in the South; this resentment was further aggravated by the great migration north that was triggered by the postwar Economic Miracle and which created a teeming underclass of southern factory workers languishing on low wages in overcrowded apartments. Salerno’s Turin was the 1970s equivalent of Visconti’s 1950s Milan in Rocco and his Brothers: a social and economic trap breeding alienation, disaffection, perversion and violence. In Savage Three Turin looks like a city that has been overwhelmed and degraded: the football stadium, streets, piazzas, boulevards and even the modern office blocks are visibly broken, exhausted, unclean, crumbling. In place of the haunted Art Nouveau suburbia of Dario Argento’s Profondo Rosso or the Baroque, bourgeois decadence of Luigi Comencini’s The Sunday Woman, Salerno shows a grim urban sprawl: a dead space producing only despair and conflict.

Every frame of Salerno’s film looks depressed and drained of colour, in line with the common visual tone of the 197os Italian crime films and poliziotteschi: in these films, the sky is invariably blank and grey, a featureless ceiling of drab cloud that creates a simultaneously flat and oppressive atmosphere, the saturation of the gialli and the luxurious monochrome of neorealism replaced by an ugly, washed-out tonal range. The poliziotteschi city is a bleak, malignant place, where all human relations are negative and most interactions are violent. Fernando di Leo’s Milan is not defined by its neoclassical arcades or the Duomo di Milano, but by rotting ghettos that run alongside the canals, grey rain-drenched piazza tiles and warehouses where corpses wait weeks to be discovered. Umberto Lenzi’s Rome is not the Rome of romantic weekends and ancient ruins, but a dirty and congested labyrinth of squalid flats, dank alleys, damp staircases, bleak wasteland and scrappy tenement rooftops, settings for various acts of torture, rape and murder. Enzo G. Castellari’s Genoa is perhaps the most desperate of them all: a terrifying, feral, decadent city, rotten with vice and corruption, festering on the edge of the Ligurian sea.

The fate of Italy’s cities in the 1970s is encapsulated by some of its most famous crime titles: Fernando di Leo’s Milano Calibro 9, Marino Girolami’s Violent Rome, Lenzi’s Gang War in Milan, Rome Armed to the Teeth and Violent Naples. The cities are the focal point of Italy’s crisis: the piazzas and train stations are bombed and the banks are robbed, while criminal gangs and rogue cops rule the streets and citizens are terrorised by random acts of slaughter. Perhaps the definitive Italian crime title is the one that Sergio Sollima gave his 1970 hit man melodrama, Città violenta, even though that film was set in New Orleans. The cities are violent places that condition their inhabitants to commit more violence: an endless, animalistic cycle that Salerno depicts so well in Savage Three.

In Massimo Dallamano’s Colt 38 Special Squad the motivation for the crime is even more ambiguous than in Imperoli and Salerno’s films. At first the operation planned by ‘the Marseillaise’ seems like a simple case of common theft, albeit conducted on a grand scale, but as Rachael Nisbet shrewdly points out in her accompanying essay to the Years of Lead set, there is something more sinister at work:

While the motivations of the common criminal are clear, the Marseillaise is a more complex individual; a man driven by a certain sense of madness and anarchic glee…his perverse sadism and disregard for life suggest that his actions are motivated by something far darker than the driving factors of vengeance and retribution…

Savage Three’s Ovidio and ‘the Marseillaise’ are both nihilists but the scale of the Marseillaise’s plan is more ambitious than Ovidio’s spasm of violence. He wants to inflict a grievous wound on Turin and live to see it; the motivation of money does not adequately explain this instinct. This is more than simply a plot point, or an absence of one: it taps into the atmosphere of uncertainty that defined the atrocities of this period and was never adequately resolved.

The Italian political culture of the 1970s was so convoluted and secretive that when Henry Kissinger claimed that he did not understand it nobody thought he was joking. In 1988, the Italian state set up the Commissione Stragi (‘The Slaughter Commission’) tasked with uncovering the truth behind the bombings that occurred between 1969-88 and were variously attributed to the Red Brigades, anarchists, neofascists and the CIA. Predictably, it failed to remove the opacity of the period or provide any real psychological closure. The scenes of carnage that follow the bombings of Turin railway station and market in Colt 38 Special Squad stand out for their graphic brutality and emotional poignancy. Dallamano shot the film only four years after the Piazza Fontana bomb, so these scenes pierce his movie like unmediated expressions of national post-traumatic stress: they were not shot for thrills and carry a lot of psychological weight, evoking memories that were, in 1976, still raw. What can’t be answered in the film, and what could never be effectively answered in real life, is the reason for all of this destruction and cruelty. The Slaughter Commission could not solve it and Dallamano refuses to provide a neat conclusion in the character of the Marseillaise. The ambiguity of the violence and the veil that fell over the most extreme events that ripped through Italy in the 1970s are a central part of the poliziotteschi world view: if nobody can fully account for this violence, then perhaps it is simply endemic to the fragile and conflicted Italian nation, something that can never be solved. 

But Colt 38 Special Squad also fulfills another function common to these films: it provides a psychological outlet, a form of mass catharsis. The disintegration of Italian society was intensified by the prominent role of organised crime, black markets and corruption in a free falling economy. The Italian crime films gave voice to the pervasive feeling that the Italian authorities had fallen behind the criminal gangs, even if they were not already hopelessly compromised by them. Fear and helplessness combined with anger; the films responded with bleak cynicism and tales of vigilante justice and police brutality (a source of the misguided accusation that they were “fascist”). The ‘38 Special Squad’ is put together to crush the crime wave that has tipped Turin into near anarchy and they are given licence to use their Colt 38s in pursuit of their targets with a latitude that stops short of murder (or is supposed to); it is only by going beyond the limits of legal authority that the Marseillaise is finally stopped. In a similar vein, Stelvio Massi’s Highway Racer pays homage to Armando Spatafora, a member of Rome’s Squadra Mobile whose 1960s exploits were legendary. In the film the young Squadra Mobile driver Marco Palma soups up a boxy Alfa Romeo and demands a Ferrari from his boss, the Spatafora doppelganger Tagliaferri, because “I don’t want to lose before I begin.” Retaking the advantage is key and requires special measures. Palma is played by Maurizio Merli, who specialised in the role of rogue cops like Commissioner Betti and Inspector Tanzi in Umberto Lenzi’s frantic and sporadically stylish films Rome Armed to the Teeth, Violent Naples and The Cynic, the Rat and the Fist, mavericks who push their job description beyond law enforcement into the realms of vigilantism. The poliziotteschi gave Italians an alternative reality in which cops redressed the unlimited power and protection of organised crime to redeem Italian society as a whole.

But they also provided a troubling critique and quite often without any release or redemption. Italy in the 1970s was paralysed by corruption and this was more insidious than terrorism and crime because it undermined any sense of security in state and local authority and, even, trust in the reality of appearances. Vittorio Salerno’s No, the Case is Happily Resolved is the one entry in the Arrow set that focuses on this total breakdown in trust, with a narrative so pure in its inexorable and dire logic that it almost presents a parable for the Italian crisis. The corruption in this case is psychological and sexual: at the opening of the film Professor Eduardo Ranieri, a quiet and respectable maths and physics teacher, brutally beats a Roman prostitute to death in a reed bed outside of the city. Fabio Santamaria, a young working class man who witnesses the murder, eventually finds himself framed, arrested and jailed for the crime after a fatal series of errors that recall the fate of Richard Blaney in Alfred Hitchcock’s Frenzy. Santamaria makes the fatal decision not to report this crime and to try to cover up his presence at the scene, largely because he distrusts and even fears the police. This instinct proves correct: the police believe Ranieri because of his position and his appearance, but jail Santamaria after a cursory investigation. Murderous and perverse impulses are veiled by the professor’s exterior presentation and this is compounded by an official corruption that renders the police ineffective and even dangerous to defenceless citizens. All the authority figures in this film either conceal their true identity or cannot be trusted to do their jobs safely: all certainty is therefore undermined and Italian society is shown to be based on deception and illusion, a place where reality is inverted and nobody is secure.

The Italian crime films of the 1970s did not just reflect their own society, then: they made an active contribution to the atmosphere and dynamics of the Italian crisis. The poliziotteschi cycle played out in the shadow of real and relentless atrocities committed by political and criminal groups and state actors. The films did not always or necessarily comment on any of this, but political violence and social disintegration were part of their visual and thematic fabric. As Emilio Gentile noted, all of this occurred in the ruins of the myth of the nation, at a time when “Italians were experiencing a mass anthropological revolution in their attitudes and behaviours” and the state was being contested, in the popular imagination and in reality, by the existential conflict between Catholicism and Communism. In this context, popular culture had a crucial role to play in shaping narratives, ideas and emotions on a mass scale and Italian artists seemed to instinctively grasp this. It just turned out be the case that the 70s crime films demonstrated a more profound and immediate understanding of their world than a lot of the more fêted cultural products of the time. The importance of Arrow’s Years of Lead set is that it recognises this and values the films on their own terms.

 

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‘Everyone Middle East is here’: The British in Iraq

The real difficulty here is that we don’t know exactly what we intend to do in this country. Can you persuade people to take your side when you are not sure in the end whether you’ll be there to take theirs? No wonder they hesitate; and it would take a good deal of potent persuasion to make them think that your side and theirs are compatible. 
Gertrude Bell, Basra, 1916

Britain is a high-maintenance ally.
I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, Chief of Staff to the Vice President of the United States, 2003

I: The Cairo Conference

When T. E. Lawrence met the Iraqi delegation of Gertrude Bell, Sir Percy Cox, Jafar Pasha al-Askari and Sasun Effendi Eskail at Cairo train station on March 11th, 1921, he could have expected a frosty reception. Bell, in particular, had been furious with Lawrence for his harsh criticism of the post-war British occupation of Mesopotamia under Arnold T. Wilson. “Things have been far worse than we have been told,” Lawrence wrote in The Sunday Times, “our administration more bloody and inefficient than the public knows” (1). “Tosh…pure nonsense,” Bell had responded defensively, but by the time they met again in Cairo this disagreement had faded into insignificance. They had important work to do. “Dear boy,” Bell warmly greeted her old Orientalist comrade. “Gertie,” Lawrence replied, scanning the colonial delegates stepping off the train, “everyone Middle East is here” (2). “We arrived yesterday,” wrote Bell in her diary, “T. E. Lawrence and others met us at the station — I was glad to see him. We retired at once to my bedroom at the Semiramis and had an hour’s talk…” (3). Here they discussed their joint strategy, in preparation for the conference called by the Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill. Both had the same objective: to convince Churchill to adopt the principle of Arab self-determination in Mesopotamia and appoint Faisal — the third son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca — King of Iraq.

Even when they argued, Lawrence and Bell were in accord. Bell sympathised with Lawrence’s criticisms of Wilson because she basically agreed with them. Wilson was a colonialist who believed that Mesopotamia should be absorbed into the British Empire under the direct authority of the British crown. He was not alone: his staff in Baghdad agreed with him and, following his example, froze Bell out of all the social and professional engagements that they could, dismissing her as a female dilettante and pro-Arab adventurer. The fate of Iraq under the British had been caught between the parochial ambitions of two British institutions: the government in India wanted to annex the Iraqi state and keep control of Arabia, while the British administration in Egypt aimed to incorporate the former Turkish vilayets of Mesopotamia into an Arab Kingdom that Britain would influence but not directly rule. The Cairo Arabists were willing to cede more autonomy to local clients than the Indian government, who reacted with fury to this challenge: “I devoutly hope that this proposed Arab State will fall to pieces, if it is ever created,” Viceroy Hardinge wrote in a letter to the Foreign Office, “It simply means misgovernment, chaos and corruption, since there never can be and never has been consistency among the Arab tribes” (4). This rage was partly due to a sense in India that their power and influence over the tribes had been lost, particularly after the propaganda triumph of the Arab Revolt led by Faisal and orchestrated by Cairo. Bell had been highly influential in the conception and execution of this campaign — as Lawrence acknowledged in a radio interview in 1927 — her geographical, cultural, linguistic and political knowledge of the territory and its tribes providing unrivalled intelligence for British officials.

Both Lawrence and Bell were British imperialists who believed in Arab self-determination under the tutelage of British administrators such as Cox, Bell’s main ally in Baghdad. They blamed Wilson for stoking anti-British sentiment that culminated in a nationalist revolt among the Arab and Kurdish tribes in 1920, and considered his brutal response — bombing villages and Shia shrines, machine-gunning insurgents and burning down their homes — to be counterproductive, or “bloody and inefficient” as Lawrence wrote in the Times. Wilson’s preference was for colonial subjugation: he did not see any prospect for successful local rule and he did not want it anyway. Wilson was a complex character: after leaving the Middle East and entering parliament he became a vocal supporter of Hitler and Mussolini, but then died in a plane crash in Dunkirk in 1940 after enlisting with the R.A.F. volunteer reserve (he would later be a model for Sir George Corbett in Powell and Pressburger’s One of Our Aircraft is Missing). 

Meanwhile, Lawrence and Bell both worked towards Arab self-rule, but against British withdrawal from Iraq. Having outmaneuvered Wilson and convinced the Indian government of their case, the prospect of abandoning the nascent Iraqi state remained the gravest threat hanging over the Cairo conference. Churchill summoned the key Middle East administrators and Orientalists to help resolve a number of outstanding and interrelated political issues in the British mandates, but he also wanted to save money. The British public, in the midst of post-war depression and strikes, had protested against the cost of pursuing British ambitions in the Middle East, and a lead article in the Times had asked a question that would haunt later occupiers: “how much longer are valuable lives to be sacrificed in the vain endeavour to impose upon the Arab population an elaborate and expensive administration which they never asked for and do not want?” (5) Churchill was himself inclined to pull out of Iraq, leaving only a controlling presence in the strategically critical vilayet of Basra — “I’m going to save you millions,”  he crowed to the press. Bell, Lawrence and Cox were aghast at the possibility of abandoning their Arab allies, which they saw as a recipe for territorial disintegration rather than independence.

For Bell the conference was a success because it avoided this outcome, although she didn’t know that the key decisions had already been made in London. As Bell later wrote, somewhat surprised, “Sir Percy and I, coming out with a definite programme, found when we came to open our packet that it coincided exactly” with Churchill’s proposals (6). The Iraqi borders that she had drawn up in Baghdad were reinforced, incorporating the vilayet of Mosul, home of the Kurdish tribes. Churchill was sceptical of its place in the new Iraqi state and favored their independence, but Bell and Cox insisted on it as a way to counter the imbalance between the urban Sunni minority and the rural Shia majority, and he had finally agreed. Furthermore, the principle of self-determination under her own preferred ruler, Faisal, was affirmed, while his brother Abdullah was chosen to rule Transjordan as a temporary governor. Despite her own modest disavowals, Bell returned to Baghdad as a state builder and a kingmaker. For the rest of her short life, her influence over the creation of modern Iraq was unrivaled and her identity intimately woven into the elite cultural and administrative structures of the new state. Faisal considered her to be an honorary Iraqi. She loved the country and felt responsible for its fate, although by the end of her life she was troubled by the course of its development and the behaviour of the King, her old friend and confidant.

Following the end of their mandate in 1932, the British handed control to Iraq’s parliamentary government, while protecting their own political and business interests in the country they had just created. The result was a cultural and economic boom in the cities of Basra and Baghdad, but also resentment of the British that permeated all sections of the Iraqi population, even those identified closely with them, like the monarchy, the governments of Nuri al-Said and the Jews of Baghdad. Despite his desire for independence and the end of de facto occupation, al-Said believed that it was in the best interests of Iraq to work with the British rather than to expel them, but this position was compromised by the economic and military priorities of the British themselves, as exposure of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 made clear to all Iraqis. This fed into the atmosphere that led to the 1958 military coup which effectively terminated British colonialism in Iraq. The revolutionary officers and their Baghdad mobs butchered the royal family in their Palace, while anybody identified with the ancien régime faced a choice of incarceration or slaughter.

Tamara Chalabi’s family memoir Late for Tea at the Deer Palace paints a vivid picture of the terror and chaos of that day, when families associated with the monarchy and the government fled in desperation to safe houses and, eventually, the country. “Whether it was as a direct result of the Suez debacle which Britain had suffered a few years earlier, or a calculated plan to sell out their friends,” Chalabi writes, “it was unclear what lay behind the apparent indifference of the British. There had been a subtle shift of attitude amongst the British in Baghdad, who were clearly aware that propaganda against the monarchy had reached immense proportions within Arab circles” (7). To the horror of the Chalabis (who fled to London) the British did nothing to stop or reverse the coup, even when their Embassy residence was burnt down and a British staff member was shot dead. They had made their own calculations and abandoned their Iraqi allies with ruthless expediency. 

After 1958, British engagement with Iraq was more fractured and distant. During the years of the Ba’ath regime the British tried to intervene in different ways, each ultimately unsuccessful and simply reinforcing the broken link with the Iraqi state that they had created. This essay is about those interventions. It is a tangled tale of exile and opposition, political strategy and foreign policy, invasion and occupation; a story haunted by Britain’s imperial past and the events set in motion by Churchill, Lawrence, Bell, Cox and Wilson.

II: Someone must keep track of these things

On March 18th 2003, the day that Parliament voted to approve the invasion of Iraq, Ann Clwyd wrote a combative op-ed for the Times that made graphic claims about the methods of torture and execution being used in Saddam Hussein’s prisons (8). This included details of screaming prisoners being fed into huge plastic shredders, a claim that was dismissed as simplistic propaganda by opponents of the war but which caught the attention of the U.S. Deputy Security of Defence, Paul Wolfowitz. There followed a unique tête-à-tête in Washington between the Labour member for the Cynon Valley and the neoconservative Pentagon civilian that typified the complexities and controversies of the 2003 intervention.

It turned out that they had more in common than she had expected. “Surprisingly, we hit it off,” Clwyd recalled, “it emerged that he had a long-standing association with human rights issues, dating back to his time as ambassador to Indonesia” (9). She was not the only person that Wolfowitz surprised in this way, but Clwyd also had a tendency to surprise people. Her support for intervention in Iraq did not go down well with former friends, allies and colleagues. “At Swansea, while attending a Welsh Labour conference, I was openly jeered and called ‘Bradwr’, ‘Traitor’. Somehow it sounded so much worse in Welsh” (10). Clwyd’s pragmatic approach to politics awarded her diverse allies, from Wolfowitz on Iraq to Jeremy Corbyn on East Timor. “In general, when weighing up whether or not to lend my support to causes and campaigns, I have learnt to make decisions based on what I believe is the right thing to do rather than the personalities involved” (11), she wrote in her 2017 memoir Rebel With a Cause. The cause of human rights in Iraq eventually left her isolated within her own party.

During their meeting Wolfowitz asked Clwyd who she thought would be the best candidate for the role of interim Iraqi president. She had acquired many contacts and friends over decades working with the Iraqi opposition, particularly within Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress (INC), Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Masoud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), but her choice was unequivocal: 

I spoke strongly in support of Jalal Talabani, since I felt he had the ability to draw the factions together, in other words he would provide the glue. At that point Donald Rumsfeld came into the room, and Wolfowitz said, “Tell him what you just told me.” We discussed why I was against some of the names he had mentioned and why Talabani would be such a strong candidate, and I was delighted when Talabani did indeed land the job as interim President of Iraq. (12)

Clwyd had credibility with the Iraqis and her opinions were taken seriously in London and Washington. During the years of Saddam’s genocidal Anfal campaign she had publicised the plight of the Kurds in parliament and the media, while the British government tried to consolidate their own covert trading relationship with the Ba’ath regime. Following the Gulf War she travelled into the Zagros mountain range to meet Kurdish refugees, taking personal and political risks in order to witness and record their suffering. She was instrumental in lobbying for no-fly zones and could take some credit for the designation of Iraqi Kurdistan as a safe haven. During the 1996 Kurdish civil war, she facilitated a delicate prisoner exchange between the PUK and KDP, negotiating an agreement between Talabani and Barzani that foreshadowed their eventual political settlement.

In her memoir Clwyd is vague about the details of the intra-Kurdish conflict but it was a key moment, not simply for the political course of Iraqi Kurdistan but for the Iraqi opposition as a whole. The civil war was exacerbated by the failure of the INC-Kurdish military offensive of March 1995, an operation that drove a deep wedge between the Kurdish parties after the KDP pulled out at the final moment, unsettled by the Clinton administration’s late denial of support. In the factional scramble that followed, the KDP, hounded by the PUK and its Iranian allies, sought protection from Saddam, a desperate and catastrophic move that led to the reinvasion of the northern safe haven by Iraqi troops in August 1996. Saddam used this opportunity to wipe out the INC: the Iraqi army attacked their camp at Qushtapa and occupied Erbil, executing all the INC personnel they could find and seizing their computers. The CIA airlifted the surviving INC members to Guam and evacuated Iraq, leaving the Kurds to their fate. Clwyd was present in northern Iraq during the operation and took desperate calls from the INC leader Ahmad Chalabi who implored her “tell the world” (13) what was happening. “It was a tragedy for us,” Chalabi later reflected, “‘Twas a devastating blow” (14).

This outcome seemed to confirm Churchill’s early misgivings about Bell’s plan to incorporate the Kurds into the Iraqi state: he had wanted to establish an independent Kurdish home in the north “to protect the Kurds from some future bully in Iraq” but had been overruled by the Foreign Office (15). However, by the 1990s, the Kurds carried the hopes of a democratic and unified post-Saddam Iraq on their shoulders, an outcome the PUK was far more committed to than the KDP. For this reason, the Kurdish collapse into open war and Saddam’s cunning exploitation of the division between the Kurdish parties was a bitter blow for their supporters, and Clwyd did not try to hide her own despair. “I pulled no punches in my conversations, even using emotional blackmail to remind them of my long-standing commitment to the Kurdish cause,” she writes, “I was blunt in telling them of the pain they were now causing their own people” (16). It was a low point for the exiles and their allies. The northern safe haven had been penetrated by Saddam’s army while British and American warplanes watched and did nothing. More importantly, the linchpin of the opposition and the supplier of its most effective existing fighting units, the Kurdish Peshmerga, had disintegrated as a united force. But for Chalabi — among the most resourceful and ruthless of the Iraqi exiles — this was only the beginning of a new, and more successful, phase in the war against Saddam.

To understand the origins of Clwyd’s role in all of this it is crucial to understand Britain’s status as a haven for Iraqi exiles. After 1958 a number of surviving members from the constitutional government fled to London, among them Chalabi’s father Hadi, who had been head of the Iraqi senate before the coup. They would later be joined by émigrés from successive purges until, by the end of the 1980s, London hosted a large and prestigious community of Iraqi refugees. This was partly explained by the close links that remained between the British state and the old Iraqi elites. These ancien régime survivors retained their anglophone sensibilities and a powerful nostalgia for pre-coup Baghdad having benefited from the prosperous and liberal society of the Hashemites and their British sponsors; for some later additions, there were MI6 links. Then, during the years of the Ba’ath, the genteel elegance of their lives in Mayfair, Bloomsbury and Surrey had been overshadowed by the threat of Saddam’s assassins: famously, Chalabi’s rival Iyad Allawi of the Iraqi National Accord had been attacked by an axe-wielding intruder in his Kingston-Upon-Thames home and left for dead by the side of his swimming pool. The escalating brutality and depravity of the Ba’ath regime, as well as Saddam’s willingness to murder his enemies on foreign soil, focussed minds among the opposition groups, although they remained too fractious and scattered to pose any real threat to the dictator. 

London remained a key base for Chalabi, who kept his Knightsbridge office as an operational hub for the INC until the eve of the 2003 invasion. The Chalabis were, in many ways, the epitome of the elite Iraqi exile families: wealthy, cultured, well-connected and determined to return to Iraq to reclaim their stolen inheritance and identity. While he shuttled between Washington and Tehran for the INC, Chalabi kept his family in an opulent Mayfair apartment overlooking Green Park, replete with silk Persian rugs, European and Middle Eastern paintings and a resident maid. When he relocated to northern Iraq in the 1990s, he recreated this refined environment in his house in Salahuddin, decorating it with local sculptures and paintings, hardwood and walnut furniture carved in the style of Frank Lloyd Wright, a state-of-the-art stereo system and a library of imported cookery books from which he taught his Kurdish cooks French cuisine.  One of his favorite relaxations in Kurdistan was to rewatch videos of his favorite TV programme: the 1981 ITV production of Brideshead Revisited, a work with great personal and atmospheric resonance for him. “Fighting Saddam does not mean you have to eat bad food or live in shabby surroundings,” he insisted (17).

Clwyd had worked closely with Chalabi as chair of the Campaign Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI) and its successor INDICT, in the effort to archive evidence of Saddam’s crimes against humanity. In her memoir, Clwyd recalls the time Chalabi visited her in Cardiff on INDICT business and requested a visit to the National Museum of Wales to see the Davies Sisters’ celebrated collection of Impressionist paintings: “as we walked past the renowned Brangwyn Panels, Ahmad pointed at them and said casually: ‘I bid for those at auction’” (18). For Chalabi, European culture was simply part of the human inheritance that he absorbed without compromising his Iraqi or Shia identity. For his allies, he was the living embodiment of the possibility of a new Iraq, even a new Middle East: proof that a viable alternative to the totalitarianism of the Ba’ath regime or the medieval recidivism of Shia and Sunni fundamentalism actually existed. But for Clwyd’s comrades on the Labour left this was suspicious company, a feeling only confirmed by her subsequent meeting with Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld. Even before the Iraq war, INDICT had received negative coverage or been treated with passive indifference, a fact that dismayed Clwyd, who wrote: “we knew people in Iraq were being tortured and killed in large numbers and could not understand why others did not feel the same sense of outrage” (19). This feeling of anger and futility in the face of ongoing barbarity culminated in her stark declaration during the February 2003 parliamentary debate on UNSCR 1441: “I believe in regime change. I say that without hesitation, and I will support the government tonight because I think that they are doing a brave thing” (20). On the subject of Iraq, Clwyd had become Blair’s most committed ally.

There was a postscript for the Cynon Valley MP that capped all of the work she had done with the Iraqi opposition since the 1970s. In May 2003, a grateful Blair appointed her Special Envoy on Human Rights to Iraq and in this role she witnessed the excavation of the mass graves of Shia victims of Saddam in Al-Hillah. In later years evidence collected by INDICT was finally put to use in the Baghdad trials of Saddam and his captive inner circle, while the Free Prisoners Association, founded by widows of prisoners who had died in Saddam’s jails, would vindicate the work of CARDRI and INDICT and engage Clwyd long after the overthrow of the regime. In her 2017 memoir she summed up this work with a statement that she could have easily made in 1988: “I still keep an eye on the plight of the widows…even though there are other enormous geopolitical challenges and crises, someone must keep track of these things” (21). 

III: A leader of nations or nothing 

“Ann Clwyd was absolutely terrific and we needed to hear more of her” wrote Alistair Campbell in his diary following the February vote, which otherwise delivered a backbench rebuke to the Prime Minister (22). Iraq proved to be the definitive test of a foreign policy doctrine Blair had originally formulated against a background of amoral Conservative realpolitik that had reached a low point during the Bosnian war. The Prime Minister presented his ideas in full at the Chicago Economic Club in April 1999 with a speech titled ‘The Doctrine of the International Community’ — a text partly written by KCL Professor of War Studies Lawrence Freedman, who would later be appointed to the Iraq Inquiry by Sir John Chilcot. The speech was delivered in the shadow of Kosovo, but the implications were very different for Iraq. Blair, in his statement to parliament on 18th March, 2003, tried his best to separate them: “I have never put the justification for action as regime change. We have to act within the terms set out in Resolution 1441 — that is our legal base” (23). Nevertheless, the moral argument for regime change did come within the scope of the Chicago speech and was effectively covered for Blair by Clwyd. This is why she became important to him, particularly once the WMD argument had disintegrated.

To trace the arc of this journey in British politics it is useful to return to the Conservative Party’s policy towards Iraq in the late 1980s. This policy had its roots in the Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act of 1939, an emergency war measure that gave governments the power to control import and export licenses, and proved far too useful to be repealed. In 1984, at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe had set out guidelines that prohibited exports that would “significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict” (24), but by the end of the war he had secretly revised his own guidelines in order to establish “a more liberal policy” towards exports to Iraq’s lucrative weapons market. Parliament was not informed (as it did not need to be under the existing 1939 act) because, as Howe recognised, “it could look very cynical if, soon after expressing outrage about the treatment of the Kurds, we adopt a more flexible approach to arms sales” (25). The “treatment of the Kurds” referred to by the British Foreign Secretary was the chemical weapons attack on Halabja, which had been dismissed to Clwyd’s face by FCO Minister William Waldergrave, who told her, “‘There is no proof.’” (“I told him bluntly to get it,” she writes, 26). Clwyd recalls with disgust seeing photographs of FCO Minister David Mellor shaking hands with members of the Iraqi regime at the Baghdad trade fair months after Halabja. Waldergrave succinctly clarified the cynicism of government policy in the aftermath of the execution of Observer journalist Farzad Bazoft in Abu Ghraib prison: “the priority of Iraq in our policy should be very high: in commercial terms, comparable to South Africa…a few more Bazofts or another bout of internal repression would make this more difficult” (27).

From this point on the government relaxed restrictions on exports to Iraq that were clearly, if not openly, destined for Saddam’s weapons programmes. Trade Minister Alan Clark was accused of advising companies on how to tailor export licences to satisfy official guidelines and approving contracts on a “nod and wink” basis. When Customs took Matrix Churchill to court after intercepting a consignment of dual use machine tools destined for Iraq, the government used all the legal methods at its disposal to disguise complicity in the case. The trial finally collapsed when Clark admitted to being “economical…with the actualité” concerning his advice to Matrix Churchill and other implicated firms: “there was nothing misleading or dishonest to make a formal introductory comment that the Iraqis would be using current orders for general engineering purposes. All I didn’t say was, ‘and for making munitions…’” (28). Clwyd, one of the few opposition MPs who doggedly pursued the case in parliament, noted that Clark “summed up the arrogance of ministers when he dared to suggest that Labour MPs were a bit dim not to understand that, from 1987 onwards, they were being misled by the government and that we should have known Britain was selling arms to Iraq. We did suspect it, we did try to expose it, but he and his colleagues lied to cover it up” (29).

Blair would later be accused of many things, but arming Iraq was not among them. Blair, it is fair to say, was one of the more vigilant disarmers of Saddam — or, at least, he would have been, if Saddam had actually had any WMDs left to destroy. He was worrying about the dictator’s procurement as early as 1997, telling Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown,

I have seen some of the stuff on this. It really is pretty scary. He is very close to some appalling weapons of mass destruction. I don’t understand why the French and others don’t understand this. We cannot let him get away with it. (30)

Operation Desert Fox was launched in response to Saddam’s expulsion of UNSCOM inspectors in 1998 and set a number of precedents for Blair. In his own memoir he dismissed it as “a limited success…the general feeling was that Saddam had got away with it again” (31), but the operation was significant for different reasons. It was Blair’s first military intervention and demonstrated that he was prepared to confront Saddam directly. It also provided, in miniature, a model for the run up to the 2003 war. The reason for bombing Iraq was WMD rather than human rights but Blair did not even try to disguise his contempt for the dictator and his regime. Ignoring the advice of Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, he did not seek further UN authorisation, but acted on separate advice that Resolution 687 provided sufficient legal cover for action. To prepare public opinion for the bombing campaign Blair and Campbell produced a briefing note for MPs titled Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction, a tactic they would revive to disastrous effect in 2003. Chirac, already pursuing French commercial interests and seeking the end of sanctions, was furiously opposed, as he would be later on. And, in his speeches to parliament, Blair was uncompromising, refining the rhetoric he would later recycle and expand:

Our quarrel is not with the Iraqi people….our quarrel is with [Saddam] alone and the evil regime he represents. There is no realistic alternative to military force. We are taking military action with real regret, but also with real determination. We have exhausted all other avenues. We act because we must. (32)

The American alliance was a priority for Blair in 1998 and 2003, and it may well have played a part in the decisions of any Tory administration that had been in place at the same time. Nevertheless, Blair’s policy towards Iraq directly repudiated the cynicism of the Thatcher and Major administrations. Characters that appeared in the Scott Report into Arms to Iraq — like Howe, Douglas Hurd and Malcolm Rifkind — also played a role in the sacrifice of Bosnia to geopolitical calculation: again, the practical result was British complicity in the cover-up of genocide. Blair’s Chicago speech was an attempt to define an ethic of intervention that would bury this school of realism forever. It had been morally repugnant but also strategically damaging: Major’s Balkans policy had led to fracture with Clinton, who detested Britain’s pro-Serb stance. Blair would eventually irritate Clinton for the opposite reason: the Chicago speech was delivered at the precise moment Blair was pushing for military intervention against Milosevic and Clinton was vacillating. From this perspective it looked like a very public form of moral blackmail. In fact, Blair’s speech was shaped by the immediate political priorities of Kosovo but its scope was far broader. In some ways it suffered from being too broad — while superficially detailed, the doctrine sketched out was largely untested and full of holes, qualifications and contradictions. But for Blair personally, it was a key political moment.

Blair’s first significant foreign policy speech was in some ways as ambitious as Chicago: in Manchester in April 1997 he had called for the eastwards expansion of the EU, reform of the UN, and a larger British role in NATO, proclaiming, “we are a leader of nations or nothing” (33). Two years and two military campaigns later, he was now attempting to define a new foreign policy ethic and era, not just for Britain but for the entire world. “We have to establish a new framework,” he declared: 

No longer is our existence as states under threat. Now our actions are guided by a more subtle blend of mutual self interest and moral purpose in defending the values we cherish. In the end values and interests merge. If we can establish and spread the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights and an open society then that is in our national interests too. The spread of our values makes us safer. (34) 

Blair began with the premise that the age of power politics had been superseded by globalisation: the Chicago speech was, in part, a funeral oration for the Westphalian system of state sovereignty and non-interference. Underpinning this was the assumption that Western liberal democratic values are universal values that transcend religion, culture, tradition and ethnicity. In this sense, Blair’s speech was not only against protectionism and isolationism, but also against relativism. This is the point at which Blair’s version of humanitarian intervention overlapped with the moral interventionism of the American neoconservatives. Echoing Blair, Paul Wolfowitz reaffirmed the point in a 2005 interview, as Iraq was unravelling: 

The contradiction is to say that allowing people to choose their government freely is to impose our ideas on them. There was a wonderful moment at a conference here in Washington where someone said it’s arrogant of us to impose our values on the Arab world, and an Arab got up and said it’s arrogant of you to say these are your values because they are universal values. (35)

In many ways the Iraq War was an application of the principles outlined in the Chicago speech and they did not survive the experience intact. Conservative critics of Blair’s doctrine proved to be correct in one crucial aspect: the abstract principles of human rights and democracy could not account for or contain religious, national and ethnic rivalries. In 2003, specifically because of Iraq, the international community was so fractured that it barely existed, as Russia, Germany and France positioned themselves in hostile opposition to Britain and America. Later on, the disintegration of Iraq would expose the limits of both American neoconservatism and liberal interventionism by opening a new era of raw power politics stripped of all progressive and democratic illusions. 

IV: The theatre of power

In the introduction to his 1964 account of his travels among the Marsh Arabs of Southern Iraq, Wilfred Thesiger made a gloomy prediction: “soon the Marshes will probably be drained; when this happens, a way of life that has lasted for thousands of years will disappear” (36). Thesiger was not an Orientalist in the style of Bell and Lawrence, but an English explorer in the Victorian mold. In The Marsh Arabs he complained that during his travels in Iraqi Kurdistan he kept coming up against national borders he could not traverse. Travelling through Iraqi towns and cities he was bored and dissatisfied with the urban Arabs who, he felt, were “ashamed of their background and anxious to forget it. A suburbia covering the length and breadth of Iraq was the Utopia of which they dreamed” (37). Like Bell, Thesiger sought escape from “drab modernity” and found it in the Arabian desert and, between 1951-8, among the Arabs of the Iraqi marshes. This small, self-enclosed tribal world in which he tried to forget his own background was, indeed, ancient and fragile: a pastoral existence defined by flood water and reed beds, wildfowl and pig hunting and the milking of buffalo. For the tribes who welcomed him, Thesiger retained the residual authority of the English and was used as a doctor and surgeon despite his lack of formal medical training. “In Iraq, at that time,” he noted,

the British still had a considerable legacy of good will, the result of our close association with the county between the two world wars when Englishmen worked there as administrative officers and advisers. Many of the older inhabitants continued to feel respect and affection for individuals. Tribesmen were, on the whole, too courteous to embarrass a quest, but I was sometimes bitterly attacked by townsmen of Government officials over British policy — Palestine or Suez, for example. On such occasions, the mention of an Englishman they had known could turn bitterness to friendly reminiscence. (38)

During the First World War the shelter provided by the marshes allowed the tribes to attack and loot both British and Turkish forces with relative impunity. During the mandate they were largely left alone and their link to Iraqi nationalism and to the ruling administrations of Baghdad remained tenuous. Despised by the urban Iraqis and desert Arabs alike, the Marsh Arabs maintained their own society and used their natural environment for protection as well as insurrection. “The Marshes themselves,” wrote Thesiger, “with their baffling maze of reed beds where men could only move by boat, must have afforded a refuge to remnants of defeated people, and been a centre for lawlessness and rebellion, from earliest times” (39). 

In the end, Thesiger’s prediction did not come true until the 1990s, when Saddam drained the marshes in response to the 1991 Shia revolt that had been encouraged by the Bush administration. Saddam had a pressing strategic aim here: following defeat in the uprising, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and their paramilitary unit Badr Corps used the thick cover of the reeds to regroup and organise the next phase of their campaign against the regime. “Accordingly,” wrote SCIRI representative Hamid al-Bayati in his 2011 memoir From Dictatorship to Democracy, “Saddam began to target the Marshes with planes, tanks and artillery” (40) and commenced work on a vast project to divide the major wetlands and divert the River Euphrates with enormous dams, barriers and dykes. This was a double assault of heavy weaponry and civil engineering designed to destroy the environment of the marshes and the rebellious tribes that populated them. As the SCIRI spokesman based in London and a board member of INDICT, al-Bayati had the desperate task of publicising this carnage in Europe and found allies in Foreign Office mandarin Julian Walker, Conservative MP Emma Nicholson and Ann Clwyd. But this was not a popular cause in 1995 and the plight of the Marsh Arabs gained no traction. Saddam succeeded in destroying a unique part of Iraq’s natural landscape and cultural heritage in a combined programme of genocide and ecocide that attracted no significant international response. 

This was the environment in which Rory Stewart arrived in August 2003 as a provincial administrator for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Amara and Nasiriyah. Stewart was one of five British civilians appointed by the Foreign Office to support coalition troops and American officials in the immediate post-Saddam period. But he was no zealot for regime change, writing in his 2006 memoir Occupational Hazards:

Ten years in the Islamic world and in other places that had recently emerged from conflict had left me very suspicious of theories produced in seminars in Western capitals and of foreigners in a hurry. The best kind of international development seemed to be done by people who directly absorbed themselves in rural culture and politics, focused on traditional structures, and understood that change would often be slow. I believed that politicians often misled others and themselves when they started wars and that there were dubious reasons for our invasions of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. (41)

Once in post, Stewart quickly learned that Iraqi civil society had been destroyed by the lethal combination of Saddam and UN sanctions. The post-Ba’ath vacuum was filled by what had always existed underneath the political superstructure: tribal allegiance, foreign agents and religious movements. The liberal middle class professionals that the CPA assumed, or hoped, would emerge to lead reconstruction had either voluntarily vanished from the scene or been intimidated into silence. This was a constituency without power in the new Iraq: there was no mass liberal party, no liberal movement and, more importantly, no liberal militia. What actually emerged from the wreckage of tyranny, sanctions and war was not liberal or secular or democratic. In Maysan, Stewart had to contend with a local tribal warlord, Iranian-backed Shia militias and a branch of the Sadrist movement, a triangle of enmity that sidelined all other constituencies and kept the province on the brink of civil war. And this wasn’t unique to Maysan: similar struggles and rivalries were emerging all over Iraq.

As the messy transitional administration under Jay Garner moved into full CPA occupation under Paul Bremer, all of these local rivalries and conflicts intensified and accelerated, feeding a national insurgency. By the autumn of 2003 the CPA was no longer a resource to be exploited but an occupying power to be resisted. This was compounded by the strategic chaos of the occupation. CPA civilians and military personnel tripped over each other constantly, unable to clarify or distentagle their respective duties or areas of responsibility. The CPA in Baghdad devised ambitious nation building schemes that included “programmes on human rights, the free market, feminism, federalism, and constitutional reform” when, as Stewart put it, “people in Maysan talked about almost none of these things. They talked about security” (42). After a year of occupation, “Coalition governors were inventing different political structures in different provinces because Baghdad had not yet defined the legal powers or budgets for local officials” (43). Perhaps most importantly, in the end, “we could not define the conditions under which we were prepared to kill Iraqis or have our own soldiers killed” (44), which sounds harsh, but proved fundamental. Once the governor of Amara realised that the British would not give him the level of protection they gave themselves, Stewart writes, “almost any hope of cooperation was lost” (45).

The point, after all, was power. The financial and military power of the CPA was defeated by the complexity of Iraqi society and by the confusion of an occupying mission that could produce both gender quotas on local elected bodies and the abuse of prisoners in Abu Ghraib. Stewart would often be forced to project an authority that he did not really feel like he possessed: 

In an ad-hoc organisation in a war zone, most power is the theatre of power. It is not enough to do things, you must be seen to do things. I needed to promise change to give Iraqis some belief in us and in the future. I needed to claim authority and bluff people into falling in step. (46)

The problem was the Iraqis saw right through this and treated Stewart’s “theatre of power” precisely as that: theatre. The occupiers were seen as a source of money to be tapped and, potentially, a way to neutralise or eliminate rivals and enemies. But the real source of authority lay in local constituencies and external backers, a shadow power structure that the CPA could do nothing to influence or defeat. In the south, the SCIRI and Badr brigades and their affiliates and proxies extended Iranian influence into the province, using elections to take control of the regional security apparatus and infiltrate the police forces, as they would do across Iraq. Their main Shia rival was the Sadrist movement, whose local proxies stoked anti-Coalition insurrections and whose constituency grew exponentially during the occupation. As Stewart details, the Sadrists were a new and expanding element in Iraqi and Shia society: a populist movement that appealed to the young and the poor in rural backwaters and city slums and found apotheosis in the fiery sermons of Friday prayers. These were two components of the coming civil war that was, in 2003, merely a threat on the lips of petitioners who did not get what they wanted from CPA officials. As Stewart records, he and his colleagues in the CPA and British army were helpless to contain or control any of this. Even if it was possible, they did not have the real power to do so, because the occupation could not clarify its own purpose or limits. Their authority was an empty performance that was soon exposed.

There is one coda to this story of the marshes. In the aftermath of the war, international aid agencies poured money into projects to reflood the Marshlands. As Stewart travelled around the province he noted the effects of Saddam’s ecological destruction: the near-extinction of the buffalo, the depleted fish stocks and bird flocks, ruined huts and broken islands. In Maysan, the Beni Hashim tribe that had been dispossessed and dispersed into the desert and the Shia ghettos and slums of Basra and Baghdad by Saddam was finally able to return to the Marshes, although many didn’t. Slowly the wetlands recovered and some of the old communities resettled. But this was only partial: a mere fraction of the population and a sample of the biodiversity that had existed before Saddam’s original campaign of destruction. 

V: Strategic failure

In 2006, after completing a tour with the International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, Emma Sky spent some time with Stewart in a compound in Kabul working at his Turquoise Mountain Foundation. “I first met Rory in Iraq, after he had walked across Afghanistan following the fall of the Taliban,” Sky recalled in her 2015 memoir The Unravelling

He was so scarred by his experience of working with the Coalition Provisional Authority that he had come to believe that grandiose nation-building schemes could never succeed in societies such as Iraq and Afghanistan. He was now focused on helping to restore historic parts of Kabul and to resuscitate Afghan traditions of arts and crafts. (47)

Stewart was familiar with the culture and the divisions of the British army: his father was a decorated soldier and senior SIS officer and Stewart had joined the Black Watch during his gap year. Yet his memoir reveals tensions between the CPA civilians and the military in Maysan and Nasiriyah: relationships with the colonels and majors he dealt with often seemed strained, even hostile. In contrast, Sky — the liberal, anti-war NGO veteran and British Council project manager who worked in the Occupied Territories before 2001 — would eventually form a close bond with the two most powerful generals in the U.S. army, Petraeus and Odierno. 

Unlike Stewart, Sky had unambiguously opposed the invasion of Iraq before she volunteered to join the CPA. She was eventually sent to Kirkuk in the role of Governorate Coordinator and worked so effectively with Colonel Bill Mayville of the 173rd Airborne Brigade that General Ray Odierno would later ask her to return to Iraq to be his political adviser. Sky was fully aware of her unique, even strange, position: the self-declared “peacenik” who had volunteered to be a human shield during the Gulf War was now the closest political confidant of a general notorious for his aggressive combat methods in Fallujah. Odierno had featured heavily in Tom Ricks’ 2006 best seller Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, which, Sky commented, “was particularly harsh…accusing him of causing the insurgency through his harsh tactics of breaking down doors and mass arrests. The allegations had hurt. It was an exaggerated portrayal which had tarnished his reputation” (48). Sky, on the other hand, remained loyal to the generals she worked for and was impressed by their soldiers. She would later contrast the performance of the American army in Iraq with the British, candidly telling Foreign Minister David Miliband: 

in the mid ranks of the U.S. military the criticisms that Brits had made about the Americans in the early years had rankled. The British military had been very arrogant, believing they knew the ultimate truth about counterinsurgency from Malaya and Northern Ireland. Every situation, however, was different. And the American military had proved themselves faster learners than the Brits. (49)

As Sky knew, reports being sent from Basra to London were politically censored, creating a false sense of optimism in Whitehall. This optimism had been abruptly dispelled by the global publication of a photograph of British soldiers jumping from their Warrior jeep, consumed by flames, following a stand-off with Sadrists at Jamait police station in September 2005. Blair was shocked, but he should not have been. A month before Jamait, the American journalist Steven Vincent had been kidnapped and executed in Basra after uncovering links between the Iraqi police, Shia militias, Iranian agents and oil smugglers, a network that the British had both enabled and ignored. “The fact that the British are in effect strengthening the hand of Shiite organizations is not lost on Basra’s residents,” Vincent wrote in his July 31 New York Times op-ed, the final article he would live to see published:

Fearing to appear like colonial occupiers, they avoid any hint of ideological indoctrination: in my time with them, not once did I see an instructor explain such basics of democracy as the politically neutral role of the police in a civil society. Nor did I see anyone question the alarming number of religious posters on the walls of Basran police stations. When I asked British troops if the security sector reform strategy included measures to encourage cadets to identify with the national government rather than their neighborhood mosque, I received polite shrugs: not our job, mate. (50) 

The fear of appearing to be colonial occupiers was deep-rooted and historical, but history could also make this look like dissembling: Sir Mark Sykes had also told the Iraqis that the British were “liberators” rather than occupiers in 1917. The return to Basra was full of historical echoes that were consciously downplayed by British diplomats and the army without, however, being lost on the Iraqis. To pick just one example: from 2006-7 the British ambassador to Iraq was Dominic Asquith, whose great-grandfather had sent the first British troops to Basra in 1914. Once a month Sky and Odierno would dine in his embassy villa and Sky enjoyed his company:

He was tall and handsome, with the most wonderful manners and dry wit…I loved those evenings. They were our monthly treat. We would fly in from some trip to the battlefield, dirty and tired. But in the ambassador’s residence we relaxed on comfortable chairs, surrounded by paintings and photos and various artefacts of culture and life away from war. I always started with gin and tonic before proceeding to red wine…we were served a three-course meal, seated around a table that had once belonged to Gertrude Bell. Never had food tasted so good. We ate off china with metal cutlery, a welcome change from plastic and Styrofoam. (51)

Meanwhile, outside of Asquith’s diplomatic sanctuary with its fading traces of past imperial elegance, the British mission in the south of Iraq was falling apart. American irritation at British arrogance eventually turned to open contempt as the south spiralled into chaos. This feeling was shared by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who tried to confront the southern  Sadrists himself in his abortive Charge of the Knights raid, an operation that simply exposed how unprepared the British were for offensive combat and how dependent the Iraqis were on U.S. military support. The illogicality and profound failure of British strategy was summarised by a soldier in Basra Palace, in a lament that could have been scripted by Joseph Heller: “It’s going round in circles. People are getting killed for us to resupply ourselves, and if we weren’t resupplying ourselves, people wouldn’t be getting killed” (52). The British mission was finally terminated in 2009 with the evacuation of Basra Airport under a heavy barrage of Sadrist rockets. Blair redeployed a demoralised and under-equipped army to fight an equally disastrous campaign in Afghanistan, but to the Americans it looked like the British were running away from Iraq. The Americans were correct. Both the British military and politicians, including Blair, felt defeated and exhausted by Basra, and carried this palpable sense of humiliation and fatigue into Helmand, where the British mission had to be rescued once again by the Americans. As Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E Trainer wrote in their chronicle of post-war Iraq:

The British military had begun the war as the reputed masters of counterinsurgency…by the end of the Basra fight that reputation was in tatters. The British had ceded control of one of Iraq’s major cities and lost the trust of the Iraqi prime minister. (53)

For Sky the disintegration of Basra province was on the periphery of her work with Odierno in Anbar and Baghdad. In fact, Sky’s memoir reveals her distance and alienation from British institutions inside and outside Iraq: she remarks that her colleagues at the British Council took no interest in her work in Iraq; that both Blair and Miliband had no idea who she was or why she was working for the U.S. army; and her comments on the comparative cultures of the U.S. and British military are much more complimentary to her American employers. Her final judgement of the British in Basra is succinct: “it had not been the most glorious chapter in British history” (54). Nevertheless, she was no American lackey and maintained her position that the Iraq War was a strategic failure of historical distinction. By the time she returned to Kurdistan in 2012 the outcome was clear: the Iraq War had been won by Iran. The key moment turned out to be the 2010 election, which Ayad Allawi’s party won with a slim majority but was effectively handed to Maliki by Obama and Biden who, like the British before them, simply wanted to get America out of Iraq as quickly as possible. This proved to be the final victory for Iranian Quds Force Commander General Suleimani who could now fully penetrate Iraqi political space without any resistance. By the time that Sistani issued a fatwa calling on all Shia to join the Iraqi security forces to fight ISIS, Suleimani was in effective command of those forces and able to personally direct the offensive from inside Iraq. 

The truth is that neither the British nor the Obama administration were prepared to challenge the Iranians in Iraq, despite the clear Iranian effort to kill coalition soldiers and ensure that the Iraqi state remained within the Shia rather than the Arab orbit. As early as May 2004, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw intervened to stop a CIA initiative to attack Iranian agents and training camps in Iraq because the FCO did not want to jeopardise negotiations over Iran’s nuclear weapons programme, a pattern repeated on a grander scale by the Obama administration. The extent of the Iranian triumph was so great that Sky faced accusations of a secret deal between Iran and America and in Kirkuk a local Sunni Sheikh told her, “They handed Iraq to Iran on a silver platter” (55). But there was no deal. In Kirkuk in 2003-4 Sky had caught a fleeting glimpse of “a city of four ethnicities who speak each other’s languages and love each other’s cultures” (56) — a rich patchwork of Kurds, Arabs, Assyrians and Turkmen who might, one day, coexist in a secure country called Iraq. But at the same time, to Sky’s frustration, the Kurds relentlessly pursued Kirkuk as their own, seeking to reverse the Arabisation of the city that had been engineered by Saddam and secure its oil as the foundation of a future independent Kurdistan. Pluralism collapsed into ethnic and sectarian rivalry as group identities were politicised and fatally embedded in an electoral system that the Americans designed. This gave Iran — one of the great sectarian actors in the region — the perfect opportunity to divide and rule Iraq, and they took it.

VI: British ghosts

We were surrounded by half-forgotten history.
Rory Stewart, Occupational Hazards

Gertrude Bell spent her last days in Baghdad — the last days of her life — collecting and cataloging historical artifacts for her Archaeological Museum. Following the coronation of King Faisal and the dissolution of the British administration, Bell found herself isolated and increasingly adrift in the new Iraqi capital. She had helped to shape and found the modern Iraqi state, but the course of its development had not quite gone the way she wanted and she no longer had any influence over events. Her friends were leaving the city and, back in England, the family business had been fatally damaged by the coal strike. On June 16, 1926, King Faisal opened the first room of the museum and Bell wrote in her diary: 

Except for the museum, I am not enjoying life at all. One has the sharp sense of being near the end of things with no certainty as to what, if anything, one will do next. It is also very dull, but for the work. I don’t know what to with myself of an afternoon…It is a very lonely business living here right now. (57)

Bell’s focus on the museum consumed her and she spent all of her time and energy fixing up the building that was given to her and arranging all of her antiquities. When her father implored her to return home, she refused:

I do understand that things are looking very discouraging and I am dreadfully sorry and unhappy about you. But I don’t see for the moment what I can do. You see I have undertaken this very grave responsibility of the museum…(58)

In reality, the responsibility was self-imposed: the museum was the result of her own archaeological discoveries and her commitment to preserve the rich history of Mesopotamia for the new citizens of Iraq, a gift to the country that she truly loved. It was also a way to stave off her own sense of despair, grief and depression, until the point it no longer could. Bell died on July 11, 1926, after taking an overdose of sedatives. Her death was noted across the British empire and also among the tribes of Iraq, who flocked to Baghdad and lined the streets as her cortege travelled to the Anglican cemetery, her coffin decorated with the Union Jack and the new flag of Iraq that she had helped to design. 

Nearly eighty years later the descendant of Bell’s museum was looted by organised gangs who stole artifacts from the heart of her collection. The U.S. army failed to secure the building and it was left to returning museum staff to fend off the looters for four days. This was a significant and symbolic event: a presage of the anarchy and corruption to come. Rumsfeld’s infamous response to the looting exposed the vacuum at the heart of post-war planning in a manner that chilled both opponents and supporters of the war alike: “Freedom’s untidy,” he said, “stuff happens.” With this event, Bell’s archaeological legacy evaporated; her geographic legacy also seemed to be finished in 2015 when ISIS erased the borders she had drawn in the 1920s. In the early years of the monarchy, Bell had been friendly with Iraq’s Education Minister Abdul Hussein Chalabi and she often visited and enjoyed the gardens of Chalabi’s residence, The Deer Palace. In 2006, Abdul Hussein’s great granddaughter (and Ahmad’s daughter) Tamara tracked down Bell’s rarely visited, half-forgotten grave in “a barren spot” of the Anglican cemetery; having developed a fascination with the old family friend and looking at the withered flowers and dusty ground of the memorial, she decided to restore and maintain it. For Tamara, Bell’s grave stood for something more than one life: it represented the lost world of her family and an entire generation of exiles, “buried underground and in memories, almost as if it never existed” (59). But for anybody British who knew or cared about it, Bell’s grave was simply a relic from an expired empire.

The ghosts of British lives haunted the land: the traces of their lives and deaths strewn across Iraq, in graves, plaques, buildings and some living memories. In Maysan in 2003, Stewart met a man who remembered a day of duck shooting with Thesiger in 1953; he also noted the lingering memory of Colonel Leachmen, the Amara-based British political officer whose murder in Fallujah remained the great symbol of the 1920 uprising. Amara cemetery, which Stewart visited, was filled with the bones of British and Indian soldiers who had been killed during the siege of Kut in 1915-6. During the 2006 civil war, when other reporters were too afraid to leave the Green Zone, Dexter Filkins visited the British war cemetery in Baghdad; he found it derelict, with tombstones “toppled and crumbling” and grass growing up to his chest. “When an American died in this war,” he wrote,

he was flown home in a black bag, zippered at the top; the British, killed long ago, were buried across the realm from here to Trincomalee. There hadn’t been any refrigeration then, and the ships had been too slow. The British were buried where they fell. (60)

Symbols of lost power and responsibility surrounded British personnel in Iraq in 2003, but the imperial legacy was almost completely disavowed. Power and responsibility now belonged to America, a nation still changing the course of world history; the British played only minor roles as participants and spectators in an American and Iraqi narrative. Stewart and Sky would often hear praise for their imperial predecessors but only ever offered as a way to criticise their American successors and therefore serve to highlight the historic transfer of power. In the era of the CPA, the original British occupiers were lauded for their diplomacy and their knowledge of the tribes (which itself owed much to Bell’s 1920 masterpiece Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia), while the existing British occupiers tended to be treated as conduits for American money and influence. In contrast to the approach of earlier British imperialists, Bremer and his advisers had no desire to perpetuate the ancient tribal divisions of Mesopotamia and wanted to construct a modern, secular democratic nation out of the wreckage of dictatorship. The tragedy was that their method of achieving this — minority representation — had the effect of hard-wiring sectarianism into the new political institutions that they created. As Sky wrote later: “the focus on subnational identities was at the expense of building an inclusive Iraqi identity. No one at the time seemed to have any foreboding of the disaster this would bring upon the country” (61).

For many reasons, the relationship between the Iraqis and the British had been complicated. As Elie Kedourie noted — in a book written in the shadow of brutal Ba’ath reprisals after the first Gulf War — it was the British who were ultimately responsible for the descent of Iraq into factional bloodshed and military dictatorship, precisely because of the sectarian political settlement they had designed and upheld:

The newly-invented polity was…fragmented from the very beginning. The original fault lines have become, if anything, more pronounced with every change of regime. The Kurdish and Shi’a uprisings in the aftermath of the Iraqi defeat at the hands of the U.S. in 1991 eloquently show the abiding disaffection of the majority of the population towards rule from Baghdad. (62) 

Kedouri argued that an Iraqi state headed by a foreign King and governed by urban Sunni officers and officials “could not, parliament or no parliament, be governed constitutionally or within the rule of law” (63). The state established by Churchill, Cox and Bell therefore contained the seeds of its own destruction and the descent of Iraqi nationalism into genocide and totalitarianism also had its roots in British policy. Because Iraq was never fully annexed by the empire, British power was wielded in back rooms and through proxies, which simply created a different kind of resentment that festered and then exploded. Inspired by fascism and Nazism, Iraqi nationalism was, from birth, authoritarian, militaristic, antisemitic and anti-British. In her memoir, Tamara Chalabi describes the darkness and brutality that consumed Baghdad during the Second World War, inspired by Hitler who briefly courted the Iraqi nationalists. This set the scene for the execution of the royal family in 1958, the destruction of constitutional government and the slow suffocation of the Jewish community of Baghdad. In each case, British power and anybody associated with it was the target of violence and revolution. 

The interesting thing about the British engagement with Iraq during the Ba’ath era was how ahistorical it was. Modern Iraq was a British creation but all sense of ownership or responsibility had long vanished. Ann Clwyd’s campaigns on behalf of the Kurds and the Iraqi exiles were conducted in the context of international human rights, but without any real sense of the link between British imperial history and the tragic progress of Iraqi nationalism. Conservative trade policy with Iraq in the late 1980s was not even an attempt to revive old historical ties, it was simply a very modern, very grubby tale of cynicism and avarice. The Gulf War, Desert Fox and the Iraq War all occurred within a context defined by America and any British policy in Iraq was therefore almost identical to that of the U.S. Blair understood this to be the existential basis of British foreign policy and acted accordingly. The British occupation of Basra turned into a transactional commitment that, ultimately, proved too costly. The echoes of Britain’s past were nothing more than a liability during this mission: a source of tension, a provocation, a reproach. But they also taunted the British, cruelly exposing decline and fall relative to new global powers and forces, so they were best ignored. The British story in Iraq ended, finally, with Blair’s own epitaph, delivered in the form of the Chilcot Report.

As David Fromkin wrote in his account of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, “the shadows that accompanied the British rulers wherever they went in the Middle East were in fact their own” (64). This remained as true in 2003 as it had been in 1916.

  1. Quoted in Janet Wallach, Desert Queen: The Extraordinary Life of Gertrude Bell: Adventurer, Adviser to Kings, Ally of Lawrence of Arabia (Phoenix Giant, 1999), p.296
  2. Quoted in Wallach, p.295
  3. Gertrude Bell, A Woman in Arabia: The Writings of the Queen of the Desert, ed. Georgina Howell (Penguin, 2015), p.165
  4. Quoted in Wallach, p.154
  5. Quoted in David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: the Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (Holt, 1989), p.453
  6. Quoted in Fromkin, p.503
  7. Tamara Chalabi,  Late for Tea at the Deer Palace: The Lost Dreams of My Iraqi Family (HarperPress, 2011), p.274
  8. Ann Clwyd, ‘See men shredded, then say you don’t back war’, The Times, March 18, 2003
  9. Ann Clwyd, Rebel With a Cause (Biteback, 2017), p.274
  10. Ibid., p.264
  11. Ibid., p.255
  12. Ibid., p.274
  13. Ibid., p.241
  14. Quoted in Richard Bonin, Arrows of the Night: Ahmad Chalabi and the Selling of the Iraq War (Anchor Books, 2011), p.114
  15. Andrew Roberts, Churchill: Walking With Destiny (Allen Lane, 2018), p.283
  16. Clwyd, p.248
  17. Quoted in Bonin, p.81. 
  18. Clwyd, p.255
  19. Ibid., p.261
  20. See Hansard: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030226/debtext/30226-22.htm
  21. Clwyd, p.279
  22. Alistair Campbell, The Alastair Campbell Diaries, Volume 4: The Burden of Power — Countdown to Iraq (Arrow, 2013), p.469
  23. Quoted in Tony Blair, A Journey (Arrow, 2011), p.439
  24. Quoted in Richard Norton-Taylor, Mark Lloyd and Stephen Cook, Knee Deep in Dishonour: the Scott Report and its Aftermath (Gollancz, 1996), p.48
  25. Quoted in Norton-Taylor et al., p.19
  26. Clwyd, p.227
  27. Quoted in Norton-Taylor et al., p.13
  28. Ibid., pps.140-1
  29. Clwyd, pps. 175-6
  30. Quoted in Anthony Seldon, Blair (The Free Press, 2005), p.387
  31. Blair, p.222
  32. See BBC News, Texts and Transcripts, December 17, 1998: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/crisis_in_the_gulf/texts_and_transcripts/236932.stm
  33. Steve Boggan, ‘Election 97: Patriotic Blair sets out global vision’, Independent, April 21, 1997: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/election-97-patriotic-blair-sets-out-global-vision-1268592.html
  34. Tony Blair, ‘The Doctrine of the International Community’ in The Neocon Reader, ed. Irwin Stelzer (Grove Atlantic, 2004), p.112
  35. Radek Sikorski, ‘Interview with Paul Wolfowitz’, Prospect, December 2004
  36. Wilfred Thesiger, The Marsh Arabs (Penguin, 1964), p.14
  37. Ibid., p.59
  38. Ibid., p.61
  39. Ibid., p.99
  40. Hamid al-Bayati, From Dictatorship to Democracy: An Insider’s Account of the Iraqi Opposition to Saddam (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), p.30
  41. Rory Stewart, Occupational Hazards (Picador, 2007), p.8
  42. Ibid., p.82
  43. Ibid., p.276
  44. Ibid., p.296
  45. Ibid., p.297
  46. Ibid., p.35
  47. Emma Sky, The Unravelling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq (Atlantic, 2015), p.136
  48. Ibid., p.148
  49. Ibid., p.281
  50. Steve Vincent, ‘Switched Off in Basra’, New York Times, July 31 2005: https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/opinion/switched-off-in-basra.html
  51. Sky, p.167
  52. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Endgame: the Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, From George W. Bush to Barack Obama (Vintage, 2013), p.466
  53. Gordon and Trainor, p.481
  54. Sky, p.281
  55. Ibid., p.352
  56. Ibid., p.70
  57. Bell, p.248
  58. Ibid., p.249
  59. Chalabi, p.185
  60. Dexter Filkins, The Forever War (Vintage, 2009), pps. 332-3
  61. Sky, p.50
  62. Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), p.31
  63. Kedourie, p.32
  64. Fromkin, p.468

 

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